

THE Public Opinion QUARTERLY

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*Light on the problems
of military government . . .*

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In this history of Allied intervention and Russian counter-revolution in North Russia in 1918-1920, a recognized authority on Russian affairs gives the first complete and documented account of a difficult period in Russian-American relations.

Publication of Mr. Strakhovsky's objective, factual book is especially useful now because of the great flood of light which it throws on the problems of military government. Similar problems will surely be among the most perplexing confronting the United Nations in the near future, and the lessons learned in North Russia two decades ago should be of genuine value in their solution. \$3.00

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Introduction

THE occupation of enemy territory—the subject to which this issue of THE QUARTERLY is devoted—presents problems today which are as different from those of past occupations as modern warfare is different from the trench warfare of World War I. No longer is it compounded simply of straightforward military control “in the interest of securing the rear of advancing armies.” That is only the first step. It varies from what General Eisenhower has called “a spearhead taking charge of communities disorganized by the Nazi retreat” to the elaborate military-civilian structure required to rehabilitate a country as complex as modern Germany.

Central in the structure of military government is the civil-affairs officer of the armed forces. To him falls the yeoman's labor of integrating and giving administrative life to the decisions reached by the victorious powers. His task has already started. AMG, established as a model for the Italian occupation, has been one expression of his work; the Allied Control Commission now operating on the Italian mainland is still another. Within his jurisdictional territory will be operating such civilian agencies as UNRRA and the Foreign Economic Administration. For these he will have to clear a path. Both as a guarantor of security and as an expeditor of reconstruction, the civil-affairs officer has a responsibility far out of proportion to the amount of attention that has been accorded his role by the public.

The enemy will be defeated, but it may be years after that before a final peace treaty will be made. In the interim it will be the responsibility of military governments of enemy territory to amplify the mandates agreed upon by the United Nations. To implement those mandates with administrative decrees will require consummate wisdom and statesmanship. For the actions of military governments will be the earnest of the intentions of the United Nations toward the defeated enemy and the ideology for which he stood. This is not to say that the administrator will be a knight in shining armor bringing the millennium to Europe's oppressed millions. It does mean that his task must be viewed with broad social and political perspective.

In the articles which follow, both the short-run problems of security

and the long-run task of reconstruction and rehabilitation—the two paramount concerns of occupation—are treated. With one exception, all the articles are concerned with Europe, with Germany the heart of the discussion. Because events move so rapidly, it is inevitable that some of the material presented will “date” quickly. To guard against that, the articles in this issue have attempted to deal almost exclusively with those enduring problems of the coming occupation which grow from the roots of modern social movements and to avoid the momentary, “situational” problems which, at best, are temporary.

Because modern military occupation has no parallel in the past, the literature on the subject is limited. This issue of *THE QUARTERLY*, it is hoped, will help fill the gap. In undertaking this project, *THE QUARTERLY* has drawn heavily upon the advice of both its contributing authors and other experts—in and out of military service—all of whom have given generously of their time and experience. To the Civil Affairs Division of the Army's Chief of Staff, though in no way responsible for the views expressed in the pages which follow, *THE QUARTERLY* is especially grateful for much good counsel.

—THE EDITOR

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MILITARY GOVERNMENT AS A STEP TOWARD SELF-RULE

By CARL J. FRIEDRICH

In formal terms, the military administration of civil affairs in an occupied area is not concerned with the transition from military to civilian control. Yet, as Dr. Friedrich points out, the decisions which a military administration is called upon to make will indeed affect the nature of the transition.

Since military government has as its primary object military victory, not social reform, the problems of transition must be secondary. But in so far as the Rules of Land Warfare provide for the reestablishment of government by law and not by men, a first step toward self-rule

will be taken. Beyond that, common sense and the situation will be the guides. In this article, the author discusses, legally and commonsensically, the nature of the task.

Dr. Friedrich, Professor of Government at Harvard, is Director of the newly founded School for Overseas Administration at that institution and is now actively engaged in the crucial work of training the men on whom the success or failure of our occupation policy will depend. His most recent book, *The New Belief in the Common Man*, has been received warmly by the critics.

SUCH A PIECE as the present may approach its problem in the normative or the indicative mood. It may either attempt to answer the question: *Should* military government be a step toward self-rule; or it may reply to the inquiry: Is military government *likely* to be a step toward self-rule?

To the first question the democratic answer is to be found through the policy-making organs of the government, shaped as their views presumably are by the opinion the American people may have on the subject. But in the absence of any clear determination of policy by Congress or the President, the War Department rules and regulations would be a positive guide, until altered by positive orders from higher up. This does not mean that the individual citizen has no right to form or advocate his own opinion; but in view of the small likelihood of any immediate success attending such an enterprise, it may be well to determine what are in fact the military authorities' announced norms. It will be shown presently that the military do not include the establishment of self-rule among the objects of military government. They see the objective of this system of emergency government as essentially two-fold (a) military needs, (b) restoring law and order.¹ While the latter does

¹ See Paragraph 9 of the recently revised Field Manual 27-5, entitled *Joint Army-Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, 4 November 1943. This Manual supersedes the Field Manual 27-5 issued in July 1940. There are many important changes. In the present instance, the

not include the super-imposition of any form of government, including self-rule, upon the occupied territory, it may in fact have that result.

One may surmise that the majority of Americans would be glad if military government by American or United Nations forces should prove a step toward self-rule of the occupied countries. But it is doubtful that they would be inclined to quarrel with the norms as provided by the military authorities. In view of that probability, it may be wisest to abandon any effort at advocating the desirability of making military government a step toward self-rule. Instead, we might explore what likelihood there is that military government would in fact prove to be a step toward self-rule, and under what conditions. Putting it more dramatically and generally, that question may be phrased thus: Is military government as practised by the United States (and we hope by the United Nations) likely to provide a transition from Fascism to democracy? Are there any indications in present practices and rules that point toward such a result?

THE PARADOXES OF MILITARY NECESSITY

The primary task of military government, then, is to assist in "winning the war." What is meant is simply this: military government should be conducted in such a way as "to assist military operations." This assistance the manual tells us is rendered "by maintaining order, promoting security of the occupying forces, preventing interference with military operations, reducing active or passive sabotage, relieving combat troops

old manual stressed "welfare of the governed" as the second objective of military government. It contained some fine passages of liberal philosophy derived from Francis Lieber, in its section 9b, ending with the words "Just, considerate and mild treatment of the governed by the occupying army will convert enemies into friends." There is only a faint echo of these sentiments in the new stipulation that "international law requires and military necessity dictates just and reasonable treatment of the inhabitants of occupied territory to minimize their belligerency and obtain cooperation. . . . While the welfare of the inhabitants should be considered also for humane reasons and should be safeguarded as far as military requirements permit, the primary purposes of just treatment are to facilitate military operations and to meet obligations imposed by law. Proper treatment will be of direct benefit to the occupying forces in preventing chaos, promoting order, and in the procurement of labor, services and supplies. It will have a favorable influence upon the present and future attitude of the population toward the United States and its allies." See *ibid.*, Paragraph 9g (1). All references to FM 27-5 are to the new version, unless the contrary is specially noted.

For the evolution of the concept of military government and its relation to international law, see Charles L. Magoon, *Reports on the Law of Civil Government under Military Occupation* (1902); John Bassett Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VII, §§, 1143-1155; L. Oppenheim, *International Law: a Treatise*, 5th ed., by H. Lauterpacht (1935-7); Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, *The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation* (1942), and the authorities cited there.

of civil administration, and mobilizing local resources in aid of military objectives and carrying out governmental policies. . . ." (FM 27-5, Par. 4.)

The civilian population should cooperate as far as possible, both in the forward zone where combat goes on and in the backward zone, known to the military as the "zone of communications."² This primary task should be kept clearly in mind in considering such a subject as the role of military government as a step toward self-rule. A good deal of ill-considered criticism has been leveled at the army by people who think of military government in the light of American military government in the Rhineland.³ The situation then was radically different from what it is at present; actual hostilities were virtually at an end, an armistice had been concluded, and the resumption of hostilities was rather unlikely. As some observers have rightly put it: ". . . in the present war the Rhineland type of occupation may fall into the category of the exceptional."⁴

But while it is true that military necessity must come first, it nevertheless is likely that the conduct of military government will be bound to have a marked effect upon the reestablishment of orderly government in those lands overrun by the Fascist totalitarian regimes, including Italy, Germany, and Japan themselves. Why? Simply because it calls for the establishment of "law and order." Furthermore, the regulations include among the policies that (1) discriminatory laws, i.e., laws which discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed or political opinions should be annulled as the situation permits, and that (2) to the extent that military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press should be maintained or instituted. (FM 27-5, Par. 9, n and o.) On the other hand, the rules also call for the retention of existing laws, customs, and political subdivisions: "local laws, customs, and institutions of government [should] be maintained except where they conflict with the aims of military government or are inimical to its best interests." (FM 27-5,

² For a definition see *U.S. War Department, Field Service Regulations, Administration*, FM 100-10, pp. 47 ff. This field manual, when taken together with FM 27-10 and FM 27-5, constitutes the basis of military practices. Only a small part of 27-10 deals with military government, but that part is mandatory, embodying as it does the rules of war as recognized by the United States, including the conventions of 1907 and 1929.

³ The discussion of military government problems by Hiram Motherwell, entitled "Military Occupation, and Then What?" in *Harper's Magazine*, October, 1943, is vitiated by lack of clarity on these basic points.

⁴ See Ralph H. Gabriel, "American Experience with Military Government," *The American Political Science Review*, 37, 417 ff.

Par. 9, h.) The retention of Fascist and Nazi laws is not likely to promote the progress of the inhabitants of the occupied territory toward self-rule. It may be surmised, however, that in practice, such laws and customs will be revised to bring them into accord with pre-Fascist conceptions of lawful government.

It is clear that we are here face to face with a problem of considerable complexity. If military necessity provided a clear yardstick, the matter would be simple. But unfortunately there are many issues coming up under military government which permit of no clear-cut decision under the rules. Such is the replacement of Fascist by anti-Fascist officials. It may be related to military necessity—you would not want to disrupt all order. But the question remains: Which of the two alternatives will disrupt the local situation more, the retention of Fascist officials and of officials accused of Fascism, or their replacement by others?⁵ And if the former, what others should be relied upon?

MILITARY GOVERNMENT EQUALS CIVIL AFFAIRS

What makes matters worse is that considerable uncertainty shrouds the answer to the question: What is military government, anyhow? Traditionally, the War Department divides military jurisdiction into three parts: military law, martial law, and military government. Without going into the complex legal terminology, it is possible to say that military law is the rule of the military over their own personnel, while martial law is the rule of the military over American citizens and residents in American territory in emergencies.⁶ Military government then would be the rule of the military over enemy territory. It was so defined in the Field Manual.⁷

This definition is contrary to the facts as they are unfolding in this war. There has been military government in the part of North Africa taken from Vichy France, and very complex relationships have developed there and elsewhere, as they will continue to do. The appearance

⁵ The terms *Fascism* and *Fascist* are used here in the broad sense to denote the group of doctrines and movements which originated with Italian Fascism, but which in the course of time came to have representatives in all Western nations; and more specifically it includes German National Socialism as its most extreme form.

⁶ Practice during civil war excludes territory recovered from rebels who have been recognized as belligerents. For martial law, see Charles Fairman, *The Law of Martial Rule* (1930).

⁷ See FM 27-5 (1940) Paragraph 3: "Military government is that form of government which is established and maintained by a belligerent by force of arms over occupied territory of the enemy and over inhabitants thereof."

as a co-belligerent of the Badoglio government, claiming to represent Italy, suggests another type of complication. In the light of these developments, the new Manual defines military government appropriately as "the supreme authority exercised by an armed force over the lands, property, and the inhabitants of enemy territory, or allied, or domestic territory recovered from enemy occupation, or from rebels treated as belligerents." (FM 27-5, Par. 1-a.) According to prevailing international law, sovereignty is not transferred by reason of occupation, but its exercise is for the time being vested in the military government. In short, it is emergency government.

The United States Army authorities have designated the activities and work of military government as "civil affairs."⁸ What matters constitute civil affairs in the light of present trends? They range all the way from the liaison work with the civilian authorities in the country of a friendly ally (Australia) to outright government of occupied enemy territory (Sicily). The title of this paper might therefore appropriately be restated as "The role of civil affairs activities in strengthening self-rule."

OUR PREDICAMENT ILLUSTRATED

Military authorities are inclined to be rather impatient with the question: What contribution is civil-affairs work likely to make to the establishment of self-rule, of democracy? They tend to feel that it represents the approach of the long-haired reformer, the professional theorist, the impractical idealist who wants the United States Army to be the Sir Galahad of freedom to slay the dragon of social reaction. Some of these apprehensions are fairly well-founded. Undoubtedly there are a flock of quacks who would like to use the channel of military government to preach their particular gospel of social and political salvation. On the other hand, it is equally certain that the conduct of civil affairs by the United Nations is bound to have a profound effect upon the future development of political life in the occupied territory; and the longer it lasts, the more certainly that is so.

Our situation, therefore, is a delicate one. Unquestionably we have a bear by the tail. And while the present Field Manual is a marked improvement over the 1940 edition, it still leaves a great deal that is

⁸ The Section of the General Staff dealing with these matters is called the "Civil Affairs Division," the schools set up in the universities are called "Civil Affairs Training Schools," the personnel are called "Civil Affairs Officers." See FM 27-5, Paragraph 1-c.

equivocal. No aspect of civil affairs illustrates this point more strikingly than the problems connected with the use of existing government personnel of the occupied territory. Some of the sharpest criticisms of AMG raised so far have been directed against the utilization of personnel claimed to be Fascist in sympathy and antecedents.

The new regulations provide for the removal of unnecessary and detrimental offices, for the suspension of legislative bodies, and for the removal of high ranking political officials. (FM 27-5, Par. 9-i, 1-3.) On the other hand, it is suggested that "so far as practicable, subordinate officials and employees of the local government should be retained in their offices and made responsible for the proper discharge of their duties," subject to the military government, of course. Civil affairs officers are urged not to assume operating functions, not to appoint members of "political factions," not to allow local groups, "however sound in sentiment," to determine policy. Warned against fraternizing with the local inhabitants, they are also forbidden to accept gifts. (FM 27-5, Par. 9-i, 4-10.)

There are territories in which such prescriptions would be sufficiently explicit. But it is doubtful whether they provide an adequate guide in Fascist countries. In all probability a large percentage of the government officials, even on the lower levels, employed by the Nazis both inside and outside Germany, are definitely unreliable. Hence it may not be practicable to use them to any extent.⁹ This caution applies even to the many turncoats who allowed themselves to be "coordinated," that is to say, to become willing tools of Fascist or Nazi policy. Why should they be expected to do for the American occupying forces what, at the time of Hitler's taking over control, they did not do for their own government?¹⁰ This being so, the civil affairs sections will at once be

⁹ The old Field Manual was definitely misleading in this respect. It provided, in Paragraph 10-6, that "so far as reliance may be placed upon them to do their work loyally and efficiently, subject to the direction and supervision of military government, the executive and judicial officers and employees of the occupied country, its states, provinces, counties and municipalities should be retained in their respective offices and employments and held responsible for the proper discharge of their duties." We should note, however, one important exception to this general statement. Judges, while likewise coordinated, may be retained in much larger numbers. For they are bound, in the continental tradition, by statutes. The range of their discretion is very limited. At the same time, their ritualistic significance is considerable, and their technical preparation of vital importance. See below for further detail.

¹⁰ In the discussion which follows attention will be focused on the problems presented by Nazi dominated lands, especially Germany. The issues in the Japanese territories present distinct problems, as many have never been subject to the rule of law or anything like it.

confronted with the task of selecting many alternative office holders among the natives; for to staff the many essential activities themselves is a manifest impossibility. The Field Manual definitely provides for these contingencies when it states that "it may become necessary for military government to train native personnel to take over certain positions," and furthermore that "when an official is removed, a replacement should be sought from among the inhabitants who by training and experience is qualified to take over the duties of the office." (FM 27-5, Par. 9-i, 6.) Where the Fascists and Nazis have ruled for any length of time, unfortunately, very few persons will be available. Hence, "in some circumstances it may be determined that the duties of the position can better be performed by a representative of the military government."

SLEEPING DOGS THAT WILL NOT LIE

In short, the task of selecting alternative office holders among the natives presents very grave complications and difficulties. For beneath the terror of oppression by the secret police there slumber the old party divisions and divergencies. Even in this country among the representatives of the various nations of Europe the issues which divided them into numerous parties before the coming of the Nazi terror are keenly felt. Such issues are more than likely to come to life as soon as the pressure of that terror is removed. Even the united fronts which were formed during the period of underground activity are likely to dissolve once the Fascist enemy is down.

How else can we interpret such a spectacle as the never-ending conflict between the "partisans" of General Tito and the peasant following of General Mikhailovitch in Yugoslavia? What is in store for us is equally discernible in the bitter feud between the left and the right in the Polish underground. Violent party conflicts have definitely come to life in the parts of Italy now occupied by the United Nations. While sanguine observers were looking forward to a field day of brotherly love—with the Italian people, having long yearned for freedom, hugging their liberators—bitter antagonisms at once appeared among royalists, republicans, conservatives and revolutionaries.

Yet there is really not very much to be startled about or to exclaim against in moral indignation. The parties which divide European peoples are not accidental or the work of stealthy politicians (though no one can deny that the latter make the best of the troubled waters);

rather, they are the natural concomitant of the complex structure of interests in its relation to an equally complex array of challenges.¹¹ Landowners, peasants, industrialists, bankers, merchants, professional and craft groups, workers, officials, and *rentiers*, each range themselves in response to war, trade cycles, nationalism, communism (Soviet or Trotsky style), and the rest.

It cannot be the task of American occupying forces to take sides as between these various groups and forces. It is not their business to determine which one is to control the situation. Our democratic tradition, indeed, forbids it. We are not, in cold fact, in the comfortable position of being able to take such sides; our own people are divided along somewhat similar lines, and each subdivision would be inclined to favor the support of its particular group. Since in the nature of things the actions of military government cannot be submitted to public scrutiny and debate during wartime, a wise army command will therefore seek to avoid getting embroiled in that sort of political controversy.

Let us take, as a striking illustration, the position of the Catholic Church in Italy. Italians are bitterly divided on the subject, as they have been for centuries. Some would separate Church and State completely. Others would look toward the Church as the more reliable stabilizer. Whatever the American occupying forces did along lines of influencing permanent policy in this field would certainly cause sharp conflict in our own country. The issue is, in fact, so explosive that even short-run actions will be watched by many with nervous excitement. It is, of course, desirable that the political authorities should reach decisions concerning as many of these problems as possible, provided they do not determine the issues without reference to the task with which military government is faced. And since this task is difficult to assess from a distance, a wise government will be slow to reach definite decisions until the situation becomes stabilized.

It is in keeping with the delicacy of the task with which our military forces are confronted that the United States Army should have undertaken a large-scale program of preparing officers and men for these duties. This preparation is rigidly non-political, avoids all indoctrination, and focuses attention exclusively upon giving the military personnel the

¹¹ See Chapter 17 in Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (1942), where the natural history of parties in Europe is depicted on a broad canvas; or the corresponding chapters 3 and 5 in Herman Finer's *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (revised by William B. Guthrie, 1934).

necessary knowledge of language and a sympathetic understanding of the area to be occupied. The statements to the contrary which have appeared in the press and magazines, suggesting that these men are being prepared with a view to the execution of specific policies, are contrary to the facts.¹² The purpose of this training is clearly to enable such personnel, through a better understanding of foreign institutions and culture, to carry out more effectively any policy that may be decided upon.

THE RHINELAND: A FALSE ANALOGY

Military government in the Rhineland occupation, in spite of its post-combat character, had to struggle with some of these issues. A revolution had swept away the old order in Germany, and a democracy was in the making. Although the American government was favorably inclined toward the aspirations of the revolutionaries, the army authorities were reluctant to go very far in promoting the new order. While they permitted the elections to the constituent assemblies to be held, they hesitated to permit much else. The Hunt Report shows throughout that the American occupying authorities felt they could rely on the well-established processes of German local government, and the Hunt Report so states.¹³

When the allies entered Germany in December 1918, they found that the duly constituted local authorities had, in many places, been Soldiers' and Workingmen's Councils, which had sprung up during the revolution. It was then and there decided by the military authorities that the "local authorities" referred to in the Armistice were the officials chosen under the then existing German law. The Soldiers' and Workingmen's Councils were therefore not recognized.

The Armistice had provided (in paragraph 5) as follows: "The countries to the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local

¹² Cf. the directives issued by the War Department to the collaborating universities and colleges. The article by Kingsbury Smith in the *American Mercury*, April, 1943, is quite misleading in its discussion of the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, and the comments which it has elicited from writers such as O. G. Villard, *Shall We Rule Germany?* (1943), p. 14, are equally unfounded. Instead of questioning the facts, they argue the theory.

¹³ See *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943, p. 268. ". . . the armies of occupation had a thoroughly capable group of officials to carry out their orders and wishes. . . ." See also the Annexes on German local government in Vol. 2 (MS).

authorities under the control of the troops of occupation of the Allies and of the United States." In other words, the Armistice agreement had left the question open, and the Allies chose the old Imperial officials. As a result, civil affairs staffs did not have to bother with German administration beyond the point of seeing that their orders were carried out. "Inefficiency of officials in executing their own laws was not a matter for our concern," the American military authorities felt.¹⁴

No comparable advantages can be looked for this time. Indeed, the precedent of the Rhineland occupation as described in the Hunt Report is quite dangerous. The discarding of revolutionary developments at that time can be justified on two grounds: (1) that the officials of the old regime were trained in remaining politically neutral, (2) that the Rhineland was a small part of Germany, not likely to affect the course of development in the rest of the country. Neither of these conditions is probably going to exist this time. The Fascist revolution has not only destroyed the traditional *cadres* of the bureaucracy, but has rendered the men who have remained much more suspect than was the case in the Rhineland in 1919. Whole countries, furthermore, are now being occupied, and their development is going to be controlled from the center and subjected to military government.¹⁵

THE CLUE: GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO LAW

The problem of how much of officialdom to retain is, of course, closely bound up with the question of the retention of existing laws, customs, and traditions. The military authorities are undoubtedly right in urging that "it is unwise to impose upon occupied territory the laws and customs of another people." But that is hardly the only alternative to retaining the existing law.¹⁶ And while it is true enough that "any attempted changes or reforms contrary to local customs may result in the development of active or passive resistance and thereby handicap the operation of military government," it is equally true that failure to abolish Fascist

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 276.

¹⁵ It may be mentioned in passing that the policy adopted in the Rhineland seems part of the general policy of the Allied powers after 1918 to favor the old officialdom as against the revolutionaries, and thus to nip democratic development in Germany in the bud. See Arthur Rosenberg, *History of the German Republic*, *passim*.

¹⁶ Fortunately the new Field Manual abandons the obsolete philosophizing of the old FM 27-5 which in Para. 10-d mused: "The existing laws, customs and institutions of the occupied country have been created by its people and are presumably best suited to them." The first of these propositions, when applied to Fascist laws, is a silly euphemism, the second clearly the opposite of what we believe and are fighting the war for.

laws and decrees may likewise result in active or passive resistance. Instances of such difficulties in Sicily and North Africa have in fact been reported widely in the press, and while no authoritative information is as yet publicly available, the general prospect of such troubles can hardly be gainsaid.

Fortunately, the rules and regulations, as well as the law under which military government operates, provide the clue to this difficult situation. As noted at the outset, it is the secondary purpose or objective of military government to establish and maintain law and order. The military governor and civil affairs officer, while not usually in a position to pursue a positive policy of reform, nevertheless occupy a neutral, arbitral position as a result of their interest in law and order. They will not seek to impose the laws and customs of another people. But, as the collapse of the Fascist power invalidates Fascist "law," they will seek in older legal norms the firm ground which their operations require. And in so doing, they are likely to help the occupied territory make the most important first step in the direction of establishing self-rule. For there cannot be any self-rule without the rule of law.

In short, it is important to re-establish the rule of law. This is so partly because law is at the very core of what we are fighting for—all civil liberties, all constitutional government depend upon it¹⁷—and partly because the Axis, and more especially the National Socialist government of Germany, may be said to have destroyed the rule of law. In a sense, this statement is rather inaccurate; for the rule of law, as customarily defined, is peculiar to the countries under the common law.¹⁸ But its core consists of the conviction that government should be carried on according to law; and in this sense it is just as characteristic of constitutional government on the Continent as it is here and in England. The Germans have the idea of the *Rechtsstaat*, and the Weimar constitution specifically provided for equality before the law (article 102).¹⁹ There can be little question that the revival of these traditions of government according to law would constitute a first promising step toward self-rule.

There is, however, one grave difficulty involved which places in a paradoxical position anyone who would seek to establish the rule of

¹⁷ See C. J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (1942), especially chapters 7-9 on the constitution together with the bibliography cited there. See also Charles H. MacIlwain, *Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern*, and Charles A. Beard, *The Republic*.

¹⁸ See A. V. Dicey, *Law of the Constitution*, 8th edition, 1926.

¹⁹ See the able discussion in Rupert Emerson, *State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany*, 1928.

law through military government. For military government and martial law are by definition forms of government in which the rule of law is suspended.²⁰ Fortunately, the paradox is more apparent than real; while the situation is difficult, it is not so insoluble as the paradox would suggest. For, in the first place, the incompatibility of the rule of law and military government applies to the specific and refined sense which the conception of the rule of law has acquired in English-speaking countries. If we study the activities of the American military government in the Rhineland, we find that over wide sectors of social life it was a government according to law, as customarily understood in Europe. In other words, our military government would be extricated from some difficulties by the less advanced stage of constitutional and democratic development in Europe. Furthermore, from a realistic viewpoint, "government according to law" is an ideal to be aimed at rather than a completely consummated reality. There is, in other words, sometimes government *more* according to law, and sometimes government *less* according to law (and sometimes government not according to law at all). It would appear to be the re-establishing and re-invigorating of the former tradition which military government may bring about.

SUSPENSION OF FASCIST RULES

In the very nature of our army's traditions, fairly rigorous adherence to the rules of land warfare is to be expected.²¹ Under these, the occupying power assumes the exercise of the rights of sovereignty. The purpose, as stated before, is "to maintain law and order." In countries where the doctrine of the National Socialist government has prescribed that "the will of the Führer is the source of all law," law and order cannot be maintained by inquiring of the will of the Führer, obviously. What, then, should be done?

It would seem that the concrete measures consist of two interrelated steps: (1) purge the law of those accretions which embody Fascist and National Socialist outlook and prejudice;²² (2) do everything possible to strengthen the authority of the regular courts and of those judges who

²⁰ See Charles Fairman, *op. cit.* Compare also Frederick M. Watkins, "Constitutional Emergency Powers," in *Public Policy I*, 1940.

²¹ See Basic Field Manual 27-10, War Department, especially Paragraph 271 ff.

²² It will be noted that we are excluding from consideration the problems raised by the occupation of Japanese-held territory. The answer will differ for different territories, but obviously the rule of law can only be reestablished where it has existed before.

possess the personal and professional qualifications required. Both these steps are more easily indicated than executed.

The continental judiciary is traditionally more subservient to the government than in English-speaking countries. Judges, closely tied in as they are with the Ministry of Justice, look toward the Ministry for preferment. Dwelling far above the ordinary lawyer as high government officials, they do not consider themselves members of the legal fellowship of the bar. As a consequence, the German judiciary, with some notable exceptions, became a tool in the hands of the Hitler government; through the National Socialist German Union of Judges it was possible for the government to press many men even into party membership.²³ Similar conditions prevail elsewhere in Europe under Nazi domination. At the same time, it is argued that the wholesale dismissal of men with such background would foredoom to failure any attempt at the re-establishment of law.

Fortunately, the very conditions which led to the surrender of the judiciary when the Nazis took control, likewise will operate to bring these judges back to an attitude favorable toward the maintenance of law. It has been argued, indeed, that a dual structure has evolved under Nazi control—one part operating according to the minute application of law, the other according to personal and party caprice.²⁴ If that observation is sound, the destruction of the Nazi sector will automatically revive the other, giving the latter opportunity to fill the vacuum created by the disappearance of the party.

In purging the law of Fascist-dominated lands, it would also be possible to secure a measure of cooperation from the judiciary. Paragraph 286 of the Rules of Land Warfare specifically confers the power to suspend and promulgate laws. The instructions to AMG officers explicitly call for the suspension of certain laws, such as those discriminating between men on the basis of race or religion, thus asserting principles of law, in turn, which are more acceptable to the occupying power. (FM 27-5, Par. 9-n.)²⁵ There is very little question that in view of the official

²³ See "An Outline of Nazi Civil Law," by William J. Dickman, *Mississippi Law Journal*, 15, p. 128, and Otto Kirchheimer, "The Legal Order of National Socialism," *Studies in Philosophy*, 9, 456 ff. Cf. also the author's *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, Chs. 6 and 12, and the several studies cited in the bibliography of that treatise, including F. Dessauer, *Recht, Richterium und Ministerialbürokratie* (1928).

²⁴ Ernst Frankel, *The Dual State* 1938.

²⁵ We are also, under the accepted rules of international law, going to find ourselves involved in a maze of property law disputes. On this problem see Ernst Feilchenfeld, *The Laws of Beligerent Occupation*, 1942.

position of the judiciary, European judges would accept and apply such suspensions. FM 27-10, Par. 287 points out that "the occupant will naturally alter or suspend all laws of a political nature as well as political privileges and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command."

It will be seen that when National Socialist and Fascist legislation is examined with this standard in mind, wide breaches are laid into the seemingly contrary provisions of the Hague Regulations, embodied in Paragraph 282 of the Rules of Land Warfare, which state that "the occupant shall take all measures in his power to restore . . . public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." These provisions were written in the period when the rule of law was generally accepted as the norm. They did in no wise envisage a situation of utter lawlessness such as the Fascist domination has brought about.

In view of these considerations, military government should be prepared to re-examine the arbitrary rules and regulations prevailing in Axis dominated lands, with a view to suspending whatever rules appear to have been promulgated mainly with a view to securing a privileged position for the party in power and its henchmen. Since most of these rules and regulations have appeared in print, careful preparation could eliminate much confusion and contradiction later on in the active phase. In spite of such preparation, there are bound to be numerous alterations made in the law just because the United Nations cannot, after occupying the country, undertake to enforce Fascist policy as embodied in Fascist legislation. If such an effort is carried out in that spirit of adherence to legal procedure and justice which animates the entire approach of the American military to the problems of military government, it will automatically operate as a step toward self-rule.

THE RE-BIRTH OF A WILL TO BE FREE

In conclusion, it may be observed that military government can play only a rather limited role as a step toward self government. Its primary objective is related to the military victory. No one knows how long after the achievement of this goal military government of occupied territory will be kept in force. Those who envisage a long period of military occupation will perhaps be inclined to view optimistically the prospects of imposing constitutional government and democracy by force of arms.

The writer considers such assumptions unsound. The establishment of constitutional government calls for a constituent group ready to assume the responsibility of a limited government, and democracy calls for a people who are on the road to freedom. Military government, by its very nature, may oppose the one and stifle the other. The advocates of such schemes, realists though they may be from their own viewpoint, do not believe in either freedom or self-rule for all men.

American military government, exercised on the constitutional authority conferred by the American people upon the President of the United States, will not long be suffered to serve such alien objectives. But it will operate during and immediately after the cessation of hostilities. Conceived as it is in terms of the law of war, it will be in a position to re-establish the rule of law in lands which have been deprived of that first condition of self-rule. In thus re-establishing the government of laws, and not of men, American military government will make a substantial contribution toward the re-establishment of self-rule among the enslaved peoples of the world.

But the re-establishment of that rule of law is only a negative condition. Unless a positive desire and will for ruling themselves make themselves felt among the occupied peoples, no self-rule will develop. Among the most delicate tasks of the military governor is this: to avoid interfering with such a re-emergence of a will to be free, while yet executing his mission of maintaining law and order and the safety of communications.

It is a matter on which no easy principles can be offered. All depends upon the particular situation. The task of sorting the genuine wheat of democracy from the chaff of political opportunism and racketeering will have to be left to the common sense of the local governor—guided, one would hope, by sane general directives from the political authorities.

HUMAN RELATIONS IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT

By GEORGE BOAS

THE face-to-face relations of the Occupier and the Occupied, though treated in field manuals, can never be rigidly circumscribed. Human relations are compounded of too many subtle ingredients for even the most prescient manual-makers.

As *Orstkommandant* of a small Rhineland city during the American Occupation of 1918-1919, the author, then a lieutenant in the U.S.

Army, saw the problems of human relations at first hand. In this article he discusses some of them—incorporating in the discussion the reactions of a man who as a boy was a resident of the Rhineland city during occupation.

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WHATEVER THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS of a military occupation, there will always be certain problems which arise out of the elementary fact that two sets of human beings are in contact with each other. Regardless of questions of right and wrong, one set is a group of victors and the other of vanquished. It seems to be assumed that if the former know enough of the history, literature, language, religion, means of transportation, penal institutions, monetary system, economic geography, and so on of the latter, all will be well. One might also assume that if the latter accepted the former's interpretation of the causes and necessary consequences of the struggle which made one set victors and the other vanquished, all would be even better. In other words, if everyone would agree on certain fundamental principles and loyally attempt to carry them out, the Earthly Paradise would be replanted wherever human beings desired to plant it.

Unfortunately such general agreement is not attainable, and we may as well recognize it at once. A psychologist can give you all the rules of human behavior that are known, but he cannot guarantee—nor should he be asked to guarantee—that any one human being will exemplify these rules. So a mathematician can tell you that you ought to throw a head once out of every two throws, but he would be a fool to make prophecies about any particular throw. When one is face to face with the problem of managing the lives of actual human beings, one is concerned with general principles as guides for one's conduct, but often specific accidents occur which cannot by their very nature be covered by in-

structions. In accepting the invitation of the editor of *THE QUARTERLY* to discuss human relations in military administration, I am purposely limiting myself to cases as concrete as is possible. My comments will be divided into two parts, those concerning problems arising out of the behavior of the occupying authorities and those arising out of the behavior of the people whose territory is occupied.¹

By a strange coincidence, one of my colleagues at the Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Karl Pelzer, was a boy of ten in Bendorf during the occupation. He has read this manuscript and permitted me to incorporate into it some of his comments.² These comments are unfortunately not very lengthy, but, as far as they go, they provide what is perhaps unique, for it is doubtful whether the Occupiers and the Occupied have ever collaborated in writing even the rudiments of a report on an occupation.

It must not be thought that all the problems arising in military administration have their origin in the vanquished people. The Ad-

¹ The reader is entitled to know the source and probable validity of what is reported. The writer of this paper was Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General of the Third Infantry Brigade, U.S. Army, from the beginning of November 1918 to the middle of June 1919. After the Second Division, of which the Third Brigade was a part, went to Germany, he was appointed Ortskommandant of Bendorf-am-Rhein, a little city of about 8000 inhabitants north of Ehrenbreitstein on the right bank. He held this post for about three months, from November through part of February; that is, the period immediately following the Armistice. While he was in France, he had held for a similar period, from April through August 1918, the post of Zone Major and Claims Officer in a Zone of forty-two villages in the Haute-Marne. As such his duties were somewhat like those of an *Ortskommandant*, with the important difference that his people were not conquered by any means and that he did not of course hold court and impose fines.

He himself was a university man, a Ph.D. in philosophy. He could speak and read French and of course could read German. His speaking knowledge of German was not very good at the beginning of his administration—though it was better than that of his official interpreter—but he had little if any difficulty in understanding it. He was twenty-seven years old and had had two years' experience in teaching forensics to California undergraduates. His greatest weakness—for it turned out to be such—was a certain idealism which he had picked up from his philosophical studies and his relatively sheltered life. The latter, if not the former, had been corrected by eighteen months' experience in the Army in which he had served as pretty nearly everything an Infantry lieutenant can serve as. His idealism was strengthened by his close association with a man who never manifested a mean or unworthy thought, who was candor itself in his human relations, who never used his rank to gain privileges, who had no snobbery in his makeup, who in spite of his brilliant military attainments in the field was never boastful, and who devoted himself without stint to his job, whether it was the beating of the Germans, the care of his men, or the dealing out of justice to the conquered. Whatever may have been the shortcomings of the Ortskommandant of Bendorf, they were in no way attributable to the Commanding General. If there had been more men like him at the Peace Table, we should probably not be at war now.

² This does not imply that Dr. Pelzer agrees with any of my conclusions or that he has had a share in expressing them.

ministrator finds himself on certain occasions the arbitrator between two conflicting groups of interests; and though he may feel himself called upon always to side with his own people, he will discover if he have any sense of justice that to do so is neither easy nor right.

In Bendorf, for instance, it soon appeared that the Military Police felt their duty to be not only the arrest of malefactors, but also their creation; they wanted, in short, someone to arrest. Thus the keeper of a saloon was brought into court one morning on the charge of having sold intoxicating liquors to a soldier. The soldier was the M.P. who arrested the man. The accused testified that he had first refused to sell the liquor, which the M.P. corroborated, but that after persistent wheedling on the part of the M.P., he had given in. After all, he said, the soldier explained that he was a policeman and had made him believe that no harm would come to him if he sold him the *schnaps*. Who could blame him if he had yielded?

There was of course some question whether all the details of this story were true. Since the M.P.'s German turned out to be somewhat rudimentary, it was doubtful if he could not have carried on much of a conversation in that language. But he did admit to urging the man to sell the liquor; he had been an *agent provocateur*. How far could one go in reprimanding one of one's own soldiers in front of the Burgomaster and the accused? How could one recognize the legitimacy of arresting a man and punishing him after such provocation? I realized that if I talked fast enough and with enough slang, I could reprimand the M.P. without the Burgomaster's knowing too much of what I was saying, that later I could explain to both the Burgomaster and the accused that no fine would be imposed since the United States was not in the habit of using *agents provocateurs*, and that should anything like that happen again the bartender for his own good was to get in touch with the Ortskommandant. But it was interesting that the next time a man was brought into court on the same charge, he pleaded the same defense and the soldier to whom the liquor was sold denied any unusual urging. Fortunately in that case the soldier had clearly committed a misdemeanor which could be turned over to his company commander for discipline.

There were also, of course, several cases involving German girls which were classified, if I remember correctly, under the head of "fraternizing." There was nothing which the Ortskommandant could do

to bridle the natural appetites of an American soldier. At the same time it seemed a bit over-zealous to punish the girls involved. But, on the other hand, the Burgomaster wanted them punished, for he felt that they were a disgrace to his town, and the M.P. also wanted them punished, because he had arrested them. And for some reason which was never clearly defined, the commanding officers high and low wanted them punished too. Though the *Ortskommandant* was more puritanical then than he would be now, he still could not see that these girls had committed what might be properly called a crime. Yet to satisfy all concerned, and with due consideration to the usually admitted fact that the girls had been paid for their favors, he would fine them ten to fifteen marks, which they usually paid gracefully enough. At the General's suggestion, I had a talk with one of the clergymen in the town, and told him that he must assume some of the burden of correcting the situation. After a few weeks things settled down, either because of a change in the disposition of the fines, of which something will be said below, or because the soldiers learned to frequent certain girls who were professionals or semi-professionals and thus were not arrested.

This question of boys and girls is always the most difficult to handle. Dr. Pelzer comments on it as follows:

Soldiers are always anxious to make the acquaintance of the young girls. Even in towns where soldiers come as Allies it is hard on the young men of the towns to see the girls pay possibly more attention to the newcomers than to the men whom they have known since childhood, and clashes resulting from this circumstance are not infrequent. As a matter of fact, if a German youth from the outside came to a Bendorf dance and danced frequently during the evening with one of the popular girls, the local young men would wait for him outside and beat him up.

In occupied towns where soldiers belong to the forces of the enemy the problem is much greater. The demobilized young men of Bendorf found that the enemy whom they had fought on the battle-front were becoming social rivals. The Americans were able to draw freely on the canteen to give the girls gifts of chocolate, candy, cigarettes, etc. In the eyes of people who had been close to starvation, these things were fabulous. I remember that Bendorf's population was placed under strict curfew for several weeks because two soldiers

coming from a dance with two girls were beaten up by a group of local boys who objected to their new rivals. The organizer of the group was a young man who had been in a German regiment which had fought American soldiers on several occasions.

The parents of young girls were in constant fear that their daughters might fall in love with foreign soldiers, which would bring disgrace to their families.

At the end of the occupation, families were ostracized and denounced in newspapers for having associated with the enemy, although as long as the occupation lasted, no newspaper could have printed an attack on a family for this reason.

The most difficult cases to handle were those not involving any crime but complaints made by the civilian population against the Army. It was easy enough to preach a sense of justice to our soldiers; each had his own idea of what justice was. In France when they returned from the Front, they thought nothing of overturning beehives, throwing hand grenades into fishponds, breaking windows, letting cattle out of their stables at night, and generally raising hell out of sheer high spirits. In Germany some of them had even less respect for the rights of people who were not their allies but their former enemies. Abuse of power was probably pretty infrequent, all things considered, but the population naturally did not consider all things nor could it have been expected to. It is very difficult for a person brought up in a bourgeois European home to realize the lengths to which sheer high spirits can go. We in America see high spirits on the loose at Fraternal conventions and think little of it. Europe in 1918 had not yet become habituated to our form of high jinks. To Europeans it represented wanton destruction. In many cases paying for damages did no good, for what the European wanted was not the money—which frequently could not replace what had been destroyed—but the objects themselves. The discipline of the offenders was of course the problem of their commanding officers, but commanding officers often took the side of the men regardless of circumstances. They felt that, after all, the Germans were getting simply what was coming to them. Whatever we did, it was not so bad as what the Germans had done in France and in Belgium, things which they had seen with their own eyes and which had horrified them. They ought to be glad that we were not worse.

It was next to impossible for a first lieutenant who held the contemptible position of a general's aide to stand up to an infantry colonel, or major for that matter, for whose battle record he had an uncritical admiration, and tell him that his attitude was making civil administration harder. Such men could not understand that sympathy for the rights of Germans as human beings was not pro-germanism, a close approach to treachery, but really a safeguarding of the reputation of America, to say nothing of their own. As one of them said to me, "What the hell difference does it make what they think of us?"

There was one regimental commander who was especially ferocious. At the beginning of our occupation a woman was brought in with syphilis; she had been generous in giving it to our troops. The regimental commander thundered and stormed and wanted her thrown out of town. His idea was to drive her over the city limits into the next town. As the next town was Neuwied—and division headquarters—one could see very little sense in sending her there. To the Colonel's disgust, none too well concealed, the General managed to have her admitted for treatment to the hospital in Koblenz. But this act on our part, received with no more enthusiasm by the Burgomaster than by the Colonel, was received with least enthusiasm by the patient herself. Hence a gesture which seemed to us simply good sense appeared goody-goody humanitarianism to one person, brutal interference to another, and downright abuse of power to a third.

As far as our own forces are concerned, a junior officer in the position of *Ortskommandant* can do little. The military hierarchy is such—or at any rate was such in World War I—that power flows in a unilateral direction: down. It cannot be made to spread sideways, and the most one can hope for is influence through personal esteem. Professional officers usually realize this fact and do their best to cooperate. Having been through the mill, they are willing to let a man's position take the place of his rank. The worst cases are officers who have received their commissions from civil life and who as civilians were not used to command. But even they can sometimes be persuaded to use their intelligence instead of their shoulder ornaments. In the long run the junior officer in a position of administrative responsibility will have to create respect for himself and count on that respect for his success. If anyone knows how to teach people to do this, let him publish a textbook on the subject. I for one have no testimony to offer.

In spite of these examples, which could of course be multiplied, the more serious problems arise from the side of the conquered.

Now in Germany we may have thought that we had defeated the Germans; the Germans did not think so. They appeared to believe that they were to have a sort of compromise peace based on their interpretation of the Fourteen Points. I can still see in my imagination the little posters which were pasted on the telegraph poles in Bendorf: *Wir wuenschen die vierzehn Punkte!* At the time I thought that such posters were evidence that the Germans, having suffered a change of heart, were expressing their belief in American principles of democracy. But I discovered that to them the *vierzehn Punkte* were a *quid pro quo*, something which they were to receive and were willing to receive in return for peace. Consequently they were far from beaten in the sense of recognizing to themselves that they had to accept whatever we chose to give them. To use Cardinal Newman's language, they gave notional but not real assent to the Allied Victory. As later events have shown, they were continuing in a subtle fashion and in a prudent form the antagonism of belligerency.

Thus it looked to us as if the espionage system of the war was still in operation. Whenever it was to the Burgomaster's advantage to let me know that it was working, he did so. For instance, when we first entered Germany, we were told to post listeners at the central telephone exchanges. This order was naturally unpleasant to the Germans, but surely not an extravagant demand. When the Burgomaster first asked me to remove the listening post—which I had no power to remove—I told him that I would reflect, for I soon learned that it was well never to give what might look like a snap judgment but to appear to be giving grave thought to every demand however unreasonable. On the morrow I informed him soberly what I already knew, namely that to remove the listening post was against orders.

"But your orders are going to be changed, Herr Oberleutnant."

He was right; they were changed.

But how did he know it before I did?

Again, it irked the Germans to have soldiers billeted in the parsonage. In France we had had no hesitation in billeting troops in the *cures*, and the various *curés* accepted the situation as normal. Once again the Burgomaster came to me to ask that the soldiers be removed from the *Pfarrhaus*, and once again I pointed out that to do so would be to

violate orders. Again he told me that my orders would be changed; again they were changed. Since such changes of orders came, I suppose, from Trier, I could only conclude that his system of communication with that somewhat distant city was more rapid than my own—which was indeed the truth.

There is, however, another explanation, according to Dr. Pelzer.

"I don't think there is anything mysterious or indicative of espionage," he says, "in the fact that the Burgomaster knew that an order was coming through about removing soldiers from parsonages. In all likelihood the Bishop of Trier had requested it and had been promised such removal. In the weekly letter of the Bishopric each Pastor got the good news of the coming order, which probably took about two or three weeks to pass through all the offices until it reached the *Ortskommandantur*. Upon reading about the new order freeing parsonages from housing billeted soldiers, each Pastor no doubt immediately notified the Burgomaster and requested action.

"In the same way the Regierungspresident of Koblenz notified all *Landraete* and Burgomasters of the coming withdrawal of the listening posts in the telephone exchange.

"I know of a number of other instances where the townspeople knew several days in advance of the local commanding officer that a change was to be made. But their knowledge had come through legitimate civil channels—which in turn were shorter than the military channels."

I confess not to have thought of this, nor did any of our staff from the General down. To us it looked like espionage, and appearances not corrected can often cause as much harm as reality itself. It would have been perfectly easy for the Burgomaster to tell me that he had heard of a coming change through the Pastor or the appropriate civilian authority, but it is still clear that to spring the news on me in his usual manner was a humiliation for me and a little triumph for him. Simple frankness would no longer work and could not be expected to. The Burgomaster was not a fellow administrator; he was a rival, a competitor with his own ends. These ends might be discordant with those of the Army.

I remember how strongly I was impressed during the first few weeks of our administration by his apparent severity in fining mis-

demeanors. We could not impose large fines, for our court was on about the same level as that of a municipal magistrate's in America. But no matter what the offence, the Burgomaster would always suggest something close to the maximum. Our custom naturally was to send the defendant from the room while the punishment was being decided, and I used to find myself in the position of constantly pleading clemency. After all, to fine a girl fifty marks because she had sat on the lap of a soldier or stolen the burlap wrappings of a ham, out of which the poor child wanted to boil the grease, did seem somewhat excessive. We often discussed the Burgomaster's severity at Brigade HQ and thought that it was just another symptom of that Draconian government which was so infamous in Belgium. But one day the Burgomaster changed. It was he who began to argue for clemency and understanding, and I who appeared the Shylock. This went on for a few days until the solution suddenly burst upon us. At the beginning all fines collected were turned over to the municipality for running expenses. Consequently here was a case where crime paid. But then Erzberger arranged to have such moneys credited to the expenses of the occupation. Crime paid no more.

The next episode in the chapter of Crime and Punishment occurred one day when a girl was brought in on the usual charge of fraternizing. The Burgomaster, no longer feeling like imposing heavy fines, became very red-faced and fierce. "She should be made to sweep the streets," he shouted. Fortunately for our reputation, I had the sense to object strongly, saying that Americans did not impose cruel or unusual punishments. When I reported the incident at mess, the General smiled and said, "Has he a camera?" From the Burgomaster's subsequent behavior, one could tell that the General had a point. One could well imagine photographs showing these poor girls sweeping the streets and performing other degrading tasks in public appearing with appropriate captions in the Berlin press. My suspicion was corroborated to some extent by his confusion one day when I asked him what the Germans would say if we were to impose such a punishment.

As for the townspeople themselves, they had two traits which remain with me as not making the job of *Ortskommandant* any easier. One was their extraordinary lack of solidarity. If a man was convicted of anything, he would finally admit his guilt and then proceed to give me the names of others who had committed the same misdemeanor, as if he wished to be sure that they also would be punished. I don't re-

member any cases of actual informing and denunciation before a trial, but they never failed to appear after conviction. Whether this was attributable to German reverence for the law or to a spirit of downright "orneriness," so often found in oppressed or suffering people, or to a desire to stir up trouble by large-scale punishments, I never found out. All three—and other—causes may have been at work. The effect of such denunciation was of course to keep the court busier than it otherwise would have been, and consequently to give anyone reading the records or hearing about our affairs the impression that we were a badly run town with a large number of malefactors. Moreover, though the misdemeanors were trivial and would not have been tried if not denounced, once they were denounced, the individuals had to be tried at the risk of partiality. I have often thought that one of the reasons why the people of Bendorf disliked us was traceable precisely to the action of the townspeople in denouncing one another.

Another cause of annoyance which never led to real trouble was the petty tricks the townspeople used to plague us. The Brigade HQ was at the home of a psychiatrist. He had an aged servant who would always appear when any caller entered the house and wash the stone stairs after he had gone up or down them. We joked about this, naturally, for the washing consisted merely in sloshing water over the steps and wiping it off. But it could only have been calculated to annoy us. And sometimes it really did become annoying, as one had to walk by a dour and withered servant lying in wait on her knees to wash off the print of one's feet. The real effect of such gestures is of no importance; what is interesting is the feeling that stimulated them. They were similar to the silent treatment which the French have been giving to the *Occupants* who in this war are billeted with them. Had we been more introspective and given to brooding, it might finally have got on our nerves. But the people of Bendorf happily knew little of American psychology.

Anyone can imagine for himself whole series of incidents which would have made us disagreeable to the town and which did make the town disagreeable to us. I shall not elaborate. There are one or two conclusions which should, however, be made; though they are obvious, so far they do not seem to have occurred to the authorities. The first is that there is just no sense in thinking an occupying force will ever make itself beloved by the occupied. One should be fair and just and kind and charitable, but one must expect neither gratitude nor affection. There

is nothing more nerve-wracking than having foreigners billeted with one; even in England, I believe, the country people find the *evacués* from the cities pretty trying, and the German newspapers today keep pleading with their readers to be charitable to *evacués* from the Ruhr. Where the sharing of common disaster and tragedy is not enough to overcome the desire of people to be left alone in peace in their homes, defeat is certainly not going to succeed. Whatever kindness may have been shown the German population by our troops, and there was plenty of it, it was bound to be resented. Dr. Pelzer tells me that the use of chewing gum, which was distributed to the children out of sheer friendliness by our men, was denounced in the pulpit "as a disgusting American habit." I have seen German mothers prevent their children from accepting less disgusting presents. They clearly did not want us around, and their leaders were not anxious to have their feelings change. When it would suit them to praise us at the expense of our Allies, on the other hand, they would do so; unfortunately we fell into the trap too often. The truth of the matter is that military occupation is a nasty job that has to be done. The occupants should have no illusions about it.

Military administrators, furthermore, should not imagine that they will be liked by their own forces. An *Ortskommandant* is the least popular of men. No one likes him, friend or enemy. His rules of government which he meekly accepts from on high are obnoxious to everyone. When he takes over the job, he may as well resign himself to a life of cold duty. If there is any fun in doing one's duty, I have never seen it. There is a kind of priggish satisfaction in it, to be sure, but most people crave a little affection. A military governor by his very position never sees the better side of life. He sees arrogance, pride, humiliation, slyness, deceit, pettiness, selfishness, mendacity. His office is a stage for a *Masque of Wickedness*. He consequently either throws up the sponge or becomes cynical or gets down to brass tacks, forgets himself, and nobly considers virtue to be its own reward.

The great weakness of any American occupation comes from one of our many virtues: the desire to do good. This desire, which is very laudable when properly oriented, often turns into nothing finer than constant interference with the business of others. To us it looks like hypocrisy to be good out of self-interest. But when one is occupying a defeated country, especially a country like Nazi Germany, that is probably the most sensible attitude to take. Nazis seem to think that what-

ever decency is shown them is either a sign of weakness or just simple recognition of their superiority to all other human beings. Hence in so far as kindness will make an occupation easier, one should be kind. But one should never expect either one's fellow soldiers or the Germans to be understanding.

One should expect, on the contrary, that the former Nazis will do everything which they believe to be safe to make our occupation difficult. Some of these things will consist in complaints of every sort: that we are damaging property, that we have given too much power to the Jews, that we have not shown enough respect for the churches, schools, hospitals, playgrounds, means of communication, that we are taking up too much room with our billets. Another will be trickier and will consist in spreading stories against our allies to us and against us to our allies. Another will be an attempt to disrupt our *esprit de corps* by suggesting to our soldiers that whereas they themselves are very agreeable companions, their officers are terrible; or that whereas their particular outfit is all right, the outfit in the next town is not so good. Nothing much can be done to prevent such gossip; the same thing goes on right here in the United States. There will probably be no great amount, if any, of open disobedience to orders, but there will be a great deal of underground sabotaging of orders. The Nazis will remember that once again the Americans have come to Europe to bring just that amount of added power to the British and Russians which was needed to cause their defeat. They will play upon our naive pride and emphasize our contribution to the common victory with the hope of creating disunity, but all the while they will be flattering the French and British and Belgians and everyone else in the same way with talk about the American barbarians. This is to be expected; it is one manner of continuing the fight. One may rail and rant against it as much as one wishes; railing and ranting will do no good whatsoever. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the soldiers will be more comfortable in Germany than they were on the front; they will therefore like Germany better. They will mutter to each other as they did in the last war about the superiority of Germany in bathrooms, kitchens, heating, and so on, forgetting that they came to the continent to live in ruins caused by these very people whose installations they admire so much.

There is only one sure way of avoiding much of this trouble; it is a way so drastic that I scarcely imagine our authorities will follow it.

We could do what the Belgians did in the last Occupation: post in the various towns the regulations which the German Army had posted in Belgium. There is good sense behind this step. For if the Germans have a certain idea of the right way to govern an occupied region, that idea is based upon what they think would bring order to a German locality. German rule is extremely severe, but it is what the Germans approve of. There have been few if any cases among them of refusal to carry out orders or efforts to mitigate them. The German Army seems to have thought the thing out clearly on the basis of its own psychological theories. These theories, one imagines, are true of Germans. Repugnant as they are, they are no more repugnant than most of the things one does in war: the bombing of cities and the sinking of passenger ships. I do not advocate this procedure as revenge, for revenge is stupid. But I think it might be tried as a system which would seem right and natural to a population indoctrinated with Nazism and which would therefore work much better than the evangelistic attitude which I fear we shall adopt. No one knows German psychology better than the Nazi leaders. What they have succeeded in doing with these sixty-five million people they have done scientifically. Why shouldn't the Army of Occupation profit by their research?

THE SPECIAL CASE OF GERMANY

By KURT LEWIN

THE following article goes well beyond the problems of military government to a consideration of German culture and the seeds of militarism. The heart of the problem, as Kurt Lewin sees it, is the relation of leader and follower in Germany. Germans, because they confuse loyalty with obedience, have never learned how to criticize their bosses. Can that be changed? How, and by whom?

The author brings to the problem a rich background of research experience in the training of leaders. Because the military administra-

tor, both as a leader himself and as a supervisor of Germans chosen to administer the affairs of other Germans, must deal with the special problem of leader-follower relationships, this article is more than an exercise in theory. Its conclusions are, at very least, a challenge.

Dr. Lewin, Professor of Psychology at the University of Berlin in the days before Hitler, now serves in the same capacity at the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station of the University of Iowa, and is the author of numerous books and articles in the field of psychology.

BEFORE PEARL HARBOR, in America probably more than in any other country, a fairly strong tendency was discernible to consider psychological factors such as frustration or "destructive traits" the basic cause for war. Accordingly, the avoidance of frustration was considered the main road to peace. Since then, a more realistic view of the importance of political and economic aspects seems to prevail. This shift of sentiment is to be welcomed, although there is now the danger that the pendulum will swing too far and that only the political aspects will be considered important. In planning the peace and in thinking of the future international conduct of other countries and of our own, we must realize also that the psychological and particularly the cultural factors are in the long run essential.

Thus it has been stated frequently that Hitlerism is but an extreme edition of that traditional militaristic Prussian culture which has governed Germany, to a considerable extent, since the founding of the Reich. It is not necessary to decide here whether or to what degree this is true. It would be more important to know in detail how deeply the Nazi culture is entrenched now within the various sections of the population. Although this question cannot fully be answered, at present, one can safely guess that Nazism is deeply rooted, particularly in the youth on whom the future depends. It is a culture which is centered around power as the supreme value and which denounces justice and equality of men again and again as the disgusting remnants of a decadent democracy.

The problem would be less severe if the ideals of egocentrism and

ruthless power were limited to the conduct of war. The same values, unfortunately, have thoroughly penetrated all aspects of German culture including family life. Millions of helpless children, women, and men have been exterminated by suffocation or other means in the occupied countries during the last two years, and others are still killed daily. Tens of thousands of Germans must have become accustomed to serve as a matter of routine on the extermination squads or elsewhere in the large organization dedicated to this purpose. This systematic extermination has been carried out with the expressed purpose of securing in the generations to come German supremacy over the surrounding countries. For the question of international relations and of safeguarding the peace, it is particularly dangerous that such killing is considered the natural right of the victor over the vanquished or of the "Herrenvolk" over lower races.

Before discussing the problems of how a change might be accomplished, the objective should be clear. This objective cannot for Germany be a copy of the English or the American way of living. Whatever occurs, the resulting culture will be something specifically German. It will show the traces of its history and of the present extreme experiences of war and Nazism. This would hold true even if the new German culture should become thoroughly democratic.

There is one more reason to strive for a "democratic German" culture rather than an American or English culture. The limitation of the democratic principle of tolerance toward others is defined by the maxim of "democratic intolerance toward intolerance." This right and duty to intolerance is very important if democracy is to live anywhere on this globe. This principle does not, however, demand conformity; it limits our rightful interest to certain minimum requirements which are probably not too different from the minimum requirements for international peace.

CULTURAL CHANGES OF INDIVIDUALS AND NATIONS

Even formulated in this way, a change toward democratic German culture obviously includes very difficult problems.

There is no question but that the culture of individuals or small groups can be changed deeply in a relatively short time. A child transplanted from Germany or Japan to America will, as a rule, become thoroughly Americanized. Even grown-ups who are transplanted to a

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different culture may acquire the new culture to a high degree, and much can be done toward this end through proper education. Experiments with both children and adults prove that the social atmosphere of groups can be changed profoundly by introducing different forms of leadership. Experiments in leadership training have shown that it is even possible under certain circumstances to transform highly autocratic leaders of long standing within a short time into efficient democratic leaders.¹

All of these changes, however, are changes of individuals or small groups in a direction which is in line with some aspects of the general cultural setting in which these individuals or groups live. To change the culture of a whole nation is quite a different undertaking. The greater numbers involved is merely one of the difficulties. Even more important are certain dynamic relations between the various aspects of the culture of a nation—such as its education, mores, political behavior, religious outlook—which interact in a way that tends to bend any deviation from the established culture back to the same old stream.

There is no space here to discuss these dynamics in detail. I might merely remind the reader that the difference, for instance, between the American and the German culture is discernible more or less in every part of their respective cultural lives: in the way the mother treats a two- or three-year-old child, what the father talks about at the dinner table, how the worker talks to his foreman or the student to the professor, how the visitor behaves toward grown-ups and children, how the cookbooks are written, how opposing lawyers deal with each other after the court session, what type of photograph the candidate for political office uses for propaganda, and what religion means to a person in any denomination. A cultural change in regard to a specific item will have to be able to stand up against the weight of the thousand and one items of the rest of the culture which tend to turn the conduct back to its old pattern. As someone has put it, "Cultures are pretty watertight."

We may conclude: To be stable, a cultural change has to penetrate more or less into all aspects of a nation's life. The change must, in short, be a change in the "cultural atmosphere," not merely a change of single items.

¹ Bavelas, A., "Morale and training of leaders." In Goodwin Watson (ed.), *Civilian Morale*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942.

GENERAL ASPECTS OF CULTURAL CHANGE

1. *Culture as an equilibrium.* A culture is not a painted picture; it is a living process, composed of countless social interactions. Like a river whose form and velocity are determined by the balance of those forces that tend to make the water flow faster, and the friction that tends to make the water flow more slowly—the cultural pattern of a people at a given time is maintained by a balance of counteracting forces. The study of cultures on a smaller scale indicates that, for instance, the speed of production or other aspects of the atmosphere of a factory has to be understood as an equilibrium, or more precisely, as an “equilibrium in movement.”

Once a given level is established, certain self-regulatory processes come into function which tend to keep group life on that level. One speaks of “work habits,” “established customs,” the “accepted way of doing things.” Special occasions may bring about a momentary rise of production, a festival may create for a day or two a different social atmosphere between management and workers, but quickly the effect of the “shot in the arm” will fade out and the basic constellation of forces will reestablish the old forms of everyday living.

The general problem, therefore, of changing the social atmosphere of a factory or of German culture can be formulated somewhat more precisely in this way: How can a situation be brought about which would permanently change the level on which the counteracting forces find their quasi-stationary equilibrium?

2. *Changing the constellation of forces.* To bring about any change, the balance between the forces which maintain the social self-regulation at a given level has to be upset.

This implies for Germany that certain deep-seated powers have to be uprooted. Large proportions of those sections of the German population on which a democratic reconstruction will depend live now in a state of suppression and terror. It is hardly conceivable that these people will be able to act freely as long as they see the Gestapo or other masters of ten years of terror alive and free on the other side of the street. After the last war the reactionary forces in Germany, although driven under cover, were permitted to “get away with it.” Being a socially well-knit group, they soon started to come back step by step and to take their revenge in the extreme form of Hitlerism. I cannot see any

hope of more than superficial change after the present war if the German people are prevented from getting rid in a very thorough fashion of a large group which has developed to perfection the most ruthless methods of suppression. This group, at present, is known to be already preparing to go underground; it will remain a powerful threat if its utter destruction is hindered by forces outside Germany fearing any type of "chaos."

The German move toward democracy after the last war did not fail because the so-called German Revolution of 1918 was too chaotic, but because the overthrow of the Kaiser was entirely bloodless and did not reach deep enough. It did not reach deep enough socially to remove certain sections of the population from power, and it did not reach deep enough culturally to remove the idea of democracy from its identification with individualistic freedom of the laissez faire type. A revolution in Germany should, therefore, be viewed as a positive factor, not a negative one, in bringing about the desired end—a move toward democracy and permanent peace.

3. *Establishing a new cultural pattern.* Hand in hand with the destruction of the forces maintaining the old equilibrium must go the establishment (or liberation) of forces toward a new equilibrium. Not only is it essential to create the fluidity necessary for change and to effect the change itself; it is also imperative that steps be taken to bring about the permanence of the new situation through self-regulation on the new level.

TECHNIQUES OF CHANGING CULTURE

Let us assume that the situation in Germany will be sufficiently fluid. Is there anything that can be done to help the forces which may establish a new level of equilibrium closer to democracy? From the many considerations, I shall mention but a few.

1. *"Satisfaction" is not enough.* If the many needs of the German people are satisfied, will that not suffice to make them democratic? This idea, rather common before America's entrance into the war, may well be brought to life again as soon as the war with Germany is over (although it will hardly be propagated in this country in regard to the Japanese). Such suggestions are based on the naive idea that "human nature" is identical with "democratic culture"; that one needs but to destroy the causes of maladjustment to create a democratic world.

I had a chance to observe rather closely a young fellow who had been

active in the German Youth movement before Hitler. Subsequently he had been taken over by the Nazis and made an assistant to a District Youth leader for a number of years. For one reason or another he had fled the country and become politically anti-Nazi. This individual showed rather marked symptoms of maladjustment such as aggressiveness and egocentricism. Being a clever fellow, he made his way, learned the amenities of the American style, and showed a friendly and smooth surface. After a number of years he gave the appearance of being quite well adjusted and was usually considered a likeable fellow.

Only those who knew him intimately and followed his actions closely for a long time could see that actually his conduct has become more insidious than ever before. Having an exceptionally fine sense for relations of status and power, the fellow would find out immediately who were friends, who enemies, where lay the strength or weakness of everyone, or what ideas were fashionable at the moment. On the basis of this quickly gained intimate knowledge of power relations he would pursue an active, egoistic policy with an extreme degree of aggressiveness, using lies without inhibition and figuring out destructive frontal attacks with a cleverness that made people gasp. I could not help but feel that here we had a practically "pure" case of Nazi culture. This aggressiveness did not diminish but rather increased and became more dangerous as the individual became personally secure without changing his basic culture.

I think this is a clear example of the fact that, in an aggressive autocratic culture, aggression and autocratic behavior cannot be viewed as symptoms of maladjustment. They cannot be basically changed merely by satisfying the individual's need.

2. *Some general positive principles.* The studies of group life in various fields suggest a few general principles for changing group culture.

(a) The change has to be a change of group atmosphere rather than of single items. We have discussed this problem already. Technically it means that the change cannot be accomplished by learning tricks. It must be deeper than the verbal level or the level of social or legal formalities.

(b) It can be shown that the system of values which governs the ideology of a group is dynamically linked with other power aspects within the life of the group. This is correct psychologically as well as

historically.² Any real change of the culture of a group is, therefore, interwoven with the changes of power constellation within the group.

(c) From this point it will be easily understood why a change in methods of leadership is probably the quickest way to bring about a change in the cultural atmosphere of a group. For the status and power of the leader or of the leading section of a group make them the key to the ideology and the organization of the life of that group.

3. *The change from autocracy to democracy.* Experiments on groups and leadership training suggest the following conclusions:

(a) The change of a group atmosphere from autocracy or laissez faire to democracy through a democratic leader amounts to a reeducation of the followers toward "democratic followership." Any group atmosphere can be conceived of as a pattern of role playing. Neither the autocratic nor the democratic leader can play his role without the followers being ready to play their role accordingly. Without the members of the group being able and ready to take over those responsibilities which are essential for followerships in a democracy, the democratic leader will be helpless. Changing a group atmosphere from autocracy toward democracy through a democratic leadership, therefore, means that the autocratic followers must shift toward a genuine acceptance of the role of democratic followers.

(b) The experiments show that this shift in roles cannot be accomplished by an offhand policy. To apply the principle of "individualistic freedom" merely leads to chaos. Sometimes people must rather forcefully be made to see what democratic responsibility toward the group as a whole means. It is true that people cannot be trained for democracy by autocratic methods. But it is equally true that to be able to change a group atmosphere toward democracy the democratic leader has to be in power and has to use his power for active reeducation. There is no space here to discuss in detail what to some might appear as one of the paradoxes of democracy. The more the group members become converted to democracy and learn to play the roles of democracy as followers or leaders, the more can the power of the democratic leader shift to other ends than converting the group members.

(c) From what has been said up to now it should be clear that lecture and propaganda do not suffice to bring about the necessary change.

² Lewin, K., "Constructs in Psychology and Psychological Ecology." In *Studies in Topological and Vector Psychology III*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1944.

Essential as they are, they will be effective only if combined with a change in the power relations and leadership of the group. For larger groups, this means that a hierarchy of leaders has to be trained which reaches out into all essential sub-parts of the group. Hitler himself has obviously followed very carefully such a procedure. The democratic reversal of this procedure, although different in many respects, will have to be as thorough and as solidly based on group organization.

(d) By and large the same principle holds for the training of democratic leaders as for the training of the other members of the group. Democratic leaders cannot be trained autocratically; it is, on the other hand, of utmost importance that the trainer of democratic leaders establish and hold his position of leadership. It is, furthermore, very important that the people who are to be changed from another atmosphere toward democracy be dissatisfied with the previous situation and feel the need for a change. These are indications that it is easier to change an unsatisfied autocratic leader toward democratic techniques than to change a *laissez faire* type of leader or a satisfied half-democratic leader. This may be contrary to the popular notion that a change is the more easily accomplished the greater the similarity between the beginning and the end situation. From the general theory of cultural change it is, however, understandable why after small changes the tendency to return to the previous level of equilibrium might be stronger than after great changes.

THE HEART OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM

It seems to follow, then, that the basic requirement of a change in German culture toward democracy is a change in the role of the leaders and of the followers.

That German citizens have never known how to criticize their bosses has frequently been observed. In German culture "loyalty" is typically identified with "obedience." They do not see any other alternative to efficient group organization based on obedience but an atmosphere of *laissez faire* and inefficiency based on individualistic freedom. The Hitler regime has done everything to strengthen this view and to identify democracy with decadent inefficient lawlessness. After the last war the liberal German newspapers discussed the meaning of democratic leadership and democratic discipline in an attempt to educate the public away from the alternative of blind obedience or respectlessness and lack of

responsibility. The English idea of "His Majesty's loyal opposition" was used to point out the positive functions and the responsibilities which the opposition parties have in a parliamentary system. To the German reader these articles sounded strangely unreal and unbelievable. They seemed as contrary to the German concept of human nature as the idea of fair play, a concept utterly strange to German culture.

Such articles, obviously, had little influence on the political action of the Germans; I doubt whether the results would have been better if they had been multiplied a hundredfold. To understand what is being talked about the individual has to have a basis in experience—as a child in a student council, in the hundred and one associations of everyday life; he has to have some taste of what democratic leadership and the democratic responsibility of the follower mean. No lecture can substitute for these first-hand experiences.

Only through practical experience can one learn that peculiar democratic combination of conduct which includes responsibility toward the group, ability to recognize differences of opinion without considering the other person a criminal, and readiness to accept criticism in a matter of fact way while offering criticism with sensitivity for the other person's feeling. The attempt to change one element alone will merely lead to a situation where the weight of the other elements will reestablish the previous total pattern.

WHO CAN BE CHANGED IN GERMANY?

Which groups of people are particularly important for the positive aspects of reconstruction?

In regard to social classes, we have already discussed the necessity for breaking the rule of the Gestapo and the Junkers. It is difficult, without knowing in detail the present social constellation, to make any definite statement. As we have seen, a strong change in the cultural setting has more chance of permanence than a slight one (although there is, of course, the phenomenon of the pendulum's swinging too far). It would be most unfortunate if the attempt were made to place in power those sections of the German population whose aim it is merely to return to the pre-Hitler atmosphere in Germany and who are afraid of any drastic democratic setting. Such a situation—for instance, the establishing of the Hapsburgs in Austria—would not be stable; it would either mean the

return to fascism in a modified form or—and that is more likely—it would lead to a genuine revolutionary uprising.

More than usual one will have to take the age levels into consideration. In regard to changes, three age levels might be distinguished: (a) the people above forty who have experienced something other than Nazism in their mature lives, (b) the people between twenty and thirty whose formative years have been dominated by fascism and who are thoroughly indoctrinated, and (c) the children. For each group the problem is somewhat different. We shall discuss briefly the first and the second, because they will determine the atmosphere toward which the children acculturate.

(1) Among the people over forty there are many who had strong liberal convictions. Although most of the leftist leaders may have been killed, there is doubtless a sizeable body of people who are ready and eager to establish a new "free" Germany. We might expect that many will have learned from the mistakes after 1918 and will try to do a better job this time. Along cultural lines these people probably need most a better understanding of how an efficient democracy works. What they at present understand as democracy or freedom lacks both the leadership and the discipline of an efficient democracy.

(2) The twenty-year-olds who have no cultural past other than fascism to which they could return and who have well-established cultural habits are considered by some observers as a "lost generation." They might well become that, go underground, and prepare the next world war; for that seems the only ideal toward which a generation can strive in whom Nazi culture remains shaken but not changed.

I am not persuaded, however, that this is the only possibility. A large section of this group must now be inwardly desperate. They know that something is wrong with Nazism. It would not be surprising, therefore, if this group were psychologically in a frame of mind not so different from the psychological situation of the autocratic leaders in the experiments—the ones who were "converted" and retrained in a short time. It seems not at all impossible that a frontal attack on the problem of changing a selected group of young Nazi leaders in every field of endeavor would be more successful in bringing about a radical change from autocracy toward democracy in Germany than the attempt to remodel the older generation whose ideal leaned toward *laissez faire*. These young people who are familiar with problems of leadership and who

have a deep need for change would—if they could be changed—promise a more deep and stable change in atmosphere than groups that strive toward a return to the old or toward slight changes. There is, of course, no hope for conversion of the young without a strong and new positive ideal.

WAYS OF CHANGING GERMAN CULTURE

Mere propaganda, and particularly propaganda from the outside, will not change German culture. If a sufficiently deep and permanent change is to be accomplished, the individual will have to be approached in his capacity as a member of groups. It is as a member of a group that the individual is most pliable. At the same time such a group approach can better influence relatively deeply large masses than either the individual approach or the mass approach through propaganda.

It is natural to think of the school system—from the nursery school to the university—as an organization through which the culture of a nation can be changed. Yet one should be clear about its limitations. The idea, for example, of using some 100,000 foreign teachers or former refugees seems to have been abandoned, because it would lead to nothing but a strong negative reaction. It has been suggested, again, that the Allies be content with securing certain minimum requirements concerning textbooks; that, of course, would not contribute much toward changing German culture.

I think one should neither under- nor over-rate the importance of the educational system. It is, of course, very important for long-range planning. Yet the atmosphere in education is but a mirror and an expression of the culture of the country; it changes with every change of its general social atmosphere—as the history of German education between 1918 and 1933 shows strikingly enough. Education of children, therefore, is in the beginning less important than a change in leadership.

Change in culture requires the change of leadership forms in every walk of life. At the start, particularly important is leadership in those social areas which are fundamental from the point of view of power. Ideology and power problems are closely linked. *The shift of political power to other sections of the population and the change in leadership techniques in the fields of politics, law, law enforcement, and economics are, therefore, fundamental. Only as a part of such a political change can a cultural change toward democracy occur and survive.*

To my mind, not too much can be expected from an exchange of potential leaders between countries, although such an undertaking is laudable. There is a definite limit to what a person can learn in the unrealistic setting of a guest, outside of the particular atmosphere in which he will have to work. Much more promising would be a training "on the job." The reconstruction after the war should provide ample possibilities of collaboration for Germans and non-Germans, opportunities which could well be used for the training or retraining of youthful German leaders. This training does not need to bear the stigma of "education," because a job is to be done, a job of cooperation in the interest of Germany. It could be demonstrated there and experienced first hand that "democracy works better." If strategically managed, such training on the job of leaders and trainers of leaders might well reach into every aspect of community leadership. It might help to set in motion a process of self-reeducation.

The ideas discussed herein seem to point to a procedure which offers at least some realistic hope of success. Whether or not an attempt along this line can be made, and how successful it would be, depends on the world situation. Moses led Israel through the desert for forty years, until the generation that had lived as slaves might die, and the rest learn to live as free people. Perhaps there are still no faster or better methods for the permanent cultural reeducation of a nation.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF JAPAN

By GEOFFREY GORER

ONE of the greatest problems facing future administrators of Japan, Mr. Gorer points out, is the recognition of those elements in Japanese culture and society which can be employed constructively in the rebuilding of Japan. At the same time it will be necessary to uncover and destroy those tendencies in Japan which have fed the springs of aggressive imperialism and militant nationalism. Japan, stripped of her empire, will present no easy problem to the admin-

istrator. The author does not list a set of easy answers in the pages which follow. What he does do is to assess the problems, weigh the alternatives, remark the dangers.

A Cambridge-educated Britisher, Mr. Gorer brings to his task a broad background of research on Asiatic problems. Anthropological field work in Asia and a period of intensive research at Yale on Japanese character are the bases upon which his conclusions rest.

FROM THE SOCIOLOGICAL point of view, the problems involved in the military occupation of Japan do not represent a special case; rather, they represent an extreme case. The difference between the occupation of Japan and that of a European country, for instance, is one of degree, not of kind. All cases of military occupation can be subsumed under the larger sociological category of "culture contact," a technical term to describe the interaction of members of two cultures or civilizations. Military occupation differs from other types of culture contact in the fact that the members of the intruding culture or cultures are self-conscious concerning the way in which they wish to transform the occupied society, and that they are able to employ force, as well as persuasion and imitation, in their efforts to achieve their goals.

For a proper evaluation of any culture contact it is essential to take into account the characteristics and motivations of both the cultures in contact. Generally, there is a tendency to avoid doing so; some study may be made of the customs, government, and characteristics of the occupied society, but the occupiers are treated as though they were representatives of "human nature" at its best and most abstract, as though they had no motives or characteristics which needed to be taken into account. It is as if a mathematician were provided with only one side of an equation.

Although Japan will be conquered by the United Nations, acting as a corporate body, it seems fair to assume that the greatest part of the duties of military occupation will fall upon the British and Americans. Most of the other members of the United Nations especially involved

in the Pacific will have enormous problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation in the areas in which they are especially involved; in particular, the liberation of the Netherlands Indies, of French Indo-China, and of occupied China will make very heavy calls on the available trained personnel of the Dutch, French, and Chinese. Although these peoples will naturally be symbolically represented on the Occupying Commission, it seems probable that the greater part of the occupying personnel will be English and American. Apart from the fact that these two countries are the only ones likely to have trained personnel available, there is the further important consideration that English is the best-known foreign language in Japan. The number of foreigners who can handle Japanese really adequately, without fear of ambiguity or use of interpreters, is, and will inevitably remain, very small. The greater number of educated Japanese, on the other hand, possess some English; hence English is likely to be the chief contact language.

Both English and Americans will arrive with considerable animus against the Japanese for the defeats inflicted, the ill treatment suffered by their nationals, the destruction and disorganization produced in the territories in which they have special interests, and all the losses involved in a long and costly war. It can be presumed, however, that the policy of the United Nations will be not to exact revenge for these losses and humiliations, but to further as much as is possible the emergence of a non-militaristic and cooperative Japanese society, which will obviate the necessity of permanent expensive armaments in the Pacific. Consequently it is to be expected that an attempt will be made to control the inevitable animus felt by the individuals occupying Japan.

The fact that Japanese are physically different in appearance from the English and Americans will also produce personal reactions dangerous to the emergence of a cooperative Japan. The responses of the two groups to this fact can be expected to differ considerably in degree. Individuals of both groups will claim superiority on account of their pigmentation and stature, but the degree of superiority claimed is likely to be different. Owing to their long experience of administration in Asia and Africa, the British are accustomed to treating peoples of different skin-color and habits as colleagues and assistants, and to working with them, even though not admitting them to social intercourse. Few Americans have had similar experience; moreover a great deal of indoctrination will have led the majority to consider the Japanese as inferior

as imbued with all morally reprehensible qualities, even in many cases to deny them the minimum qualities of humanity, considering them instead as noxious animals or insects. This prejudice probably represents the greatest single difficulty involved in the successful fostering of a cooperative Japan; for the latter can be produced only by a recognition and fostering of those aspects of the Japanese character and institutions which may develop towards cooperation and democracy. No army of occupation can completely transform a society by force; at most it can institute a reign of terror which will enforce a simulacrum of the desired institutions. The attempts of Germany and Japan in this direction should prove how unsatisfactory such a method is, even if the indiscriminate use of terror did not go counter to Anglo-Saxon mores. One of the greatest problems facing future administrators of Japan, whether military or civil, is the recognition of those elements of Japanese culture and society which can be employed constructively in the rebuilding of Japan.

Here too the contrast between English and American experience and attitudes is likely to be apparent. Both groups have a deep-founded preference for parliamentary government and its concomitant institutions; but whereas the British have had considerable experience in dealing with political institutions of varied types, the Americans have had much less. The existing Japanese institutions which have democratic potentialities do not, as will be explained below, fall into the pattern of parliamentary government. Although parliamentary government, either under a republic or under a constitutional monarchy, can be considered the ultimate ideal for Japan, very considerable risks would be involved if the parliamentary forms were reintroduced prematurely. Since the Meiji restoration and the granting of the constitution, Japan has possessed parliamentary forms, but the elected representatives have never been capable of controlling the aggressive plans of the military and the big industrialists. It would be easy after defeat to hold elections in which liberal democratic candidates would be returned. Such a result would be immediately gratifying but would give no assurance of permanent cooperation. Anglo-American impatience for spectacular results will have to be restrained.

I JAPAN IN DEFEAT

It is even more difficult, in one respect, to speculate about the situation of Japan after military defeat than it is about that of any other

country. In all countries not yet defeated there is the same group of imponderables; what government, if any, will be in power when the forces of the United Nations enter; how great will be the physical devastation, the condition of the public means of communication, the possible presence of epidemic sickness, the stores of food available? With Japan, however, there is one more imponderable; the Japanese are one of the very few countries in the world (the only one among the Axis powers) who have not suffered military defeat and occupation by hostile forces in recent history. The Japanese have no precedent for responding to defeat. We have no analogies from which we can predict possible Japanese responses.

The nearest analogies to military defeat in Japanese history are the political defeats suffered at the hands of the Western powers during the second half of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth centuries, and the intermittent periods of internal chaos concomitant with shifts in the controlling groups in Japan. The political humiliations—the Perry episode, the Treaty of Portsmouth (by which Japan was deprived of most of the fruits of her victory over Russia), the enforced withdrawal of the Twenty-one Demands on China—all resulted, first, in some sporadic rioting and, second, in an exacerbation of nationalist feeling, with ever more determined efforts to force the humiliators to acknowledge Japanese superiority. Such behavior is strictly analogous to the behavior of the Japanese individual who “loses face.” This would be the chief danger of a compromise peace.¹

Perhaps even more indicative are the periods of internal disorder. The last of these came in the years preceding the establishment of the Tokugawa regime in the first years of the seventeenth century, and later with the breakdown of this regime and the establishment of the Meiji in the middle of the nineteenth century. Besides the actual armed conflicts between the various clans, these periods show another regular feature: the appearance of *rōnin*. Technically the *rōnin* is a samurai, a professional soldier, without a master or lord; but the term can, without impropriety, be extended to professional soldiers whose army has been disbanded. In the historical instances, these *rōnin* went into hiding in the mountains and countryside, occasionally meeting secretly with their fellows, sometimes taking menial jobs, sometimes extorting food

¹ See G. Gorer, “Themes in Japanese Culture,” *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Series II, 1943, 5, 121-123.

and shelter from the terrorized peasantry; and always killing in any available way those whom they judged to be enemies of their defunct lord or his interests. The historical rōnin were not, apparently, interested in loot. They wished to continue the only way of life which had significance for them, to continue to enjoy power and extort respect.

If analogies are meaningful, it can be expected that the equivalent of rōnin will appear in a conquered Japan, its personnel probably mainly recruited from the professional army officers, somewhat similar to the various German *Freikorps*. Such groups would represent a very considerable danger, both to the peaceful establishment of a cooperative Japan, and to the actual lives of the occupying forces. If they were numerous, their existence might entail almost endless and extremely costly punitive expeditions across the length and breadth of the Japanese islands. They would be able to terrorize part of the population, to whom their actions would appear patriotic. A guerilla warfare against them might well continue for years, ending only when Japan had been reduced to a mass of chaotic rubble, and many thousand United Nations soldiers had been lost. One of the chief aims of the occupying forces must be to minimize the number of rōnin.

To follow the historical analogy further is to discover that the number of rōnin is a positive function of the degree of internal chaos and anarchy. This historical fact is consonant with contemporary views of individual Japanese psychology. Under normal circumstances the restraints of organized Japanese society—the laws, and the conventions of suitable behavior—are adequate to restrain individual aggression. Once these external restraints have broken down for any reason, however, the Japanese are likely to be extremely violent. The reputation for docility ascribed latterly to the ordinary Japanese people is exaggerated. During the two and a half centuries of the Tokugawa period there were more than a thousand peasant riots; and there were serious rice riots at the end of the last war.²

The moral of these observations is clear: the immediate task of the occupying powers must be to reduce to the minimum the political and economic chaos and the anarchy which are the inevitable concomitants of defeat.

Even for victorious societies, the end of a war brings with it the

² See H. Borton, "Peasant Uprisings in Japan of the Tokugawa Period," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Tokyo, 1938.

very considerable problems of reabsorbing the demobilized forces, of re-establishing the civilian economy, of making the complicated transfer from a state of war to a state of peace. The vanquished have to face all these problems also, accompanied by the discrediting, if not the disappearance of, the government and other institutions which were in control until defeat. Under such circumstances the likelihood of confusion and anarchy is very great.

Such a situation presents the occupying powers with two alternatives: they can attempt to solve the problems of the vanquished by force majeure, or they can attempt to use the least objectionable of the groups in the conquered society as their instruments. The latter solution has so far been the choice of the United Nations in the liberated and conquered areas in the Mediterranean. It would seem to be the course indicated for Japan.

One of the chief reasons for relegating as much power as is safe to the Japanese, is that the Japanese have as much knowledge, experience, and success in internal politics as any contemporary society. During the two centuries of isolation, a great deal of their energy and ingenuity was put into political experiment; this knowledge has been extended over the intervening period. The Japanese have been at least as successful in dealing with such social problems as unemployment, inflation, and public health as has any of their present enemies. It would seem reasonable to employ such abilities to produce an orderly Japanese society; for without an orderly Japan, a cooperative Japan can never emerge.

All this would suggest that the occupying forces should, at least after the first period of actual military occupation, be relatively small, and composed of experts who will be able to exploit and cooperate with the available Japanese personnel. Such a small group would have considerable advantages. It would lessen the likelihood of unfortunate incidents of revenge; it would also provide a smaller number of targets for Japanese antagonism. Americans and British, as a matter of fact, formerly enjoyed considerable prestige among the Japanese, until it was undermined by their passive political behavior of the last twenty years. Victory will almost certainly restore to the Anglo-Americans that reputation for "virility" which had been lost; but the prestige can be retained only if the representatives of these peoples who have to deal with the Japanese manifest knowledge and understanding, as well as strength.

Since the expert personnel is inevitably limited, the administrators should be few, and placed in strategic positions.

II MINIMUM PROGRAM: REMOVAL OF ELEMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR AGGRESSION

Let us assume, then, that there is general agreement among the United Nations concerning the objects of a military occupation of Japan: (a) to insure as far as may be that Japan will not in the future disturb the peace of the Far East by aggressive warfare; (b) to assist in the emergence of a peaceful and cooperative Japanese society which will take a place in whatever international order is evolved; and (c) to guarantee that the use of force will be kept to a minimum, and that the reformation of Japanese society and policies will to the greatest degree consonant with safety be entrusted to Japanese, under the supervision and guidance of trained United Nations administrators. Such would appear to be the program which holds out the greatest hope of success. A culture and society so complex, deep-rooted, and highly integrated as the Japanese cannot be forcibly transformed in a lifetime even by the best-meaning missionary efforts. It is, on the other hand, quite feasible to canalize Japanese characteristics and energy in directions compatible with, instead of antagonistic to, the goals and policies of the peace-loving nations.

To prevent the recrudescence of an imperialistic and aggressive Japan, it will be essential to remove from the Japanese scene those individuals who have been primarily responsible in the past for Japanese aggression, both military and commercial. This is, however, a minimum program. It will not be sufficient to remove from influence and power merely those individuals who have actually been involved in the promotion of the aggressive policies of recent Japanese governments. Owing to the very great strength of family unity and family traditions in Japan (a characteristic which, as is explained below, can also play an important role in Japanese reconstruction) all the members by birth, marriage, or adoption, of those families who have a tradition of high military or naval command must be considered and watched with considerable suspicion. Though the number of such families is relatively small, their ramifications are so considerable that they penetrate every level of Japanese society. To remove or sequester them all would probably be beyond the bounds of practicability; but all of them would need to be

carefully watched and most thoroughly investigated before they were permitted to assume any position of responsibility or power.

Even more complex is the situation of the five or six families—the Mitsui, the Iwasaki (the owners of Mitsubishi) and the Sumitomo are the best known—whose businesses by their systems of vertical trusts, cartels, and interlocking directorates have maintained almost complete control over Japanese economy. After an earlier period of disagreement, they both financed and backed the military in their overseas expansion, being themselves the chief profitters of military conquest by their acquisition of raw materials, cheap labor, foreign-owned enterprises, and closed markets. Japanese economic policy, owing to the very limited purchasing power of the home market has been conditioned by monopoly capitalism and founded on export trade. If Japanese wages are allowed to remain as low as at present, and if these family commercial empires are allowed to remain intact, a recrudescence of economic, if not political, expansion appears inevitable. It is difficult, however, to apportion responsibility for Japanese economic expansion. The boards of directors of the famous firms contain strangers to the families; by marriage and adoption the families permeate the official structure of Japan; and in addition it is quite probable that the most important decisions were not committed to writing. It would seem desirable that the members of these monopolist families be investigated most carefully, and that those who have actually furthered the military expansion be removed from the country. It might also be desirable to prevent members of these families from playing any further important role in Japanese economic life for a certain period. To break up permanently these family commercial empires, and to redistribute the assets and properties on which the empires are founded is vital. Unless the business and financial structure of Japan is radically transformed, all other changes will be rendered nugatory.

About the retention of one other family group debate is sure to rage bitterly. This is the Imperial family. There will undoubtedly be strong arguments for the removal of the Imperial family, arguments backed by deep emotional feelings. The war itself, with all its accompanying violences, has been carried on in the name of the Emperor. The present Emperor is a symbol on which the popular hatred of the United Nations is concentrated. The institution of absolute monarchy is repugnant to the great majority of the United Nations. Unless the majority of the

Japanese evince a desire for some other form of government, however, there are a number of arguments for retaining the Imperial family. It might possibly be desirable to persuade the present emperor to abdicate (there are numerous precedents for this in Japanese history) and for his heir to replace him. The chief argument in favor of retaining the Imperial house has already been stated: the desirability of reducing to a minimum the chaos and confusion incident to defeat. The Emperor has remained a permanent figure, if with widely varying powers, during all the different phases of Japanese history; the different revolutions have all taken place under the symbolic leadership of the Emperor. For most Japanese, a constitution without an Emperor would be inconceivable; and his forcible removal by foreigners would produce a state of psychological confusion and disorientation which would be completely antagonistic to the goals envisaged.

The actual, as opposed to the symbolic, power of the Emperor has varied enormously over different periods; it would seem possible to use the symbolic power of the Emperor to produce the goals of the United Nations more quickly and efficiently than any other means. The Constitution was "granted" by the Emperor Meiji; a more liberal one can be "granted" by his successor. Because an Imperial Rescript can do more than many regiments, the power of the Imperial Rescript is a political device with which it would be short-sighted to do away.

If the Emperor were retained, as is here argued, it would of course be necessary to provide him with advisers. Even more important, however, would be the necessity of redefining with considerable clarity the rules by which the Emperor can be approached. The prestige and authority of the relatively liberal and democratic civilian cabinets of the '20's were undermined by two political phenomena: the Army and Navy were able to sabotage any government of whose composition they disapproved by refusing to release suitable officers to hold the portfolios of the Army and Navy (which constitutionally had to be filled by appropriate officers); and secondly, the Army and Navy ministers could approach the Emperor directly, without consulting or informing their civilian colleagues in the Cabinet. These powers of the Army and Navy assured that the policy of imperialist aggression, originally started (it would appear) without civilian approval, would be adhered to. At present the symbolic power of the Emperor is the chief device for promoting

aggression; wisely used, on the other hand, it can be the greatest single asset in the hands of the United Nations.

III INSTITUTIONS FOSTERING AGGRESSION

Besides the individuals and their families who have carried Japan along the road of aggression and war, there are also the institutions through which these aggressive policies have been carried out, and by which the mass of the people have been indoctrinated or terrorized into acquiescence. The most important of these institutions are five: the Army and Navy; the police, both civil and military; the educational system, especially in the lower and middle schools; State Shinto as an institution; and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA). If Japan is to be successfully transformed into a cooperative society, none of these institutions can be left unmodified.

The Army and Navy represent the easiest problem. The Atlantic Charter and subsequent speeches by the leaders of most of the United Nations have stated unequivocally that both are to be completely disbanded. As far as the enlisted personnel is concerned, this disbandment would present relatively few problems. Transport would have to be sufficiently organized so that the disbanded men could be returned to their families with the minimum of delay and without being exposed to indoctrination by their officers in favor of continued resistance. Once the men are dispersed over the country, the admirable Japanese family system will, if it is in any way possible, find places, sustenance, and work for them. Provided the village system is left untouched, demobilization should, indeed, present less difficulty in Japan than in any Occidental country.

The officers, in particular the younger officers, represent a far greater problem. Selected to a great extent for their fanatical characters, they have received much undesirable indoctrination. The responsibility for the most shocking acts of the Japanese during the war can be laid to the door of the officers, and often of the high command—such acts as the rape of Nanking, the torture and murder of wounded prisoners (encouraged to destroy the squeamishness of the enlisted men, and to make their fears of surrender more realistic), the murder or enforced suicide of beleaguered garrisons, as at Attu. Appropriate devices will presumably have been worked out for the punishment of actual "war criminals"; it is doubtful, however, if this category would include the

whole officer corps. For the sake of future tranquillity, and to obviate the possibility of *rōnin*, it would seem desirable during the first years of military occupation to segregate these officers from the rest of the population. Such a procedure will undoubtedly cause individual hardship, and may well be protested by the professional soldiers of the United Nations; it would seem, however, a most essential prerequisite to a peaceful development of Japan. The history of Germany after 1918 might have been very different if there had been no demobilized officers to foment and precipitate overt and covert resistance. The history of Germany, particularly that of the occupied Ruhr, after 1918, provides many suggestive clues to the difficulties inherent in the military occupation of Japan.

To one branch of the armed forces must go special mention and special attention; that is the military police (*kempei*). The original mandate of the military police was the control of the army and the guarding of military secrets; in recent years they have acquired more and more power, have encroached more and more on the functions of the civil police, and have acted in an increasingly arbitrary and high-handed fashion. Most of the petty (and more serious) persecution of foreigners is due to their actions. Their representatives are stationed in every hamlet in the zones defined as "military," with powers analogous to those of the German S.S. Not only would the military police have to be disbanded; its members would have to be regarded with considerable suspicion.

The civil police represent a problem of a different nature. Japan has for a long period been the most efficiently policed country in the world, and an efficient police force is essential for the maintenance of order. In so far as they are used to obeying whatever group is in power, the Japanese civil police (who, incidentally, have individually and collectively resented the encroachment on their powers by the military police) resemble the civil services of Occidental countries. They would, in fact, probably carry out the orders of a United Nations military commission.

By democratic standards, however, the Japanese police have always possessed too much power. They represent a *polizeistaat*, rather than a *rechtsstaat*. Not only do they exercise very arbitrary power, but the existing Japanese practice does not provide those guarantees of the rights of the citizen which lie at the basis of a democratic constitution.

A democratic Japan cannot emerge while the mass of the Japanese are terrorized by a police force possessing and using arbitrary powers.

The remedy for this state of affairs would seem to lie not in recruiting an entirely new personnel but rather in a redefinition of the powers of the police and the rights of the citizen. Whatever device is used for promulgating new laws—whether the fiat of the Occupying authorities or Imperial Rescripts—should be used to establish some version of *habeas corpus*, and detailed definitions of the limits of police power set and promulgated. Individual officers of particularly recalcitrant character, or with particularly brutal records, would have to be dismissed; in addition there would have to be instituted a regular system of inspection of police behavior by members of the military commission. With these safeguards, however, the police could probably be entrusted with the maintenance of internal order. With possible individual exceptions, they should not prove to be a subversive influence.

Although the main lines of the typical Japanese character structure are firmly established by the age of six (and the mechanisms by which they are established are not susceptible to modification by any system of military government) the direction in which the energies and wishes will be canalized is to a very great extent determined by the public indoctrination received in school. There are various mechanisms of indoctrination—the Imperial Rescript on education, read solemnly and publicly two or three times a year, the daily ritual of reverence to the image of the Emperor and the flag, the official textbooks used, especially those on history and civics, the official exegeses on these textbooks supplied by the Ministry of Education, the attachment of regular Army officers to the staff of each school to act simultaneously as teachers and controllers of the rest of the staff. All these serve to inculcate the peculiar Japanese brand of patriotism, marked by devotion to the Emperor, sentiments of national superiority, and a strongly distorted picture of the universe—one-sided fact inextricably mixed with undisputed fiction, resulting in a set of values which makes cooperation with other nations nearly impossible.

In all the enemy countries, indeed, the educational system represents the greatest single difficulty facing the United Nations. The typical national psychology, even though it is one which renders the people particularly susceptible to aggressive ideologies, cannot be greatly modified by any techniques now available. If, however, sophisticated

manipulation of existing institutions can spare the coming generation from exposure to aggressive ideologies, the drive and industry which are important facets of both the German and Japanese character may be canalized into constructive and cooperative behavior. If, on the contrary, this cannot be achieved, the chances for peace when another generation comes of age are slight.

The problem of the transformation of Japanese education cannot be dealt with in vacuo. It is part and parcel of the whole problem of the future government of Japan and particularly of the retention of the Emperor. If an amenable Emperor is retained, a new Rescript on education can be issued, stressing the virtues of democracy and cooperation; in such a case the old rituals could reenforce new values—reading the Imperial Rescript, the daily reverence to the shrine holding the Imperial pictures (the Japanese equivalent of the Salute to the Flag), and the commentaries on the Rescript. Without the symbolic power of the Emperor such results would be far harder to achieve.

Many of the present textbooks, especially the history and civics books together with the official "teachers' guides" thereon, are definitely antagonistic to democratic cooperative values. Their employment would have to be forbidden. Substitutes would have to be written, but not by any non-Japanese. To do the job successfully, the cooperation of Japanese scholars would need to be enlisted, and the manuscripts submitted to the approval of a United Nations educational board, which would have powers of veto and recommendation.

The existing school teachers, with the exception, of course, of the regular army officers attached to the staffs, would have to be left in control of the schools, at least until a freshly trained group of replacements is available. As with the police, the majority of the personnel would probably follow instructions faithfully; inspectors would have to discover and discharge particularly recalcitrant individuals.

Existing teacher-training schools (normal schools) offer a particularly fertile ground for indoctrination of the next generation of teachers by members of the United Nations commission. It might well be desirable to appoint one or more members, with the proper scholastic and political qualifications, to the staff of each normal school. The system of examination and appointments could be so controlled that the next generation of schoolmasters for Japan would be educated and convinced proponents of democracy and cooperation.

Although State Shinto is an important supplement to the present Japanese attitudes towards war and aggression and to the Japanese system of values, it is questionable whether, without the other institutions and the legal compulsion to follow its rituals, its importance would be very great. If it is treated as a religion, it could come within the concept of "freedom of religion"; hence the legal compulsions to observe State Shinto rituals would be automatically abrogated. If, besides this, some or all of the financial support of the shrines were withdrawn, State Shinto, artificially inflated in recent years, would probably shrink to modest proportions and be of little danger. It would be desirable, to be sure, to investigate those people who have received appointments to State Shrines in recent years, and to control these appointments in the future. Such appointments have great influence and prestige, and, in the recent past, have been made chiefly for political aims.

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, with its numerous affiliates, is the Japanese equivalent of the Nazi and Fascist parties of totalitarian Germany and Italy. The differences, however, are marked. It has not very much power, but its tendency is anti-democratic; it should certainly be dissolved. A relatively new political growth, its disappearance would not leave any important gap in the Japanese social structure.

Somewhat deeper rooted, and much more dangerous, are the various chauvinistic secret societies, of which the Black Dragon Society is the best known. It will require considerable intelligence work to identify the officers and members of these societies; it is essential, however, that such secret societies should be disbanded and outlawed, and their members kept under surveillance.

IV THE JAPANESE VILLAGE A BASIS FOR DEMOCRACY

The chief basis for the hope that, under favorable conditions, Japan can evolve into a democratic and cooperative society lies in the contemporary village organization. The Japanese village today, as well as in its past traditions, is a good example of cooperation and democracy.³ Village affairs are looked after by headmen elected by a representative of every household; village meetings allow popular discussion of every problem; local public works are carried out by the village as a corporate

³ See especially John F. Embree's *Suye Mura*, Chapter IV, "Forms of Cooperation." Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1939.

unit. Smaller units parallel this democratic structure. There are cooperative groups of neighbours (*kumi*) who perform various agricultural and building tasks in rotation for one another, and cooperative loan clubs (*ko*) which enable villagers to meet sudden expenses without too great difficulty. Religious rites are also carried out by the village, acting corporately; religious specialists (priests) are supported by the group. The spokesman for the village is the elected headman (*sonshō*), who would be perfectly capable of dealing with the occupying authorities.

That Japan has never extended the admirable village pattern, with its democratic political patterns and its nice balance of rights and duties, is a matter of deep regret. The authoritarian hierarchy of the ruling (and latterly middle) classes has obscured the democratic, but atomic, base on which Japanese society rests. But the democratic pattern and the cooperative practice are there. There is already existent, for example, the pattern by which the hamlets (*buraku*) are democratically integrated into the larger village unit (*mura*). The latter is today the largest area of democratic integration, the villages being under the autocratic centralized prefectural government acting through the resident chief of police and often representatives of the military police. But, given the opportunity, it should not tax Japanese political ingenuity too much to evolve a democratic pattern for integrating villages into still larger units, eventually taking in the whole country. In some such development, indeed, lies the chief hope of a democratic Japan.

The electoral and operative unit in the Japanese village is not the individual but the family or household through a male representative. Japanese family solidarity is a cushion against pauperism or unemployment, provided the family is in any way capable of sustaining its dependent members. In the recent past, and probably in the near future, this ability has been dependent on the world market price of agricultural produce, above all rice and silk (though, in the case of rice, an artificially inflated price has sometimes been maintained). Japan has a money economy, dependent on world markets; any severe drop in the purchasing power of the Japanese peasant household would do much to disrupt the harmony and cooperation of the Japanese family and village.

Other favorable aspects of the Japanese social scene which would appear to need no interference are the excellent health, medical, and

sanitary services, the very respectable tradition of the greater part of the judiciary, and a great deal of the higher education.

Aspects of the Japanese character structure which could be as well canalized into democratic as aggressive patterns are their industry and ingenuity, their frugality, their development of the concepts of rights and duties. The unconscious aggression, which has found vent in recent periods in war and rapine, need not necessarily come to the surface in socially undesirable ways; the relatively peaceful (externally completely peaceful) Tokugawa period demonstrated that.

If the above diagnosis of the means by which Japan can develop into a cooperative and democratic member of the nations of the world has any validity, the tasks and problems of the members of the United Nations military occupation authority will be evident. The transformation of Japan by force would be a labor of excessive difficulty and dubious success. The task is more subtle. By removing or modifying those factors in Japanese society which have made for nationalism and aggression, and by encouraging those facets of Japanese society which are already democratic and cooperative, the society might well be transformed in a relatively short period. The Americans and British start with the advantage of considerable prestige among the Japanese as models on which their modernization was to a great extent founded; one of the chief tasks of the individual member of the occupying authority will be to see that he regains and enhances this prestige. Politeness, a certain recognition of Japanese deviousness, particularly in conversation, an ability to discriminate between the characters of different Japanese, and a willingness to give respect and delegate authority to those Japanese who are worthy of it, are essential requisites for a military occupying authority working on the levels which have been envisaged in this article. Such a personnel would, to be sure, need careful selection, long training, and political sophistication; but they could produce far more results and far more quickly than could a much greater number of less well instructed and more emotionally disturbed officials.

REHABILITATING FASCIST YOUTH

By GREGOR ZIEMER

THE fascist movements of Europe and Asia have concentrated tremendous energy on the indoctrination of youth. For upon the fanaticism of youth the ruthless vigor of fascism has depended. In Mr. Ziemer's best-selling *Education for Death*, that story was told.

A major problem during occupation and for long years afterward will be the rehabilitation of these youths. In the short run, the effectiveness of military occupation can be jeopardized by the presence of sullen or rebellious groups of young Nazis. In the long run, the future peace depends in large measure on how the youth of today in fascist countries is handled. In the

present article, the author sketches the dimensions of the problem and suggests ways in which measures of rehabilitation can be undertaken.

As Director of the American Colony School in Berlin before and during the Nazi regime, Mr. Ziemer was in an ideal position to observe fascist education at work. Since then he has written and lectured extensively on European problems. Joining the staff of WLW as a commentator in November, 1941, he can boast the strenuous distinction of having been on the air broadcasting every day since then.

THE YOUTH OF EUROPE AND ASIA, as we find it in 1944, is not the youth it was before events made it clear even to their immature minds that somebody lied when the exciting theories of Nazi and Japanese invincibility were propounded to them in their schools. The Nazi boys, who were told over and over in a thousand classrooms that Nazi ideology would sweep the world, have realized by now that the bombers which Goering said would never come, have swept Germany. And even the Hitler youth must have heard of the latest joke in Germany. Goering is called Herr Meyer behind his back—the fruit of his own words: "If enemy planes ever cross our borders, my name isn't Goering—but Meyer."

The millions of boys and girls who have been brought up under totalitarian regime are going through a weird, forlorn readjustment. More and more they will realize that the myth of superiority is only a myth. And so the question of what to do with Fascist youth may call for some flexible answers after we discover the ultimate effect the defeat of their own countries will have on them.

There are, however, certain immutable truths that face us. Human nature being what it is, we can with immunity predict, at least hope, that if certain rules are applied, certain solutions may be expected. For no matter how much the youth of the Fascisti may be affected by war from now on, the past years of Fascist indoctrination will have left almost indelible marks. Deep, lasting damage has been done to the

morals, the minds, the entire thought processes of Fascist youth. If those vicious marks are ever to be erased, we shall have to get busy—very busy. The first move, of course, is military.

We are anticipating nothing but unconditional military surrender of the Nazis and the Japanese; nothing but liquidation of the Japanese and the Nazi military clique. In Japan that includes not only the entire military set. It must include the so-called leaders of thought—the thousands of teachers, who, following the model set by Nazi Germany, using many of the same methods as Nazi Germany used, are hoping to earn the gratitude of Japanese posterity by making of the children good Japanese subjects, loyal only to the emperor, worshipping only Shintoism. In Nazi Germany we must annihilate not only the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Gestapo, and the Sicherungsdienst, the Junkers and the Herr Geheimraete. The group of men who call themselves the Nazi *Beschuetzer der Jugend*, the protectors of Youth, must also go.

That will help. It is a preventative measure for further prostitution of youth; but it is no cure for the rottenness now gnawing at young souls in Nazi Germany. We can punish the leaders in Nazi Germany and in Japan. But what will we do with the youth which they perverted?*

We have all reason to hope, first off, that Italian youth has not been so deeply indoctrinated as Nazi youth. Men who have studied both agree on this point. A Fascist leader who observed some Nazi schools with me was utterly astounded at the thoroughness, the deeply fanatic tone set in the Nazi schools. The Italians, according to him, would never take their theories of Fascism so seriously as the Nazis. So for the time being, the youth which needs attention first, and which should at the same time offer us one of the finest opportunities for rehabilitation, is German youth. Germany will be our real laboratory.

Although most psychologists agree that there are certain fundamental qualities which run through all youth, perhaps a word of warning is in order. When we think of German youth, we come up against a question not only of the kind of human qualities, but of the intensity of these same qualities. In Germany we find young human beings who have the intensity of the Germans, the pride of the Germans, the thoroughness of the Germans, plus the ferocity of the Nazis, the blindness of the Nazis, the utter devotion of the Nazis.

* I shall henceforth eliminate Japanese youth from this discussion. Fortress Europe presents more than enough problems to handle in one article.

I need not give you accounts of Nazi schools. That much is common knowledge. Examples of their fanaticism pile up in my memory. There was a girls' school in Schmargendorf, Berlin, where I saw a group of Nazi girls, BDM girls they were, hypnotized into utter adoration for Adolf Hitler by a spinster Nazi teacher in a black shirt and a flaming orange blouse, wet under the arms. And there were the ardent young maidens dancing a dance of fecundity in the old Amphitheatre of Trier on October 9, the birthday of the party hero, Horst Wessel, noted pander. Or again, I recall the class of Nazi boys, ten-year-old Jungvolk, in the Volksschule of Westend, attending a science class in which the teacher gave a lecture on tomato plants; how blessed were the plants, he declared, because they could grow in holy German soil, and how great the glory of dying for the Fuehrer and lying as a dead soldier in that same holy German soil. So too I remember the pre-school boys, in a Nazi institution provided for youngsters of mothers working in a war plant, who at the age of five had learned a song: "For Hitler I live, for Hitler I die—Adolf Hitler is our Savior."

The Nazi leaders have been brutally thorough in their totalitarian efforts of claiming the souls of Nazi youth. And they have succeeded in their task. There may, to be sure, be a certain element in German youth even today who never did wholeheartedly swallow the Nazi creed. But in my opinion these are exceptional cases. The average German youth is a Nazi youth. That is the only sane premise on which to proceed.

I do not, on the other hand, subscribe to the theory that the German children who have been under Nazi influence for more than a decade have none of the underlying elemental human reactions. They have the same instincts, yes, but these instincts have been warped and bent and cramped into almost inhuman forms. Nazi youth does get hungry like other children; they get tired, they get frightened. But they have been susceptible to an iron discipline so long and have been influenced by their Nazi superiors to such an extent that their mental and moral reactions are no longer normal.

The question simmers down to this: How reclaim these warped youths? And when?

When? Just as soon as we can get at Nazi youth. Right now our bombers are conditioning them as effectively for a new regime of fairness and decent cooperation and world fellowship as anything we could do.

By whom should this reclamation be put into practice?

By those who defeat Germany. And that will obviously include us! In fact, America may well be called on to take a definite leadership in this rehabilitation.

How?

Very likely, a few more thousand bombings will be the first stage in the reeducation of German youth. As yet Nazi youth is defiant enough. At this writing reports coming from Switzerland indicate that the painstaking and fanatic work of Hitler's *Lehrer Bund* has thus far been quite sufficient to provide Nazi youth with more faith in a final Nazi victory than the older folk possess. That defiance will have to be softened first.

The doctrines of Nazism have been sown so well, and have taken such deep roots in the minds and souls of Hitler's youngsters, that you cannot eradicate them easily. He got them young.

For the youth of Germany, the memories of the days before the saturation bombings are sweet memories. The Nazi party has really known how to play on the lowest emotions of youth. Youth was told it is always right. It was told that not only by Goebbels, in every public square of Germany, but by every teacher in every classroom of the Nazi schools. Youth had parades and uniforms; youth had military maneuvers. The bullying instincts in youth were encouraged. Youth was made to feel that the world was at its feet.

Nazi youth will remember these feelings, these emotions. Yes, some day one of Hitler's children may have nostalgia.

Unless—unless we can make Nazi youth forget as soon as possible after the war. And we can make them forget only if we make them focus their minds on something new, something obviously better—something so stimulating that even Nazi youth will not care to think back to the days when Hitler told them all they had to do to conquer the world was to kill all the weaklings in it.

So our task is clear.

We may never be able to eradicate memories completely; only death can do that. But we can replace them—replace them with more soul-satisfying feelings—after German youth, conditioned by bombings, begins to grope almost instinctively for other values. But it will not be easy.

For one thing, whoever is sent into Germany to recondition the

millions of boys and girls after this war will have to face suspicion, distrust, even hot hatred. You can't instill in youngsters a hatred of everything a democracy stands for, as has been done with the youth of Hitler; then have those same democracies bomb their homes, kill their relations; and expect this youth to greet the personal representatives of such democracies when they arrive as conquerors, with anything but an intensified hatred. German youth will hate everything American. Consequently, simply sending a contingent of American teachers into Germany with the army may be too drastic, too early a step.

First of all, the United Nations will have the gigantic task of proving to the youth of Germany that the democracies have a definite, decent program, and full intentions of carrying it out with fairness and determination.

Nazi youth will have to be gathered in from the streets, from the farms, from the army. They must be disarmed, deloused, washed, fed.

But always German youth must be treated with discipline. It must be a definite, strict discipline. They have been told for more than ten years that the democracies are weak, slipshod, half-hearted. They must be made to feel not only that our soldiers are strong enough to conquer their soldiers, but that our civilian administrators can be firm—very firm—firm without being cruel.

Then, if the qualified civil affairs officers will make the effort to investigate the regular residence registrations of German cities, all of which list the occupations of the citizens, they will find a certain nucleus of German teachers who still respect America, teachers who were dismissed by the Nazi regime.

Right here in America I have met several of these anti-Hitler teachers, in American internment camps for Nazi prisoners. They were dismissed from the Nazi schools years ago because they were not good Nazis. One of them told me that he was glad to see for himself what America was. What he was experiencing here was making him feel he would be able to explain better to his students, if he could get back to his school in Brunswick, just what a democracy is. Of course he was going back to teaching in Brunswick if possible. Teaching was all he was fit for. You don't change your profession over night in Europe.

Before the war is over, we will have in this country hundreds of thousands of German prisoners. Among them will be many who were sent into the Army because the Nazi regime did not consider them polit-

ically reliable; and among them, in turn, will be a number of teachers. Perhaps our Government or our military machine could ferret out those teachers in our internment camps, classify them, and give them special courses; and then eventually, after peace has come, use them as a nucleus of German teachers who will go back to their country with our army. How many such individuals are in this country now I do not know. The number will grow. But those pre-Hitler teachers are here now; we can get at them; we have access to them.

Perhaps the objection will be raised that we should not, could not possibly, deal with German prisoners of war?

Why not? Many of them are in the Nazi army against their will. I know that for a certainty. Available now for special courses, they might turn out to be excellent post-victory teachers. It would take good judgment to single out those prisoners who are really reliable and can be of service, but it would be something to do while we are waiting. Many of the German prisoners, especially those with education, have begun to admire America even from behind the barbed wire of our internment camps. They certainly would be valuable as assistants in the great task of reeducating German youth, each according to his ability.

Then there are other teachers still in Nazi Germany who were dismissed from their profession simply because they had no love for Nazism. Not all of them have been stuffed into the Nazi army. I recall a red-headed German teacher who was on a ship on which I toured the Mediterranean. He was later dismissed simply because for three months, years before Hitler came, he had been a member of the Social Democratic party. The army refused him because of a bad leg. He is about forty now, excellent material for the post-victory schools. There must be thousands like him, too old for the army, but not too old for educational work.

But the *supervision*, the actual administration of the German schools, at least for five years, should be in the hands of American and British educators who not only know the German language but also the German psychology and what has been going on in Nazi schools. There are hundreds of Americans in this country now who at one time or another have attended German educational institutions, or who have been exchange students in the days before Hitler. Many of them would volunteer for this work; given special courses, special instructions, they could then help to supervise the educational reconstruction of the new Germany.

Various American educational organizations, moreover, could be drawn into service. I am thinking of Mr. William G. Carr of the National Education Association in Washington, who has for months been advocating an international agency for education. He and his organization would be of great help. We have queried American educators about this plan. I have many letters from school men all over the United States expressing their belief that this sort of international agency would be of great value.

And student exchange ships could start functioning. We could bring tested and tried pre-Hitler German teachers over here and let them observe our methods and visit our schools. It would be cheaper to send a dozen such floating schools across the ocean than one battleship.

Here is another suggestion. Recently I had the honor of addressing the annual congress of the Girl Scout leaders of the United States at Cleveland. I was informed that this organization has already voluntarily offered its entire experience, its entire wealth of knowledge, and its members for work in post-war Europe. No doubt other youth organizations in our country would, or perhaps have, made similar voluntary moves.

That much for personnel. A few words about methods. The first period of this educational reconstruction in Germany will of course put the emphasis on physical elements. German schools will have to be repaired. The youth of Germany and the occupied countries will be hungry. They will have to be fed. Then with patience, with firmness, and with discipline, they will have to be registered and inducted into the new German schools with regular school hours, and regular courses. Gradually, as they gather first-hand impressions, they will realize that the lies which they learned about democracy are just that.

Textbooks will have to be printed, under supervision. One advantage the Nazi teachers and the Nazi educational system have given us. Much of their teaching was word-of-mouth teaching, by lectures and oral drills in Nazi ideology; the Nazis did not believe in too many books. But I know from first-hand experience that German youth would take to our American books, and teaching methods—provided there is discipline and firmness.

We must be represented in the lands of the Fascisti by men and women who are realists but not skeptics, who have no doubt in their hearts about the efficacy of American educational methods. We must

take it for granted that the educational system we will employ in Nazi Germany will really represent the finest in America. It should be a composite of our best methods, and appropriate to the task. We have some methods that would create only havoc if introduced into Europe. Let educational experts get together on the curriculum.

In our attempt to put decency back into the German schools, special attention should be devoted to the age differences. The very young tots, the kindergarten and the pre-school youngsters, even though they have been brought up with the intention of making Nazis out of them, will not have had too concentrated a course since the war began. They ought to adapt themselves easily to a new system. The slightly older ones, the *Pimpfs* (boys six to ten), the *Jungmaedel* (girls ten to twelve), and the *Jungvolk* (boys ten to twelve) may present a more complicated problem. They have been indoctrinated with Nazism ever since they began school. But they will not present so serious a problem as the older boys, now aged fifteen or more, the Hitler youth. The girls over twelve, the BDM girls, may on the other hand be somewhat more malleable, since they were being educated for family life, motherhood, and childbearing rather than for political thinking.

To discuss in detail at this point the different kinds of schools Germany had before the war is manifestly impossible—the *Grundschule* (to be attended by all boys and girls in separate buildings, of course, until the age of ten), the *Gymnasium*, the *Realschulen* emphasizing classic education, the *Oberrealschulen* and the *Technische Hochschulen*, the engineering colleges, and the academic colleges. In the last few years the distinction between the different German schools on the same level has been more and more obliterated. All of them became simply Hitler schools.

Perhaps one phase of education could be emphasized from the very beginning in the reconstructed Germany. The country has been woefully lacking in real industrial schools. There have been laboratories and some shops, all of them devoted to a training for war. Perhaps ways and means could be devised to bring, at least during the first years after the cessation of actual fighting, many more of these industrial schools into being. Germany will be a shambles before this war is over. Many cities will have to be rebuilt almost from the ground up. Why not let the children, at least those of some maturity, help in such reconstruction? Certainly our army and our navy would know what courses to suggest:

they are now sending millions of young Americans through these specialized courses in our own schools and camps. The Army Specialized Training Program is a good example of what can be done with young men if they have the least bit of aptitude.

Perhaps many of the German cities will find difficulty in providing buildings and space for school. I should not be astonished if so-called resident-centers, as we have them in this country, where all boys and girls pitch in to do whatever work is necessary, would have a very useful preliminary place in a battered Germany.

But the Nazis have many special schools devoted exclusively to the propagation of Nazi ideology; for example, the *Reichsakademie fuer Jugendfuehrung* in Brunswick, the *Lehrerschule Rust* in the same town, named after the Minister of Education Bernhard Rust, the various *Ordensburgen*, where the most promising Hitler youth were made into miniature leaders. These will have to be eradicated with thoroughness and without a tremor of regret. What I have seen in some of those special exclusive Hitler schools is not fit for print; it is fit only for utter extermination. It will not be difficult to get a list of these schools. I have a list of most of them. The leaders of those institutions should be brought to justice. If any of them escape, we may be certain that they will act as leaven for further Hitler indoctrination in the future—the near future. That *must* be prevented.

This whole task of salvaging young humanity will make of us crusaders in the true sense of the word. But reclaiming lives is as worthy a task as stopping the enemies on the battlefield. It will require understanding, patience, and stamina; it will also require manpower and money. We are training men now for this great task, to the end that our next generation, our children, will not have to meet Hitler's children some day, and go through the same travail.

That, we are resolved, must never happen. It will not happen, if out of Hitler's children we can make children of a better world; if out of American children we can make children with hope and determination in their hearts; and if we all realize that, being American, we have not only the privileges but also the responsibilities of citizens in a democracy.

Are we big enough to redeem the youth of Germany? We are, if we are big enough to believe in America and its methods.

HANDLING DISPLACED POPULATIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

By CLARENCE E. PICKETT

At the close of World War I, some six million Europeans had been uprooted and displaced by the whirlwind of war. In 1939, ten per cent of that population—600,000 people—had yet to be permanently relocated. The problems of resettlement were handled either in a piecemeal fashion or left entirely to personal initiative and chance.

This time, conservative estimates put the number of displaced Europeans at thirty million. How many will be added to that number by the havoc of invasion from the west cannot yet be said. Certain it is, however, that the

magnitude of the job of resettlement and relief will be enormous. Piecemeal planning and casual administration can bring untold suffering upon those in Europe who have already suffered much. In the pages which follow, Mr. Pickett discusses the nature of the displaced groups and the steps which may be necessary in resettling them.

As Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, Mr. Pickett has worked at first hand with the tragic dislocation of World War II.

THE UPROOTING of European populations as a result of military operations, persecution, labor drafts, and the execution of Axis concepts of the New Order is a deeply tragic manifestation of these war years. Aware as we are of the ruthless price of war on the battlefields and of the slow and inexorable spread of hunger and disease among civilians, most of us find it difficult to understand the extent to which Europeans have been torn from homes, separated from families, and forced to subsist in alien lands. In these terms, Europe has become one great internment camp.

Because the problems of resettlement are so vast and so complex, it is generally recognized that their solutions can be found only in international planning and in the establishment at the European peace conference of an international administration strongly backed by the new national governments of Europe. Not only will the task be one of the most difficult facing the peacemakers; on the humane and wise solution of the needs of displaced people will depend much of the genuine rehabilitation of Europe.

Eugene Kulischer in his excellent book, *The Displacement of Populations in Europe*, published by the International Labor Office, puts their number at thirty million. His estimate, based on careful studies of the International Labor Office over a period of years, includes some six and a half million prisoners of war and seventeen million presumably dis-

placed within their own national frontiers. Of these about a million are Belgian, French, and Dutch families removed from the coastal areas and some ten million removed from Western to Eastern Russia ahead of the German armies. Yet Mr. Kulischer states that his figure of thirty million is conservative and that the actual figure is probably closer to forty million.

At the close of World War I there were only about five to six million displaced persons. Even so, the chronicles of the tragic migrations of those post-war years are a reproach to us—the caravans of lost and neglected children, the death and disease which swept through the overcrowded and terrible refugee camps of Eastern Europe, the Polish refugees who trekked through the famine wastes of Russia to find in their homeland only dugouts for shelter in what had so recently been battlefields. In France refugees returning to their devastated farms and homes subsisted on grass. Indeed the suffering of many of these people was greater in the post-war years than during the actual period of conflict. Such unnecessary suffering may be attributed to inadequate planning or no planning at all; to a narrow nationalism which failed to find solutions in international organization to provide temporary transit and reception care. That some refugees of 1919 were, in fact, never actually resettled is demonstrated by the statement of the head of the League of Nations Commission for Refugees in 1939 in estimating the number of unrellocated refugees—Russians, Armenians, Turks, Saarlanders, etc.—at 600,000. We in our day, faced with a number of displaced persons approximately six times larger than after World War I, cannot certainly afford to leave their resettlement to personal initiative or chance, nor are we justified in any piecemeal approach.

WHO ARE THE DISPLACED?

Who are the displaced people of the present war, and why have they been driven from their homes? Some of the reasons are as old as war itself. First there are the victims of active warfare, those who have fled before the advance of armies or been removed from their homes for military considerations. Some six and a half million in a second group are the voluntary and involuntary workers transported to the Reich to maintain the German war economy. A third group includes those resettled in accordance with the Axis plan for a "New Europe." And,

finally, there are those who have fled from racial and minority persecution, usually the least protected and most economically destitute of all.

A. VICTIMS OF ACTIVE WARFARE

As the war has progressed, the number in the first group has increased. Here are included not only civilians but prisoners of war. While it is true that war prisoners are the most protected group under international agreements and that their respective governments will presumably wish to arrange for their repatriation as quickly as possible after the close of hostilities, they will be in need of many of the same services as other displaced people. Thousands are scattered in isolated camps and labor crews, where they will require temporary care until their repatriation to their homelands can be arranged. Inevitably this means careful planning at the reception end. That such planning must be undertaken is demonstrated by the experiences of World War I, when thousands of these men wandered for months, ill-nourished, among hostile populations, in an effort to reach their families and homes.

Civilians are, of course, the largest group of victims of active warfare. Either by their own fear of approaching armies or by decrees, they have been moved away from active theaters of war or bombed cities. In 1940, for example, some five million Belgian, Dutch, Luxemburg, and French refugees fled before the German armies into Southern France. Whole villages were evacuated. Families were separated. These people traveled by train, by truck, and on foot. Few mothers remembered to bring warm clothing for their young children; only an occasional family, recognizing that the journey meant weeks on the road, carried any food supplies. Our relief workers reported that they were taking people from the trains at reception points who wore only night clothes under their coats. Fleeing without destination, they were completely dependent on the inadequate facilities of the already overcrowded provinces of Southern France. Since that time there have been in Russia other and larger migrations. Even more recently, thousands of Italians have fled from Northern Italy into Switzerland.

B. WORKERS TRANSPORTED TO THE REICH

The second group of displaced people, estimated to number some six and a half million persons, includes the men and women transported to the Reich for labor service. Preparing for total mobilization, Germany

first attempted to enroll volunteers for her labor corps. When volunteer workers were insufficient to meet the needs, occupied nations and Axis satellites were required to provide fixed quotas of workers. In some areas, particularly in Russia and Poland, able-bodied men and women were rounded up on the streets and transported to Germany. Other expedients were used. Raw materials were withheld from factories in occupied Europe not engaged in war production until the factories were obliged to close; then the unemployed workers were transported to service in the Reich.

In the beginning foreign workers were used almost exclusively for agriculture. Subsequently they were assigned to construction and building; since 1941 an increasingly large percentage have gone into industry. The urgent need for skilled workers is reflected in the more recent levies on the occupied countries of Western Europe.

There has also been a movement in the other direction. German business men and technical experts have been sent into the occupied countries to strengthen and extend German economic control over the continent. Many of these men have taken their families with them and are occupying homes and farms confiscated from the national owners.

C. SETTLERS IN A "NEW EUROPE"

The third group, representing part of an exchange of population or a planned colonization policy on the part of the Axis, will undoubtedly present one of the most difficult problems in the post-war years. Even before the war Germany had begun to recall persons of Germanic race to the homeland. These included the Baltic Germans and the Tyroleans moved from Northern Italy. In the war years German settlers have been moved from such Balkan areas as Serbia, Bulgaria, and Italian-occupied Slovenia. Originally they were presumably all to be settled within the Reich, but as German conquest moved over Europe, concepts of the Reich borders were expanded. With the exception of the Tyroleans who were transferred to Carinthia and German-annexed Slovenia, and a few thousand Germans moved from France into Alsace-Lorraine, the greater number have been resettled into the Incorporated Polish Provinces. Reliable estimates place their number at between five and six hundred thousand. The business establishments and farms of a million and a half Polish residents, banished to the General Government or pressed into labor service in the Reich, were confiscated for the resettlement of the

newcomers. These German colonists, regardless of the involuntary or voluntary character of their settlement, will invoke little sympathy in the national communities since their establishment has been at the expense of nationals.

D. VICTIMS OF RACIAL AND NATIONAL PERSECUTION

The displaced people with whom many of us concerned with international relief have had most direct experience are the victims of racial or national persecution. These are the millions deprived of all economic and social status as a result of arbitrary decrees and racial laws. Evicted from their homes and homelands, they have wandered unwanted and shackled over the face of Europe. As early as 1933 Jews, "non-Aryans," and democratic leaders began to flee the Reich. Their number increased after Anschluss and again after Munich. Those who settled temporarily in Belgium, Holland, and France were forced to further flight as the German army swept over Western Europe.

With Axis occupation of areas like Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece, there were further large-scale expulsions of nationals. The expulsions of French families from Alsace-Lorraine in 1940-1941, it is estimated, approximated half a million. Frequently they received only a few hours' notice, insufficient to arrange their affairs, and were hurried off, permitted to carry with them only hand luggage and about \$23 in cash. A young Alsatian, demobilized from the French army, and seeking his family in Southern France, once summarized the history of his people:

"My grandfather fought for France in 1870," he explained. "My father was conscripted into the German army in 1914. When my three brothers and I were called up for the French army in 1940, my father, who is a hard man, wept. We have had too much of war in our family."

In the relief offices of the American Friends Service Committee in Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and North Africa we are seeing the human faces of those who are without homelands, hearing the tragic stories of those who have known no peace. There are men and women who have spent the greater part of the past six years in the concentration and internment camps of Europe. Broken in health, stateless, and without funds, they are the first concern of the relief committees dedicated to the service of the oppressed.

The most tragic chapters in the annals of man's inhumanity to man

concern the treatment of the Jews. Evicted first through social and economic pressures, they were compelled to migrate under conditions which meant confiscation of most or all of their economic resources. Then, as migration to other countries became increasingly curtailed with the war and the restrictions which many countries placed on the granting of entrance visas, the measures against Europe's Jews became increasingly punitive. Deportation, segregation, and extermination are the openly announced policy with respect to these long-suffering and innocent people. Quaker workers have seen the great cattle trains crowded with deportees move out of Berlin and Vienna, have seen mothers in France forced to leave young children behind as they departed for "destinations unknown," the ghettos of Eastern Poland. In these dark years of their martyrdom, the suffering of the Jews of Europe is indescribable.

These, then, are the displaced people of Europe who will be in critical need of care at war's end. In many respects their needs will parallel those of the resident population. Like the resident population they will require food, clothing, and shelter. Because of the privations which have characterized the living of so many during the war years, they are likely to be in more urgent need of medical and health services than resident groups. Enjoying less protection from the community and national state, generally separated from families, they will be without the potential resources of the established residents. They will be able to do little planning, since their aims and objectives will be determined by policies outside their immediate control.

Displaced people, aware of the alien suspicion surrounding them and deprived of initiative over a long period, may be expected to show the serious psychological effects of their uprooting. Particularly will this be true of those who have suffered internment or imprisonment. It has been said that imprisonment compels men to live at a depth for which he can make no true adjustment; that, as for divers we have decompression chambers to readjust their bodies to life above the surface, there should be a comparable process which recognizes the stages by which men recover from this survival at the depths.

AFTER THE ARMISTICE: PROHIBITION OF TRAVEL

The danger on Europe's Armistice Day is that all of the thirty million displaced people will wish to start immediately for the places which have been home. Manifestly such travel will be impossible.

European transport has been greatly weakened and reduced as the result of military operations. The retreat of the Axis armies may be expected to produce further disorganization and disruption. Restoration of this crippled transport service will be the first task if food, clothing, and medical stocks are to be moved promptly into the stricken areas and the work of reestablishing economic life undertaken. Undoubtedly civilian and military administrators will be compelled to prohibit unauthorized travel in the first critical weeks following Armistice. Despite the impatience of everyone to get home, there will be recognition that any unplanned migrations, even within the country, will be likely to produce chaos and widespread suffering.

In the summer of 1940 we saw in France the kind of situation which can too easily develop. Following the Armistice between France and Germany, the majority of refugees from Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, and Northern France wished to leave the "unoccupied zone" and return home. French officials issued orders that they were to remain where they were until the conditions of their repatriation had been determined.

But French administration was enfeebled by the shock of defeat, and possibly some local officials, eager to be rid of their surplus refugee population, condoned the issuance of gasoline coupons to the refugees. At any rate, thousands of cars started north. No effective efforts were made to halt these refugees en route until they were stopped at the demarcation line dividing occupied and unoccupied France. There the German military control refused to permit them to pass. Within a few days the roads south of the demarcation line were clogged with cars, and a half million people were trying to subsist in mountain towns which had barely enough food for the residents. Private relief committees such as ours sent some supplies, but our resources were quite inadequate to meet the need. These unhappy people waited for weeks before their repatriation was arranged; some from the coastal areas and others who were rejected on racial grounds had to be turned back. All this unnecessary suffering could have been avoided if the orders freezing the refugees in their places of temporary refuge had been strictly enforced.

FUNCTIONING OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

The establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration represents an important step in international relief administration. It is to be hoped that UNRRA will speedily provide for

the establishment of an International Commission for Displaced Peoples. Such a commission should be both an intergovernmental authority and a united service organization of the principal private international relief committees which have been traditionally active in refugee and migration service. A high degree of integration will have to be achieved within this international commission, with functional subdivisions of service to permit orderly and humane provision for the millions who are far from home. Such an international commission will need national and regional offices within each country. It will require strong backing and cooperation by the national governments to carry its planning into effective action and to enforce uniform procedures. Inclusion of the private international relief agencies in this integrated service seems essential if there is to be full utilization of the skills and experiences which they have acquired in the past decade. Their participation will also mean that voluntary contributions can be used to supplement intergovernmental grants.

A comprehensive program covering all basic services for the displaced group needs to be worked out in detail and implemented by international agreements long before the actual coming of Armistice. Such agreements will necessarily cover documentation, visas, transportation, and provisions for temporary transit and reception care. They should also envisage some of the long-range solutions for those whom it will be impossible to repatriate.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ASSEMBLY PLACES

Administratively, through its national and regional offices, the International Commission should be prepared not merely for the technical services involving documentation and transit, but for a variety of other services. Because of the size and range of problems which displaced people will present, it may be anticipated that their resettlement even under conditions of optimum planning and administration will extend over a period of several years. They will, therefore, need care at assembly centers in something more than the internment camps to which so many of them have already been subjected. Knowing how terrible such camps have been in the past, we may be loath to take and convert the pattern to creative purposes. Yet such assemblies need not necessarily be places of degradation and hopelessness. Through competent and humane administration they can provide decent living conditions affording both

privacy and freedom, opportunities for work, for retraining, and for self-help.¹ They can, indeed, become normal communities in which men and women have an opportunity to put aside the bitterness and despair of their recent experiences and prepare themselves imaginatively for a new life. In some countries, in fact, the men and women of such communities might choose to have a part in the rehabilitation of the countries in which they have found asylum.

One of the most important functions of such assembly places will, of course, be the opportunity they will afford for physical rehabilitation of these displaced people. All our previous experience with displaced people shows that, because most of them have lived under conditions of malnutrition and neglect, crowded into unsanitary barracks and camps, they will first of all need health and medical facilities. Otherwise they will bring in their wake disease and death, not only for themselves but for resident populations as well. Medical examinations at the time of entrance to the assembly centers, delousing stations, and provisions for isolating patients suffering from infectious disease will be important safeguards if the already alarming spread of disease among European civilians is to be halted.

REPATRIATION

For the greater number of uprooted people, repatriation will undoubtedly be the solution. Return to the homeland should be arranged as soon as transport can be provided and adequate facilities have been established for their reception. It will be a poor solution to send them home if, like the Polish refugees of the last war, they must live in caves; or, if like the French refugees, they return impoverished to devastated farms, unprovided with seeds and tools and fertilizer to restore the land to fruitfulness and their families to minimum security.

Repatriation will not, however, be the answer for many of the people who have been dispossessed. The war of insidious race and national prejudice which has been loosed in Europe for the past ten years will not cease when the armies lay down their weapons. In some countries, too, economic conditions may be such as to make displaced people hesitant about returning. For those who cannot return, the countries of their temporary refuge may eventually provide assimilation. Individual

¹ For a fuller discussion of the rehabilitation of Europe's internees, see the article by Curt Bondy in this issue, pages 629-637.—Ed.

immigration to join members of the family in other lands will enable others to reestablish in self-sufficiency. For a large number group resettlement may well be the answer.

ASSIMILATION IN COUNTRIES OF TEMPORARY REFUGE

The absorption of some displaced people into the country of their temporary residence may prove mutually desirable, particularly where there has been long residence and cultural associations and where the countries themselves find their own population decimated as the result of war and deprivation. Under those conditions permanent settlers may be welcomed. Such assimilation should, however, be protected by the safeguards of residence and permanent work permits and, wherever possible, with provision for eventual citizenship. If the displaced person is to be given recognition only through the period of emergency and early rehabilitation, and then again isolated as an alien, he can certainly not be called assimilated.

On an extremely small scale our Committee has sponsored an experiment in France looking to the assimilation of a group of Spanish families. These were families who with thousands of others had fled to France as political refugees at the close of the Spanish Civil War. Like their compatriots, they were confined to the internment camps of Southern France. In the spring of 1940, under the pressures of the manpower shortage, some steps were taken to provide for the release of the Spaniards still in camps, with the assurance that they would receive prevailing wages. Unfortunately, before any large number could reestablish themselves economically, the German army invaded Holland, Belgium, and Northern France. It looked as if all the Spaniards would be forced back into camps, despite the fact that a number of French leaders had begun to look to the assimilation of many of these people as a genuine asset to offset France's declining birthrate.

At that time our Committee had become interested in a number of abandoned villages in the Tarn, medieval towns situated in good farming land but largely depopulated since World War I. With the permission and cooperation of French officials, we arranged in 1941 to move nine Spanish families to the village of Penne. They were able to undertake the work of rehabilitating the old stone houses which were to be their homes, and with Committee funds they established a toy factory. Supplemental food rations from the Committee stocks were needed only

until they were able to get their own produce from the gardens which they cultivated. That town, which had only two children, welcomed the newcomers and their laughing youngsters; an old fiesta, long forgotten, was revived in 1941. Last year, when economic distress had increased throughout all France, French workmen from the town were introduced into the toy factory. More recently one of the reports from France has described a French-Spanish marriage in Penne, indicative of the good feeling which exists between French and Spanish residents of the town. It is too early to draw conclusions from this modest experiment, particularly since there can be no assurance that the occupying authorities may not interrupt it. The resettlement of Penne does, however, give evidence that assimilation, given a chance, is a possible solution.

It is possible that a large group of displaced people will be able to resettle in other countries on the basis of individual immigration. Particularly will this be true for individuals who have families already settled elsewhere and who will wish to be reunited with them. One of the important functions of the International Commission will be the operation of a Bureau of Missing Persons, which in locating lost members of families will give reassurance of their whereabouts to distant friends and relatives. Many dispossessed people, without other resources, may in this way hope to receive financial assistance, food packages, and, eventually, assistance in their plans for migration.

GROUP RESETTLEMENT

Migration on an individual basis for those who cannot return home or cannot count on assimilation into the countries of their temporary residence will not, however, meet the needs of the great number seeking resettlement. Such individual applications are inevitably slow and fraught with difficulties. The International Commission must look to group resettlement. Such a project will involve careful selection of the settlers for particular skills and for their probable capacities to adjust in the new environment; it will also necessitate adequate financing and assistance over the first years. But the serious obstacle will come in finding areas for such resettlement. In his recent book, *Men in Motion*, Henry Taylor writes hopefully of Africa as a continent offering opportunities comparable only to those which the newly discovered Western Hemisphere presented in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. His thesis is an interesting one, calling to a new race of pio-

neers. He does, however, seem to minimize the difficulties which Africa with all its wealth represents. A condition of any large-scale resettlement such as he envisages would necessarily depend on the abandonment of the present European colonial system, a change which is highly desirable but fraught with difficulty. It would involve also some modifications in the prejudices of the Europeans already settled in Africa, as well as protection of the Africans against exploitation by a new group of Europeans.

Precedents for such projects are not lacking. One of the most interesting and successful resettlement experiences within the past decades was that of the 1920's providing for the transfer of 1,400,000 Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece and several hundred thousand Moslems from the Balkans to Turkey. Arranged by the Greek Resettlement Commission under the League of Nations, it was financed by the Greek government and by international loans arranged by the League of Nations. The total number of Greeks entering Greece was 1,400,000 in a country of 6,000,000. Before the transfer, the population was 39.4 per cent Moslem. In 1926, when the transfer had been completed, the population was 88.8 per cent Greek and 11.1 per cent mixed. Total costs included eight million English pounds spent in loans, one and a half million pounds in Greek government bonds, one and a half million pounds representing property expropriated from Moslems, and eleven million pounds spent in the resettlement. The average cost per family ranged between forty and sixty pounds. This experience, together with that of Palestine, Bulgaria, Armenia, Syria, and the more recent settlement of the Sosua colony in Santo Domingo, provides valuable experience for any new planning. It is encouraging to note that the Intergovernmental Committee for Aid to Refugees is already concerning itself with such planning for group resettlement.

WHITE ZONES

Despite the variety of solutions sought for displaced people, there will inevitably remain a residual group requiring special provision. These will include older and actually aged people, those handicapped by wounds, accidents, and ill health, and those who, because of the traumatic shock of their experiences, will not readily respond to early repatriation. These people, likely to be ineligible and unsuitable for resettlement, should not be exposed to the uncertainties of continued residence under miserable and hostile conditions. They will require pro-

tection against neglect of their personal needs during long periods of negotiation and planning for their welfare and against expensive transfer to distant lands where they cannot be expected to make immediate or effective contributions.

Dr. Hertha Kraus of Bryn Mawr College, probably one of the most thoughtful leaders in the field of international relief, recommends that so-called "White Zones," long advocated by the International Red Cross to protect women and children against the impact of active warfare, be set up for this residual group. Such sanctuaries could be happily utilized for long-time care of the most seriously affected group in the displaced population. Established in neutral countries and in neutral zones within a number of European countries, they would require financing by the International Commission. These sheltered communities, like the assembly centers discussed earlier, will need to provide all the basic facilities of the normal community and should be sufficiently large—say at least two thousand inhabitants—to make normal community life possible. They will require the customary community resources for health, sanitation, religious life, adult education, recreation, and social services. They should preferably be located in rural rather than urban areas and should have the protection of the intergovernmental authorities, particularly in the first years.

Admittedly such sanctuaries would require considerable capital investment, which might conceivably be charged to the countries of origin of the settlers. Current support could be supplemented for individual settlers and families through contributions from friends and relatives overseas and through voluntary contributions of private relief committees. In total outlay these sanctuaries would be less expensive than individual or group migration to distant countries. It is not too early to advocate wide discussion of this proposal of international sanctuaries, since provision should be made for them in the peace treaties as a partial solution of minority problems.

Europe's population problem in the post-war years will not be a simple one. It will involve not only resettlement of her displaced people but a recognition of her population pressures in the face of increasingly nationalistic policies and the closed-door of other nations. Migration restrictions of the last decade have resulted largely from economic dislocations and the fear of new labor competition, as well as from suspicion

as to the politics of immigrants. World industrialization has also introduced complications, inclining many nations to fear that newcomers would swell the tide of unemployed in the cities, whereas in the older economy new settlers turned to agriculture. As a result there has been a tendency to place immigration on a highly selective basis, compelling the settler to bring either capital or specific skills as a condition of entrance.

Yet it is certainly true that many areas of the world which have seemed overpopulated to those who advocated a restricted immigration policy could support much larger populations under an industrial economy than under the present agricultural systems.

The solution for the pressure of European populations to migrate would seem not to lie in the relaxation of the immigration restrictions of any one government, but rather in the recognition by all governments that international cooperation must facilitate more than the free movement of capital and goods. It must facilitate the free movement of men.



RESTORING MORALE IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

By GORDON W. ALLPORT

FOR the psychological handling of a civilian population bewildered and embittered by defeat or by the ravages of battle there are no hard and fast rules. Yet the officer charged with administering civil affairs in an occupied territory must, if he is to be successful, handle such populations in a manner which will insure maximum cooperation. He must, in short, understand the problems of civilian morale.

In the pages which follow, the author is concerned with the anatomy of civilian morale

under conditions of occupation. Chairman of the Department of Psychology at Harvard, Dr. Allport is also a lecturer in Harvard's School of Overseas Administration. He is one of the country's foremost authorities on problems of morale, a field in which he has written and worked extensively. His most recent contribution to the *QUARTERLY*, an analysis of the effects of newspaper headlines on circulation and morale, appeared last summer.

LET US SUPPOSE officers in military government enter an area which the retreating enemy has stripped of foodstuffs and vehicles. People are hungry. A third of the public and private buildings are ruined or damaged. People are cold. Dead bodies lie in the streets. People are horrified and grief-stricken. Lights are out, and the public health situation is bad. People are fearful. Schools are closed; children roam the streets. There are no newspapers, no radio facilities. People are confused. The little food that is available is selling at prohibitive prices in the black market. People are angry. Labor is needed to make necessary repairs, but the public is too apathetic and too bewildered to apply for work. Civic authorities are unable to cope with the situation. Families are separated, local welfare agencies closed; distracted people form aimless crowds and follow whatever leader makes the loudest appeal. Rumors are rife.—If this scene is laid in Germany, the people are deeply suspicious of the intentions of the occupying forces, and in malicious ways show their bitterness and resentment.

Even in a situation only half as bad as I have portrayed, the moral is the same: *the human factor predominates*. Important as it is to restore the interrupted public utilities, the shattered fiscal system, a governing authority, it turns out that the state of mind of the people is often the decisive factor for policy and procedure. *Although they are not psychologists by profession, officers in military government inevitably have a psychological job to do.*

One may say, "All this may be so, but the state of mind is dependent upon the existing situation. Repair the utilities, reopen communications, establish a central government, and panic and confusion will disappear." True enough, but to accomplish these reforms requires the cooperation of the community. However excellent the engineering and formal planning may be, it is still necessary to deal directly with the people, including their emotional states of confusion, misunderstanding, prejudice, and bitterness.

A perfect set of rules for the psychological handling of populations cannot be given. We can, however, call attention to a number of principles that are applicable to one type of occupational problem or another, and to certain psychological booby-traps that should be avoided. If he is aware of these, the resourceful administrator can frame his own procedures in specific situations with greater hope of success.

TWO ASPECTS OF MORALE

Since his over-all job has something to do with the restoration of morale in occupied territory, he will find it helpful from the start to distinguish between two aspects of morale.

Short-term morale may be defined as **DOING WILLINGLY AND GLADLY THOSE THINGS WHICH MUST BE DONE HERE AND NOW**. For their own good the people of occupied sections will have to yield to the plans of military government for their safety and health. The problem is to engage their cooperation so that they will act helpfully in carrying out both letter and spirit of the regulations.

Long-term morale is a matter of **BELIEVING THAT THE FUTURE HOLDS POSSIBILITIES OF FULFILLING ONE'S DEEPEST DESIRES**. It is the possession of bed-rock values and a faith that these values will in some way ultimately triumph. The possession of such long-range morale makes it much easier to muster a short-range morale.

Even though he is more preoccupied with securing the immediate cooperation of the populace, that is to say, with short-range morale, the AMG officer will find that he can succeed only if he takes into account some of the long-range problems as well. For the immediate state of mind that he will encounter is a product of people's outlook upon past, present, and future (and of these factors the *future* is the most important of all).

He will find himself dealing with a state of mind that is in some

proportion a blend of BEWILDERMENT, SUSPICION, HATRED, and HOPE. The proportions will vary according to the intensity of previous suffering and according to the original relation of the territory to the Axis. But to some degree all these mental conditions will certainly be present. For greater convenience let us consider them separately.

BEWILDERMENT

The cure for bewilderment is clarity and consistency. Not only should orders and regulations be unambiguous and not contradictory, but they should be as few in number as possible. No public can carry a host of rules in mind, and especially not a tired, hungry, and disoriented public.

Rumor, we know, flourishes when there is ambiguity in the news and when people feel that something important to their own lives is brewing. Rumor bedevils the administrator's plans. Clarity, repetition, and consistency are his aids in eradicating rumor. One thing the war has shown is that rumor-control is impossible whenever a rumor deals with something *important* to the lives of people and whenever the facts are *unknown* to them. There is only one sure means of rumor control: *complete, authoritative information on all matters of vital importance to the inhabitants*. It will not always be possible to realize this ideal, but the administrator should nevertheless make it his goal.

Bewilderment is a product not merely of the breakdown in communications, but of the disintegration of the political, moral, and family anchorage of the individual. Possessing no other frame of security people must turn to the rules and regulations of the occupying authorities for basic guidance. No civil affairs officer can himself supply purpose, direction, meaning to the lives of all the citizens under his jurisdiction; but he can interpret the over-all Allied policies in a manner that will induce a feeling of security and trust.

The need for maximum consistency in policy and in interpreting policy to the people has been stated by an American diplomat with long experience in Berlin during the 1920's. "This time let us decide for certain," he says, "whether we are going to be friends with the German people or whether we are not—and then let's conduct ourselves accordingly. Ever since the last war the Allies have been inconsistent in their policy toward Germany. The German people never knew where they stood. Versailles meant one thing, *Quakerspeisung* another; *Kriegsschuld*

meant one thing, appeasement another." The diplomat is right. You can make even an animal neurotic by inconsistently bestowing rewards and punishments, that is, by sometimes showing him kindness and sometimes unexpected severity without apparent rhyme or reason.

Our national policy, I should like to assume, calls for invariable friendliness toward the common people of Germany and Japan, and invariable severity toward their warlords. Perhaps I am unjustified in making this assumption; I know of no clear directive on this point. But without such a policy, the future Allied administration of Germany will have no standards by which to regulate its own actions. Nor will it be able to tell the people what is in store for them. Ordinances will lack consistency. The people will not understand the new framework of their lives.

Nothing could be worse for morale than capricious treatment. A mixture of friendly gestures and generous feeding, negated by acts of revenge and humiliation will accomplish nothing that is desirable. Only confusion and dread can result. It is true that no declared policy of "invariable friendliness toward the common people" will prevent failures in practice. We cannot assign GI attitudes to the common soldier (or officer) who has seen his comrades recently slaughtered by the enemy. No national policy, however clearly proclaimed, can eradicate this kind of bitterness. At the same time, some announced policy is better than none, and a constant effort to hold to this policy is infinitely better than unpredictable conduct and government by apparent whim.

Take the matter of war criminals. Every citizen should understand where the line is drawn, i.e., who is a war-criminal and who is not. After the last war a great flurry was made about punishing the guilty, but few indictments were drawn and virtually no punishments occurred.¹ Such threats of severity, without the pay-off, engender confusion and even contempt.

Some say that the punishment of war-criminals makes matters worse because it creates martyrs. If so, it is a risk we shall have to take; and the Allies can lessen the risk by making absolutely clear to the defeated Axis populations that while democracy means friendly equality among common men it spells destruction to tyrants who try to gain control of the bodies and minds of men.

¹ S. Glueck, "By what tribunal shall war offenders be tried?" *Harvard Law Review*, 1943, 56, 1059-89.

It goes without saying that friendliness toward the common people is entirely compatible with strict policing to preserve the peace, and that it is compatible with efficient administration of relief. Food and privileges should go especially to those who, to the best of their ability, give a fair return in reconstruction labor. People do not like to receive charity.

When people are bewildered and disoriented they should have plenty of routine work to do. Idleness magnifies civilian demoralization. The skillful administrator is one who supplies jobs as rapidly as possible for everyone, from the town officials to the excited and aimless children.²

It is not, however, jobs doled out from on high that give the maximum lift to morale. Assigned work should also arouse a sense of genuine participation in a common task. Liberal use of badges, insignia, and other symbols of merit help to engage the pride of the worker, especially if he sees where his efforts fit into a total plan of community reconstruction. The general rule is this: *reveal the plan; seek voluntary participation; welcome suggestions; give recognition for cooperative service.* By following this rule an increase in morale results—for the appeal is to the “whole man”—not to a resistant, half-hearted man. Men, we know, want to solve their own problems and are normal only when they feel that they are, of their own volition, working to this end.

When bewilderment is extreme, a public is *panic-ripe*. Among the conditions leading to panic are a long previous period of discouragement, hardship, physical depletion, familiarity with gruesome sights, and past feelings of anxiety. Rumor helps precipitate panic, since it flies in the absence of solid factual assurance of safety. Panic needs no leader. It arises spontaneously and spreads by contagion. Any sudden threat may start a mad stampede to escape.³

SUSPICION

Even among friendly inhabitants watchful and suspicious eyes will be directed toward our military government. Our manners and morals

² Schools are a vexing problem. There is much to be said for a holiday in schooling until enough time has elapsed to purge the Nazi poison completely out of the school system. Theoretically a child can learn more about science and about democracy by participating in reconstruction projects than in deteriorated classroom work. But the experience in certain countries already occupied seems to show that the practical task of organizing democratic youth projects cannot be carried out promptly enough to prevent a rise in delinquency and the formation of juvenile mobs. Hence some compromise with the existent school situation has been resorted to.

³ For a more detailed discussion of panic and its control, see the article by Hadley Cantril in this issue, pages 669-679.

will be under the closest scrutiny, so too our intentions. No amount of publicity or propaganda will convince people of our good will if they have material evidence that our actual practice is contradictory to our professed policy.

Gross and obvious breaches of decorum can be guarded against, but there are subtler traps of which neither officers nor men may be aware. Probably more damage can be done to America's public relations by an unconscious patronage of native populations than in any other way.

Every person has a tendency to regard his own ways of thinking and acting as right, and to regard the ways of those who live abroad as distortions of the normal. Even those of us who pride ourselves on our tolerance fall into this trap. *Our* language, *our* standards of cleanliness and morality, *our* forms of politeness, are natural and proper. The "foreigners" with whom we deal are mildly to be pitied—perhaps for their benighted monetary system, for their outmoded sewage disposal, their queer religious practices, or their unintelligible speech.

So addicted are we to considering our own ways as the norm and all other ways as absurdities, that a tendency to patronize members of other cultures is a deep part of our unconscious natures. The fact that Tunisians, Sicilians, Italians, or Germans feel a corresponding superiority concerning their own customs, language and morals, does not even the score. For, after all, it is *we*, and not they, who are (or will be) in the dominant position—and on *their soil*. Super-sensitive to our conquest, they are likely to find even the most innocent and unintentional expressions of our patronage intolerable. What seems to us like normal and efficient administrative decision may be interpreted by the inhabitants as insufferable arrogance, as interference with their natural rights, or as Yankee imperialism.

This hyper-sensitiveness can be allayed in a number of ways. (1) Men and officers may be warned against showing amusement, contempt, or patronage toward local customs. (2) They may cultivate the language of the region, for nothing disarms suspicion sooner than the halting attempts of the visitor to speak the language in which the native with every word can measure his own superiority. (3) They may express their appreciation for the art, landscape, and social courtesies of the region. (4) They may show special kindness and consideration to children and to invalids for the simple reason that such acts are the *lingua franca* of

decent people everywhere. (5) They should not give food and relief as though they personally were the benefactors.

In short, suspicion is allayed and the evils of ethnocentricism controlled if Allied forces behave, so far as possible, in the spirit of guests rather than as conquerors.

HATRED

An instructive picture of face-to-face hostility between civilians and American occupying troops is given by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs of the American Forces in Germany between 1918 and 1920. The situation depicted is noteworthy for its complex and changeable character.

During the first days of the occupation, feeling on both sides was in fact so intense, so distrustful and so bitter, that it is surprising that no serious consequences occurred. A vast majority of Americans undoubtedly believed at the time, that the Germans respected no agreement or moral law, that they took pleasure in evil for evil's sake and sought, above all, revenge for their defeat. The inhabitants had also received their full share of propaganda, by which the American Army had been conjured up as an undisciplined mob of semi-savages. Knowing themselves in its power, a not unnatural sense of fear became prevalent. In consequence, the whole attitude of the civil population became so extremely conciliatory that both officers and men of the occupying army looked upon their obsequiousness with contempt.⁴

In order to maintain discipline our troops were instructed to treat the population with "courteous tolerance," but under no circumstances to fraternize with them. Soon, however, this famous "anti-fraternization" order was in effect nullified because privates and non-commissioned officers billeted with ordinary German families, sharing their one heated room, came to understand, and in most cases to like, their amiable hosts.

They saw that a great deal of what they had read about the innate viciousness of all Germans was not true, and their war memories in consequence began to fade.⁵

⁴ *American Military Government of Occupied Germany: 1918-1920*. Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1943, p. 204.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

But mutual hostility remained latent merely awaiting provocation. And in 1919:

About April 15th, rumors of the severity of the coming peace terms began to be noised through the American zone. Coupled with the critical food and fuel situation and the shadow of Bolshevism hovering over occupied Germany, these rumors brought home to the people, as nought else had, the fullness of the defeat they had suffered. A general spirit of discontent was not long in making itself felt, and the people in the American zone no longer tried to hide their dislike of the Allies. The soldiers' attitude towards the Germans had never been in a true sense one of friendship. Like most Americans towards a foreign race, they got along with them, tolerated them, but kept their feeling of superiority the whole time. The moment, however, that the Germans showed an insubordinate spirit, the troops reacted violently and their once forgotten dislike flared up anew. Numerous fights occurred. . . .⁶

This voice from the past describes the baffling mixture of friendship and hostility that we may doubtless again expect. It seems probable, however, that this time we must expect on the part of German civilians and sympathizers considerably less amiability and more bitterness and anger due to a longer and more intensive period of mental conditioning.

After ten years of Nazi indoctrination the German's mind is a cesspool of hostility and suspicion. He has been brought up to hate England as a traditional enemy, to hate America for its supposed betrayal of Germany in the 14 Points, to hate Communism, the Jews, non-Nordics, to suspect and denounce his neighbor and his brother. He hates even science and freedom of speech. The cleaning out of such a cesspool seems almost a hopeless task.

Revengefulness is not the solution. It does no good to meet hatred with forcible suppression. Morale will not be restored by heaping humiliation and insult upon defeat. An angry person does not become less angry when his arms are pinioned.

The best rule for directing bitterness away from the United Nations is to attach it to something else: specifically to attach it to Naziism and all its works. We know now of our psychological blunder in 1918 when Ludendorff, Hindenburg, and the Kaiser were spared the blame for

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

defeat. Unfavorable peace terms were accepted by a people's government, with the result that resentment for the national humiliation and for the disastrous inflation that followed was inherited by the wholly innocent Weimar Republic.

The danger is that the Allies will be blamed for some of the grief, sickness, and starvation that will inevitably accompany our administration. The vanished warlords will no longer be visible. It is the irrational tendency of scapegoating to place blame upon some visible and conspicuous victim. We know how in our own country the President is generally blamed for business fluctuations, droughts, floods, the high cost of living, and even bumpy roads.

To some extent the Allies can avoid much of this undeserved hostility through a broadly conceived public relations policy. Four rules may be given:

(1) Tell the people over and over again that their postwar misery has nothing to do with the military government, but is the legacy of their dictators who are now in the process of being apprehended and tried for bringing this misery upon them.

(2) Emphasize the temporariness of the present emergency measures. If they realize that their present frustrations are incident to a period of transition and not to the coming period of peace, the inhabitants are less likely to crystallize their resentment upon the Allies.

For example: it will, no doubt, prove impossible to distribute food or to restore civil rights in a manner that will appear equitable to each individual. When complaints and clamor arise, the Allied authority can do little more than explain that the ordinances under which he is operating are intended to be fair to all, and that inequalities are the temporary result of the confused situation inherited from the Nazis which will be rectified as rapidly as possible.

Officers have a moral responsibility for dissociating the confusion and hardships of the immediate present from men's outlook upon the future. It is vital that the coming post-war agreements should start in an atmosphere of hope and not in an atmosphere of resentment and bitterness.

(3) Pay conspicuous and well-advertised attention to the health and welfare of children. The quickest way to win the regard of an adult is to do something for his child. (It is true that the Nazis gave poor return to the Norwegians for their hospitality toward the waifs of the last war,

but this act of ingratitude has already become one of the scandals of history, and is unlikely to happen again.)

(4) Be willing to admit mistakes. There are, of course, practical limits beyond which public officials (particularly military officials) dare not go. Nevertheless, it is a psychological fact that as a rule the swiftest way to disarm hostility is to admit one's own errors. Every nation has its faults, so too does every army of occupation. Our democracy is far from perfect. The Germans are probably right in saying that we did not live up to our commitments under the 14 Points. The Japanese are right in saying that we have not solved our own color problem. In our oriental exclusion laws we have given insufferable offense to all Asiatics. Why not admit these facts? Such confession would do more to disarm hostility among colored races than anything else we could do. While admitting our faults we can, of course, publicize the progress that has been made toward remedying some of the evils. Admittedly, the individual Allied officer is not authorized to make such public confessions on behalf of the American nation. Still, if we want to eliminate hostility toward ourselves this matter is something for our policy-makers and for us as citizens to keep in mind.

The hardest facts in the world are the facts of human emotion, and emotion works not according to political convenience, but according to human nature. For centuries men have sought peace according to the dictates of so-called political realism. They have failed. This time we would be wise to take our cues from the realism of human nature.

HOPE

Everyone likes a mental change of venue. Even disasters and invasions can be exhilarating, bringing a fresh outlook and a tingle of excitement. For this reason the arrival of the Allies will be a signal for an upsurge of hope in a population war-weary and despondent. If bewilderment, suspicion and hatred composed the whole state of mind of the populace, the effort of military government would certainly be doomed to failure. It is the attendant atmosphere of hope that gives military government a good chance for success.

Hope, we know, tends to run to excesses, and when disappointed to give way to periods of despair. In the official records, cited above, we saw how in 1919 rumors of an unfavorable peace settlement suddenly

worsened relations and made the task of the occupying forces more difficult.

Because of its mercurial character, hope is a difficult asset to exploit to the best advantage. There are, however, certain procedures that Allied officials may safely adopt. They can give currency to whatever official peace plans exist among the United Nations at the time of the occupation. Ordinances pertaining to the safety and liberty of the common people can be clearly and inspiringly presented. The Atlantic Charter can be publicized; so too all official statements regarding future plans for the elimination of war and for cooperation between nations. So far as possible such appeals should employ easily grasped symbols. If predictions of an increased food supply in the near future are justified, they should be widely published; if the Red Cross or other agencies are bringing about the reuniting of families, let the people know. If there are symbols of a World Covenant, an International Agreement, a Pledge of Peace, they should be dramatized. Such concrete symbols have a great appeal to distraught and muddled minds that have lost their anchorage. The danger is that Allied officers, because of their heavy daily routine, may forget to make use of such hope-inspiring symbols as are legitimized by official policy.

Hope, which is the essence of long-range morale, is the only real guarantee of immediate discipline and cooperation. Luckily, if given half a chance, hope rises readily in even the darkest situations. For all people, with the exception of a few psychopaths, are more interested in their futures than in their disordered pasts, particularly if they imagine the future to be filled with new opportunities. Men are always eager for fresh outlooks, for long-range plans, for causes to which they can wholeheartedly devote their energies.

And here we come to the basic law of morale: *the individual must feel that he is participating in his own destiny*. He must feel that he is voluntarily pursuing his own goals. You can't talk a person back to mental health; you can't order a person's loyalty; you can't commandeer morale. On the other hand, if the citizen feels that the objectives of the Allies are essentially the objectives that he himself desires, if they arouse his hopes and therefore his voluntary cooperation, he will feel identified with the enterprise and aid it to the best of his ability.

Perhaps the most serious and unpredictable factor of all is the extent to which revolutionary activity will break out. People may be convinced

that in order to realize their hopes, drastic internal reforms must come about through their own self-initiated action. Since it is *their* country, it is natural that *they* want to clean it up. Obviously a popular democratic revolution within Germany or Japan has far more chance of "sticking" than democratic reforms plastered onto a disintegrated society by a military government. In other words, the only way to restore morale is to let the common people play the major part in refashioning their countries to their liking. It is beyond my competence to state whether or not the Allies shall aid or stem revolutionary movements. But whatever the official policy may be in this matter the psychological rule remains—*a genuine morale cannot be restored unless the population feels that it is actively participating in fashioning its own future way of life.*



FOOD AND FEEDING IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

By MARGARET MEAD

FEEDING a population which, through the destruction of war, is unable to look after its own needs, requires more than moving in thus and so many shiploads of flour and soybeans. Hunger is a powerful motive; but the food habits of a people are also compelling and exacting. To gain maximum cooperation from the population of an occupied area, one must not only assuage hunger but take steps toward the recognition of prevailing food habits. Under the latter heading come a variety of problems—the public relations of food distribution. To that problem Dr. Mead devotes her article.

Executive Secretary of the Committee on Food Habits of the National Research Council—in which capacity she has been working on many of the questions discussed in these pages—the author is also known for her pioneering anthropological studies of several primitive cultures. Her most recent book, a study of American culture, was published this year under the title, *And Keep Your Powder Dry*. She has recently returned from England, where she had a chance to sample expert British opinion on food problems.

IN DISCUSSING THE RELATIONSHIP between methods of food distribution and military government, it is first necessary to distinguish between possible and contrasting frames of reference. (1) Will the methods of food distribution be the same as or different from those of (a) previous administration by either fascist invaders or the country's own fascist government, or (b) projected methods of relief which may be expected to follow the period of military government? (2) Will the food distribution be regarded as a weapon, to be used as other weapons are used to further strictly military ends, or as a constructive measure for the reestablishment, not merely of a minimum of law and order necessary to the successful conduct of military operations, but of a more fundamental law and order based upon a consideration of the internal needs of the liberated society?

These problems, while basic to all considerations of military government, are perhaps especially fundamental to the question of food distribution. The process of feeding people is a continuous, ongoing repetitious process that is both particularly suitable for the establishment of continuities and extremely sensitive for the registering of discontinuities. A good meal or an adequate supply of food in the shops one week serves only to highlight a bad meal or a failure of supply in the shops the following week. Abrupt transitions from one policy to another will not

be registered once, as they might be in a regulation concerning reopening of business or resumption of transportation, but will be registered over and over again, for each act of food purchase and for each mass feeding operation, two or three times in each day. Once the question of type and degree of continuity has been established, therefore, as a matter of policy in a given area—i.e., will we wish to demonstrate that our power to feed the local population is equal to, greater than, or less than the previous authorities, and similar to or dissimilar to the procedures of those authorities?—this decision can be expressed in the methods of handling the whole food problem perhaps more concretely and repeatedly than in any other aspect of military government.

Food is important, however, for other psychological reasons. Giving of food is associated the world over with the cherishing of and responsible activities of parents toward dependent children; thus whenever a people feels that its food supply is in the hands of an authority, it tends to regard that authority as to some degree parental. As a matter of practice this means that feeding people adequately, either by the conspicuous regulation of commercially available supplies or by the provision of emergency mass feeding operations, is an efficient way of establishing the existing authority as a good parent toward whom the people assume an attitude of dependency. Probably no other operation, even the provision of hospitalization and emergency care, is so effective in proving to an anxious and disturbed people that the powers that be are good and have their welfare at heart.

But because of this very association, food is also particularly likely to be taken as a sign that the government does not have the interests of the people at heart. Food that is unfamiliar, food that is spoiled or tainted, insufficient or repugnant, will be seized upon and resented as a proof of hostile and unfriendly intentions.¹ People who have been eating flour so filled with maggots that it was necessary to consume them as part of the dish may have accepted this food thankfully when the flour was the fruit of their own efforts. But let them find one single maggot in flour given to them by a superior and external power, and they may regard it as an irrefutable proof of neglect and abuse.

A third factor of importance lies in the emphasis which all peoples put upon aspects of the food situation which are not primarily dependent upon the food itself. How the food is prepared is often more important

¹ Hunt, Edward Eyre. *War bread*. New York: Holt, 1916.

than what is served; a new type of flour baked into a familiar-looking biscuit may be more acceptable than an old type of flour served in an unfamiliar form. Such details as the way in which food is served, or the form in which it is sold, and the extent to which the emergency methods avoid the contravening of old habits of shopping, food preparation, and food service may loom disproportionately large in making a new food policy acceptable, but they also provide an area which can be more easily manipulated than the food itself.

Basic steps in planning any food program in a newly occupied or liberated area would, therefore, comprise:

(1) Determination of policy. Is the food program to be used as military strategy to provide a sharp contrast between previous administrations and the present one? Is it to be used to build good will or merely to prevent rioting, to implement the developing of local responsibility of some one group in the population or to provide the background for some working rapprochement between different political elements in the community? In the solution of these problems, one warning is pertinent. The use of food for destructive purposes—and included here are all uses where the word *food* could be used as a synonym for the word *weapon*—already involves a basic psychological contradiction, because food is universally thought of as something good in itself. When anything which has been revered and cherished by men as a symbol of kindness and goodness has to be used as a part of a destructive policy, important resistances are aroused; and arousing resistances is expensive. If food can be used to win allegiance to and establish faith in the occupying military government rather than for the discrediting of former governments, so much the better, for such a course follows the path of least resistance. If, furthermore, feeding the local civilian population is presented as undertaken merely so that they will not riot, impede troop movements, or provide a breeding ground for disease, a base for resentment in the civilian population will be established. This resentment, focused on the food itself, its content, its quality, its quantity, etc., will provide a fertile source of dissatisfaction. It becomes doubly important, on the other hand, that the occupying liberators should at least outdo in conspicuous respects the measures previously taken by the enemy occupiers—and inevitably regarded as partially or wholly hostile. If there is less to eat or less than one wants to eat under liberators than under conquerors, there will be difficulty.

(2) Knowledge of the patterns of food distribution, preparation, and consumption of the people, and knowledge of the ways in which these have been disturbed during enemy occupation or under blockade will also be essential to intelligent planning.² Not only will it be desirable to know general dietary habits—whether a given people eat one grain or another, prefer root or green vegetables, depend upon beans or eggs or whole cereals for their protein supplies; it will also be very desirable to have available considerable particular knowledge in such matters as seasoning, acceptance of or aversion to specific food combinations or methods of food preparation. Very often a failure in some small detail may condemn a whole program. Conversely, some very small familiar detail meticulously observed may loom so large that many unfamiliar features will be forgiven. Allied food advisers should have on hand organized and available data on such matters, so that they may either (a) follow to the letter the traditional food distribution methods of the people, or (b) specifically disregard those methods if for any reason they wish to dissociate themselves from the local authorities or the traditional procedure.

Although busy administrators may occasionally be impatient of the details of local traditional practices, feeling that there is little time or justification for catering to the particular local preferences of a people, there may come moments when they will be glad of the increased control such knowledge provides the administrator. Following local custom, to be sure, is not always necessary. Where supplies are abundant, methods of distribution pleasant and practical, it may be quite feasible to flout a large part of native prejudice. But when supplies fail or tension develops, it is handy to have in reserve a more delicate tool for expressing to the civilian population an active concern for their welfare. Furthermore, if an administrator decides to feed people in mixed groups, or as families, or to separate the sexes, or to separate parents from children—for purely administrative reasons which are quite independent of local custom—it is valuable for him to know whether he is or is not flouting local custom. Only so can he fully judge the wisdom of the particular procedure.

Supplementary to such basic knowledge of food practices, a valuable item will be knowledge of how these practices—including here such details as method of shopping, form in which foods have traditionally

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been purchased and transported, times of meals, composition of the social group which eats together, etc.—have been disturbed by the war-time situation and which disturbances have been most deplored or resented. Sometimes people lament the lack of a beverage like tea or coffee more loudly than the disappearance of some basic staple of their diet. It might be good strategy to make a special effort to supply the beverage or seasoning in some very conspicuous fashion. The attitude of the British people toward oranges and lemons at the present time is a case in point. A citrus fruit apiece for the entire population, of negligible importance nutritionally, would have tremendous value for morale.

(3) Both the explicit goals to be attained and the knowledge of local custom must be adapted to the available supplies of food. The problem is different for military government from what it would be for a civilian agency bringing in special supplies designated for relief purposes.³ Whether or not the available food is to be supplemented by foraging operations within the country, military occupations may be expected to use, at least in the initial stages, the standard supplies of the army. Foods which may be admirably suitable for inexpensive relief operations, such as vegetable proteins, may not be included in the standard army foods. Although the army foods will probably be superior in both variety and in quality to foods planned as part of large-scale relief operations, they may have been processed and preserved in forms which are extremely alien to the food practices of the particular country. Army equipment, furthermore, adjusted as it is to the cooking of American food, may be unsuitable for preparing foods differing very much in style.⁴

Two problems will then confront the food administrator: what should be left out or disguised in the army supplies because it will not be possible to continue them under civilian relief administration; and to what degree and in what way is the unfamiliarity of food and equipment to be compensated for by other measures?

The possibly striking discrepancies between feeding with army supplies and feeding under civilian relief may be illustrated by flour.

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The Army uses white flour. Both nutritional considerations and a greater attention to local food practices in many parts of Europe would dictate the use of long extraction dark flour, which would provide nutrients to the undernourished people. Yet experience all over the world—including relief feeding in China and the way in which European immigrants to the United States rapidly shift to and subsequently insist stubbornly upon having white flour—has demonstrated that white flour is usually preferred to dark. People in occupied countries will have been eating bread of exceedingly unpleasing quality, heavily extended with potatoes and other substitutes. It will look exceedingly tempting to demonstrate the superiority of the liberators by distributing bread made of white flour. The introduction of white flour after the last war is still remembered with enthusiasm by adults who were then children. But if this is done, the task of returning to a food regime administered by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration or by local civilian agencies, both of which may be forced by considerations of nutrition, economy, and local milling practice into the use of dark flour, will be made exceedingly difficult.

If white flour is used extensively, then there will be other problems as well: Should the desirability of the white flour perhaps be balanced by some method of seasoning which is alien to the people, so that the dark flour which forms a later stage in the program may be presented to them with all the weighting given by familiarity? Should the white flour be labelled as a compensation for some other item in the emergency diet which is disliked? The problem illustrates the double-edged character of any strategy connected with food. Sometimes it may be wise to conform to the local patterns as much as possible and to make the food given under emergency conditions as attractive and familiar as possible, and sometimes it may not. In a short-time operation, limited by the many other considerations which must operate in the case of a military occupation, it may be wiser to label the food and the methods of preparation as exceptional, to stress discontinuity rather than continuity. The specific question of the use of white flour—unavoidable in the case of the Army, indefensible in the case of UNRRA—however it may be decided, points up the responsibility of the military government for taking into account the problems of the relief agencies which will follow it and for reckoning with the scarcities and deprivations which have existed prior to liberation.

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If the military authorities do elect to make the food used in mass feeding as acceptable as possible, the surest method of doing so will be to employ in the preparation large numbers of the local population, who will automatically adapt the supplies to local tastes. As examples of the way in which foods may be adapted to local patterns, attention may be called to a series of experiments conducted on behalf of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitations Operations by the Committee on Food Habits.⁵ Sample foods developed to meet the requirements of available supply, nutritional requirements, and the necessities of processing, packaging, and transportation, were presented to groups of women from different European countries. They then experimented with adapting them to familiar and acceptable products. Here the problem was to take food, itself more concentrated, tasteless, and characterless than the basic supplies of army rations, and convert it, without expense, into patterned food. For instance, a fish paste, the same fish paste in each case, was used by the Norwegians as a spread for bread, by the Greeks as a cold salad, and by the Yugoslavs as a patty to be fried.

There may well be, however, situations in which the military authorities do not feel it is desirable to attempt to make the food acceptable to local tradition; there may be situations involving mixed groups of refugees, evacuees, imported labor battalions, miscellaneous assortments of peoples of different religions, class, and national background. In such a case the technical problem is reversed. All planning, whether it be for an uncooked ration to be taken home and prepared in households or for mass feeding operations, has to be keyed to an avoidance of foods, food combinations, and methods of preparation which may arouse the active repugnance of *any* of the recipient groups.⁶ Instead of making the food distinctively the familiar food of some particular group, it must simply be identifiable, simple, and as conspicuously pure and clean as

⁵ Benet, Sula M., and Joffe, Natalie F., "Some Central European food patterns and their relationship to wartime problems of food and nutrition: Polish food patterns," February, 1943; Haskell, Eldora, "Bulgarian food patterns," July, 1943; Joffe, Natalie F., "Background material on Greek food habits," November, 1943; "Some Central European food patterns and their relationship to wartime programs of food and nutrition," January, 1943; "Hungarian food patterns," February, 1943; "Tests of emergency rations with a Norwegian group," May, 1943; Mitchell, Ruth Crawford, "Yugoslav food patterns," August, 1943; Nizzardini, Genoeffa, and Joffe, N. F., "Italian food patterns and their relationship to wartime problems of food and nutrition," August, 1942; Pirkova-Jakobson, Svatava, and Joffe, N. F., "Czech and Slovak food patterns," February, 1943. Washington, D.C.: Committee on Food Habits, National Research Council. Mimeographed.

⁶ Committee on Food Habits (National Research Council), "The relationship between food habits and problems of wartime emergency feeding," May, 1942. Mimeographed.

possible. In practice this implies that basic army rations may be better suited for mixed feeding situations of mass homeless groups than would be the more economical concentrated rations composed of dried milk, soya, legumes, etc., which can be developed for relief operations among stable, homogeneous populations.

One of the knotty problems involved in any attempt to regularize the distribution of food in a newly occupied area will be the problem of discrimination—which groups in the population and which local areas are to be given priority for certain types of scarce supplies. A number of criteria are possible. The vulnerable groups which have been recognized at the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs could be given preference; that is, the administration of food relief can be keyed to the ethics of the occupying group.⁷ Such standards of discrimination are based on actual physiological urgency, measured nutritionally; first claim would be for young children and pregnant and lactating women. If such standards are used, however, it must be recognized that the procedures which implement them may conflict with local ethics. Even such a simple criterion as weight, by which limited supplies of special foods are reserved for the underweight children, may conflict with a standard of no favoritism among children and run contrary to the ethics of the local community. Or consider the claims of one population group, once well nourished and now feeling deprivation very acutely, versus the food needs of another part of the population, always badly nourished and, though less able to stand up to the ravages of disease, still not suffering as greatly either consciously or actually as the better nourished group. Due consideration to the local ethical standards, the position of children, of the old, of the expectant mothers, of the sick, will increase the cooperativeness of the local population, whereas reference to an ethic based upon the science of nutrition is a possible sanction which can be invoked when the procedures decided upon run counter to the local ethics. Though neither measure will please everyone, both will prevent food distribution which is necessarily discriminatory from seeming arbitrary and therefore cruel.

The British food situation, in which there is almost unanimous approval of and confidence in the government food program, suggests that the most important single factor in providing food for a people under strain is reliability. The food can be dull, it can be meager, it can

⁷ Boudreau, Frank G., "The food conference at Hot Springs," *Nutrition Reviews*, 1943, 1, 321-6.

be poor in quality. But if it is always there, if there are no abrupt changes in policy or violent fluctuations in supply, confidence can be developed and maintained. In the initial chaos of a military occupation, such regularity is, of course, a most difficult attainment. All the more important, then, that sporadic high standards which cannot be maintained should not be set. If the food itself, from whatever source, is minimal but reliable, then the methods of distribution and preparation can be used to step up morale or compensate for drops therein. But if the actual food itself has to be used to quell a tendency to riot, or to silence rumors, or to halt panicky evacuations, then no matter how effective such a short-term measure as a sudden release of coffee, tea, or sugar may be, the longer term results will be bad. Alterations in methods of forming queues, proving identity, or establishing need may be equally effective and are much safer.

Another aspect of the problem is the possible need for continuing to feed a civilian population from some staple crop to which they have been reduced by war conditions but which they deeply detest. If potatoes have become the staple, there is every possibility that there will be potatoes available locally and very little else. Even the most sensitive alteration of the social conditions surrounding food will probably fail to mitigate the people's sense of continued hardship. The only recourse of the administrator is to show that he himself recognizes the situation also for just what it is. Admission by any administration that it is fully cognizant of just how unpopular a move is, coupled with some reasonable hope that it is only temporary, is a powerful device for reducing discontent, even in the realm of food.

Finally there is the question of the way in which the local authorities within a country should gradually resume responsibility for the distribution of food through commercial channels and for the organization of relief. It may be assumed that in the cases of friendly occupied countries in which the immediate impact of battle has not been so great as to disrupt local government, the military authorities may be able to leave a great part of the task in the hands of constituted authorities. In other areas where the devastation has been extreme or the local authority has been recruited from fascist groups which are liquidated by the fact of conquest, there may be no constituted authorities whatsoever. The military may then have to take measures to invoke the help of the local populations, instigate the formation of representative committees, etc.

Whichever course is dictated by the circumstances, the whole procedure may well be labelled temporary. The solution of food problems is one which is peculiarly well suited to serve as a focus for democratic civilian action. It is to be hoped that as the process of reconstruction proceeds in every European country, food production and distribution will be consciously used to bring together, around a table, members of all the divergent groups in a community.

But just because this is a desirable goal, it seems all the more imperative that attempts to form permanent organizations should not be initiated during the period of military government. Military government works under an urgency and within a structure which contrasts sharply with the pace and methods of ordinary civilian life. Attempts to integrate civilian leaders into the scheme of military government are bound to strengthen those elements in the community who prefer the speed of authoritarian methods to the slower and more fumbling methods of democracy. So, paradoxical as it may seem, if the various steps in conquest or liberation are to serve, each in its own way, to strengthen the forces of democracy in Europe and to weaken and discredit, in internal affairs as well as on the fighting front, the forces of fascism, the period of military government can best implement this aim by remaining as military as possible.

This may mean not only refraining from setting up any sort of permanent civilian committees to deal with such problems as food and medical care, but also refraining from using democratic methods in specific feeding or food distribution situations. In a refugee or evacuee camp, for example, complaints about food and general unrest can be mitigated by forming committees from among the inmates and letting them assume the responsibility of choice and partial management of the food. This is a process which could, of course, be repeated on a larger scale for a whole community. Resort to such practices will lighten the task of military government at the time, but failure to resort to them may serve as a better way of labelling the military period as abnormal, as an emergency and not a way of life. The more the period is described in this way, the less need there will be to consult local tastes and preferences in matters of food.

If the whole phrasing of the emergency program uses democratic devices it becomes increasingly important that the relief given should be of such character as can be continued on a long-time basis by civilian

agencies. Short-term concessions in food production or food distribution, if incompatible in terms of economics, nutrition, democratic social practice, and the demands of a practical internationalism, need to be carefully avoided. Advisory experts, then, must possess a detailed knowledge of the plans of civilian agencies concerned with whatever relief and reconstruction, agricultural expansion or conversion, is to *follow* the period of military government. This means plans both of international bodies such as United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, and of individual governments.

In summary, a knowledge of the previous conditions of agricultural production, food distribution, and dietary patterns of a country, coupled with intelligent data upon conditions during the war and especially those immediately preceding invasion, are essential to military government if efficient operations, either in accordance with local custom or in opposition to local custom, in accordance with fascist custom or in opposition to it, are to be conducted. To be ignorant of whether a given food is unfamiliar will be much more dangerous than to attempt to introduce such a food knowingly when expedience demands. Knowledge of past food conditions will increase the power of the military government to accomplish its stated immediate aims. Knowledge of the projected future will enable military government to key its own procedures to the longer-term aims for which the war is being fought.

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REHABILITATING THE INTERNEE

By CURT BONDY

WHEN Allied armies march into liberated territory, they inherit the concentration camps, the internment centers, and the refugee camps—the rotting sores of Nazi rule. Through systematic suppression or neglect, the inhabitants of these camps have been profoundly affected. Some will be hopelessly apathetic, others neurotic wrecks. All will, in some measure, be a special problem for the military administrator. In discussing the rehabilitation of these internees, Dr. Bondy looks not only at the psychological problem of

readjustment but also at the administrative complexities involved.

The author has worked extensively with internees and refugees in this country, Germany, England, Holland, and Belgium, as an administrator and consultant. A refugee himself, he left Germany in 1939. In Germany, before Hitler, he wrote extensively on the rehabilitation of criminals and delinquents. He is at the present time Assistant Professor of Psychology at the Richmond Professional Institute of the College of William and Mary.

THE IDEAL SOLUTION of the problem of such internment camps as are found by the Allied armies in liberated or conquered European territory would be their immediate dissolution. The handling of internees would then not differ much from that of the free population. This ideal solution, however, will not always be possible. Some internees will not be able to go home, either because their home country is still occupied or because no transportation is available; still other reasons may prevent the immediate dissolution of the camp. Certain camps will have to be continued for some time. It may even become necessary, indeed, to establish new camps; for example, for large groups of fresh refugees from the battle zone who otherwise cannot be cared for.

Excluding the millions of prisoners of war, whom we will not discuss in this article, there are probably many hundred thousands of people now interned in the different European countries.¹ There are concentration camps, camps for civil war prisoners, camps for refugees, evacuees, and deportees, and forced labor camps—all varying in kind and size.

All age groups, men and women, are found in these camps. They have been interned for many different reasons: because they belonged to an enemy nation; because they were opposed to the present regime; because they belonged to another party, another creed, another race; because they refused to take the oath of allegiance to Hitler (Jehovah's

¹ For estimates of the number of dislocated Europeans, see Clarence Pickett's discussion of the problem in this issue, pp. 592-605.—THE EDITOR.

witnesses); because they had to flee from their own countries. There are people in the camps who refused to work, or who are vagrants, criminals, or homosexuals. They come from all professions, and from all social and economic groups. The only thing these people have in common is the fact that they are forced to stay in a camp for an unlimited period.

Each camp properly dissolved or managed, each internee properly treated, released, or prepared for release will not only help the individual internee but contribute greatly to the restoration of order and peace.

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNEES

When an administrator enters an internment camp for the first time, he may undergo an experience as stirring as going into active battle for the first time. He should go in with full consciousness and with senses keen and alert. This first impression should not be forgotten. Here are human beings whom he has seen before only in pictures: sick and starving people, clad in rags, backs bent, with undressed wounds and sores, dirty, stinking, unshaved. He will not forget how they look: sad, longing, impudent, insisting, afraid, depressed. *His* first impressions: pity, horror, and aversion. *Their* impression on seeing him well clad, well fed, satisfied: hope and jealousy. This is the situation in many camps; possibly it may be not so bad in all.

The administrator who knows beforehand what to expect will not be discouraged about tackling work in such a camp. He must ask: How did these people become what they are? What can I do to help them recover? He knows that some years ago they looked as he looks, once lived as happily, and are as well educated.

Why have these people changed so much? The reason is the entirely *unnatural influences of internment*. The internee is isolated—isolated from his family, the other sex, his friends, his usual vocation, and from all influences to which he was accustomed. He feels degraded. Here on the one hand are the internees, and there on the other is the "dominant class" of the guards and the free population who have what he has not—freedom, money, social standing and recognition, and usually enough to eat and to smoke.² He is a nothing here, a number. No one cares about him, no one loves him. Worst of all is the uncertainty about the length of his stay in the camp, the "indeterminate sentence." From my own

² Cf. Clarence R. Johnson, *Prisoners of War*, Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1941.

experience in a concentration camp I know that this uncertainty is worse than all other pains of the internment. It can break the resistance of any man. Besides this, other uncertainties nag him: What is happening to his family? Are his children still living? What will happen to his country, to his home? What will he do after the war is over?

In addition to all this, the influence of living in a mass has made its contribution. Few men indeed are able to withstand the lowering effect of the mass. Often the worst individuals, not the best ones, exert the strongest influence. The longer the stay in the crowd, the greater the loss of each man's individuality. The general level is always lowering. Moral standards change. Many internees are in the process of losing all shame, are becoming mean and cruel, full of hate and resentment; they are losing all higher interest. It is very difficult to interest them in anything which is not directly concerned with the satisfaction of their drives: self-preservation, hunger, thirst, and sex.

People in the camps become fed up with one another, become restless, nervous, and intolerant; thus quarrels and fights among internees are very common. By and by they develop an absolutely false picture of life. Freedom, family, and fatherland tend to be glorified. They lose all sense of proportion, can no longer discriminate between what is important and what is unimportant. Typical is their attitude towards rumors. The most incredible rumors are spread and believed, arousing a strong feeling of excited elation, usually followed by deepest depression.

But there are also men in the camps who are able to withstand these difficulties, who become greater and wiser, and who may have an enormous positive influence on the other internees. There are others too who, though not strong enough to withstand the impact of internment and mass influence, will recover at once if the situation changes. These are the fortunate ones.

The others constitute the real problem of handling internees. *Three groups need special consideration* by the administrators. (1) Many of the internees will be physically sick, the resistance of nearly all being at the lowest point because of lack of sufficient food. (2) Another group, which will probably be a pretty large one, are those internees who must be regarded as mentally unbalanced or ill. Besides the insane there will be a larger group of neurotics showing sleeplessness, fear, obsessions, and other neurotic symptoms. (3) The largest of the three groups will very likely be those people who have become wayward. Waywardness is the

concentration of the whole psychic energy on the satisfaction of basic drives without interest in such considerations as higher values or moral conduct. Waywardness will appear in different degrees. Many internees will change quickly to normal conduct if returned to normal living. But we must also realize that there will be some whose personalities have changed deeply and who, now potentially dangerous, are very likely to become real criminals.

Such are the people with whom the foreign administrator has to work. He must never forget how they became as they are, nor that the first and most important step in rehabilitating them is to remove them from the harrowing atmosphere of internment.

REORGANIZATION OF INTERNMENT CAMPS

Many of the internment camps found by the Allied Armies will be in a very bad condition indeed. The retreating enemy is not interested in leaving well-organized camps. The camps will very likely be inadequately supplied and in a complete state of chaos. The first tasks, therefore, will be the provision of food, clothing, and medical care for the internees and the restoring of order in the camp.

The final reorganization of the camp has to be prepared carefully. The fact that camps are to be only temporary will have influence on all the planning. That fact should be made clear to all concerned. The internees are generally not criminals, they have not committed any offense, and, with certain exceptions, their internment is not technically legal. Thus the administration should provide the kind of treatment for the internees which is no more restrictive than necessary for the maintenance of order and discipline. The internees should receive as much freedom, responsibility, and opportunity for self-government as possible.

On the other hand, the pitiful and difficult state of mind of the internees will require an especially efficient administration, absolute regularity, and clearly fixed rights and duties. *Everything that is possible should be done to normalize the life of the internees, to help them in their preparation for living at large.* Removal of wire fences, granting leaves of absence, permitting visitors, and paying for work done in the camp—these might be some of the necessary steps.

In larger camps the organization of "departments" has much to recommend itself. A health department would find urgent work in the camp as a whole in sanitation, diet, etc., as well as in the special care of

the insane and sick. A labor department could assume the double task of getting all necessary work done for the camp, and reeducating the internees to regular work—retraining them if necessary. Many may have forgotten how or be unwilling to work. An educational and recreational department would be of the utmost importance for normalizing the lives of internees and for helping them to be able to live again outside the camp.

Still more important, perhaps, is a department of social work designed to deal with personal difficulties, and above all, with the direct preparation for release: communication with other members of the family, with the home communities of the internees, with the local authorities, with welfare organizations, and so on. In this whole work, needless to say, the specialists must have their place: the administrator, the physician, the psychiatrist, the teacher, and the social worker. Here the cooperation of specialists among the internees themselves is most important.

The right *grouping* of internees is very important, for the smaller the groups, the less the corrupting mass influence, and the easier the handling and regeneration of the internees. How the formation of smaller and more homogeneous groups can be carried out depends largely on the kind, the size, and the facilities of the particular camp. Probably in many camps not even the sexes have been segregated. Now families should be brought together if possible. Children without their parents, and adolescents should be kept and cared for separately. Another grouping could be made according to nationality; often a great amount of disturbance and disorder comes from the indiscriminate mingling of different nationalities and races. Different political groups may also be fighting one another. Finally there is the possibility of grouping according to different needs of treatment. Insane and sick people should be completely separated. A high degree of waywardness and criminality constitutes a constant threat against order and discipline. If criminal and innocent people are kept together, the methods of treatment for both groups would necessarily be determined by the handling of the criminals.

These different principles of grouping, only touched on here, can be skillfully combined, according to experience, and put into action according to the special needs of each camp.

REEDUCATION AND REHABILITATION OF THE INTERNEES

In the treatment of the internees we have to keep in mind that the aim is twofold: to make the unnatural life in camp as endurable as possible, and to help the internees in their preparation for a life of freedom. There is always the danger that an administrator will be satisfied with the smooth operation of the camp, whereas this orderly routine, desirable as it is, should be only a means towards fulfilling the two chief tasks.

The task is to counteract those causes which produce the corrupting effect of internment camps. To diminish the isolation, the internees should be given as much relationship as possible with the outer world by correspondence, by leaves of absence, by contact with visitors, lecturers, teachers, and artists from outside. The feeling of social degradation can be partly balanced by appropriate treatment from the administrators and their helpers, especially by responsibility and confidence. As far as possible, fixed dates for release should be put down, to take from the internees the depressing feeling of being detained with "indeterminate sentence." They should be frankly told why their release is not possible at once, and about all changes in their status. The more the internees know about the facts, the better they are instructed, the more they can discuss the problems with the administrators—the better it is for all. They must be convinced that now they have fixed rights; above all, they must be convinced that their completely arbitrary treatment is at an end, that they are to be restricted no more than absolutely necessary. To overcome the feeling of uncertainty, the social worker should try to help the internees learn more about their families, about what is going on outside, what will be their future.

Extensive reeducation will, of course, be necessary for many internees. The U.S. Army is giving an astonishing demonstration in its rehabilitation centers of how *mass reeducation* and *rehabilitation* can be achieved.³ The extremely high figures of success which are reported are probably due to the following facts: (1) the punished soldiers are engaged in sensible work, their training; (2) they are treated as human beings; (3) they have hope of being completely rehabilitated; and (4) the officers in these rehabilitation centers are more or less consciously devel-

³ Don Wharton, "The Army's Black Sheep," *Common Sense*, October, 1943, 376-378. Condensed in *Reader's Digest*, November, 1943, 77-80.

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oping personal relationships with the men. The last is one of the most important items of all reeducation. It must, however, be clearly understood that such reeducation and rehabilitation are possible only if the men are held legally and if strong force and influence are possible as with convicted soldiers. Other methods of mass and group education can also be learned by what the Special Service Branch, the Red Cross, and the U.S.O. are doing for the entertainment and education of the soldiers. It will be necessary to make a thorough study of these methods to find out which of them can be applied to the internment camps, and whether the necessary personnel and funds are available. It probably will be possible to combine some of the efforts for the occupational army and the internment camps.

Group therapy and case work, especially psychiatric case work, can, doubtless, be highly effective; but the right workers for this may not be available.⁴ Efforts should be made to get qualified internees to do this work.

How far the neurotic internee can be treated and can profit by conventional methods of mass and group education will depend on the depth of neurosis and the number of available special helpers. It would be an interesting study for a psychiatrist to find out whether and how the reports on war neuroses compiled by Army, Navy and Marine Corps medical officers could be applied in the treatment of internees who had suffered various forms of shock before and during internment.

Signs of waywardness in lighter forms probably would disappear as a result of organized mass and group influence strengthened by casual personal talks with the social worker. In cases, however, in which waywardness has already very deeply influenced and changed the whole personality—and there will be some such cases—there are no special methods of treatment which can be applied in an internment camp. If these people are really dangerous, a way must be found to bring them into proper institutions.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE FOREIGN ADMINISTRATOR

There is scarcely any administrative or social work more difficult but at the same time more interesting than running a liberated internment camp. The camp leader, and through him his staff, determine the

⁴ S. R. Slavson, *An Introduction to Group Therapy*, New York, 1943. (This book deals with children and adolescents.)

whole atmosphere of the camp. Thus the right selection of the camp leader and his co-workers is of first importance. They must be men who, conscious of their own abilities and limitations, possess strong self-discipline. Harmonious cooperation between staff members, and clear-cut distribution of responsibility are essential.

The power of the camp officials is nearly unlimited. There is a considerable danger here—and a peculiar attraction, especially for a young administrator—of enjoying and misusing the enormous power which is given him over the internees.

The administrator will be in great danger of becoming distrustful and contemptuous of his charges. Internees usually are not very pleasant company. They will not be frank with him. How can they be? They have been disappointed so often. They have learned to use all possible means to get food and clothes and extra advantages. In their choice of method, they are not particular. In spite of all this, the administrator must not become altogether distrustful; on the contrary, he must try to give and gain as much confidence as possible.

That the administrator will have a very hard time in getting the real esteem, respect, and confidence of the internees can be predicted with certainty. He should not overestimate the enthusiasm with which he will doubtless be welcomed at first. It is obvious that if he brings food and hope of freedom, he will be loved more than anyone else. But he will generally be unable to fulfill the exaggerated hopes placed in him by the internees. He cannot possibly bring *enough* food *fast* enough, cannot cause their release at once as they have hoped. Deep depression, distrust, and often hate and resistance will be the natural consequences. He must realize this beforehand, for he must not be personally offended but must try to remain objective and understand such a reaction.

If he has genuine friendliness for and real interest in his charges, they will find it out. Eventually they will feel for the administrator a real trust which will be more solid than the first enthusiasm; for that enthusiasm was given to the food and hope of freedom, not to the person.

Immensely nervous and sensitive as internees are, the least injustice can excite them greatly. They will not tolerate any kind of favoritism. The administrator should be more than cautious in selecting his helpers. Although there will be among the internees excellent personalities who could be of very great help to him, they generally will not be those persons who push themselves forward and with whom the administrator

becomes acquainted at first. The Allied experiences right now in Italy demonstrate well the difficulty of finding the right helpers among the Italians.⁵

There is a great danger that the administrator may act the way many parents and teachers do if they feel unable to cope with the difficulties of their children. He will begin his work with great enthusiasm, great hope, much effort. He will make promises which later on he may not be able to fulfill. The internees, up to now inhumanely treated, will take advantage of his friendly attitude. But internees find it difficult to react appropriately in the new situation; they misuse the freedoms given them. Difficulties arising from all sides, the administrator will become disappointed, discouraged, and nervous. Suddenly he will change his attitude and methods completely. Becoming a martinet, he will now use nothing but severity, punishment, and sharpness. The result can be only growing resistance from the internees, and still stronger methods against them from the administration.

All this can be prevented. There are in education always the two opposite principles of authority and freedom, friendliness and firmness, nearness and distance. These two principles are not, as is often believed, exclusive of each other, but must be applied together. The administrator must have authority and power, but he can and must combine them with the other principles: friendliness, interest, and all the other elements of freedom.

A great task stands before the foreign administrator: to care for mistreated people and help them to leave the internment camp able to cooperate in building up a peaceful and better world. To achieve the goal, wisdom and skill will have to be drawn upon as never before. We have the skills. Do we have the wisdom?

⁵ "Guilt of Italians Complex Problem," *The New York Times*, November 5, 1943, p. 3, col. 3.

LABOR IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

By J. B. S. HARDMAN

EUROPE's labor movement has, during the period of Nazi domination, been the backbone of the underground. With liberation in sight, the dynamic force of labor and the underground can be turned to the constructive task of stabilizing and rehabilitating occupied territory. In the following article, a prominent leader in the American labor movement dis-

cusses the potentialities of labor in occupied territory.

J. B. S. Hardman, author of *American Labor Dynamics* and President of the American Labor Press Association, has been editing labor newspapers and magazines since 1923. He is currently at work on a book, *Rendezvous with Destiny*, a study in the development of democracy.

AT THE RECENT CONVENTION of the American Federation of Labor in Boston, Delegate Thomas A. Murray of the New York State Federation of Labor spoke as follows:

The leadership of the underground Italian labor movement has asked that its legitimate representatives be put in charge of the former fascist labor unions until such a time as elections are possible. This request might well be honored by our government. The American Federation of Labor is keenly interested in having a sound and constructive Italian labor policy for the workers of Italy, aimed not simply at destroying the fascist labor unions, and thus creating a dangerous vacuum, but in transforming the fascist unions into free unions, democratically self-governed and constructively administered.

It is unfortunate and to be regretted that such organizations as the American Federation of Labor and the Italian-American Labor Council or the General Confederation of Labor delegation, have not been consulted on the labor policy of the Allied Government.

One of the main tasks of the AMG is related to labor. American-British labor must have some sort of voice in helping to determine AMG labor policy, if the liberated peoples of Europe are to have confidence in AMG decisions. . . .

In this statement four important points are raised: (1) There is a functioning labor movement in Italy, arising out of the underground existence into which it was forced by the fascist regime, this movement being represented by the once suppressed General Confederation of Labor; (2) Labor proposes to take over the fascist unions and administer

them "until such time as elections of officers are possible," in the meantime seeking to reform them into free, democratically governed labor organizations; this it prefers to destroying the fascist unions and leaving a dangerous vacuum; (3) Labor claims a voice in the determination of AMG labor policy; (4) AMG, one hears, has thus far neither sought labor's advice nor given it consideration.

In terms of broad public policy, the issue of labor rehabilitation in occupied territory under military government raises several important questions. They may be listed thus:

(1) How compatible are the tasks with which military government of occupied enemy territory is charged, and those which are implied in a program of labor rehabilitation?

(2) What labor-movement "potential" can be expected in the fascist countries after the decades of oppression and ruthless extermination? Would it be safe to rehabilitate labor by way of the structures of the fascist "labor fronts" and "unions," or would it be sounder to encourage the formation of new movements from the ground up and take a chance meanwhile on the creating of vacuums?

(3) Would it be possible for military government to do business with the surviving remnants of the labor movements of old, or with the new labor movements which have come into being by way of resistance, sabotage, and recent underground activity; that is, are they likely to be realistic enough to prove of constructive value to the tasks? Would not we find ourselves embracing "revolution" instead of securing cooperation?

(4) How is AMG to go about doing the job of labor rehabilitation; should it, perhaps, delegate the task to a specially created group? Where is to be found the labor leadership which the AMG is to recognize and with whom it is to deal? What specific functions and what terms is the labor movement to be offered so that two vital aims may be achieved: one, that "the liberated peoples should have confidence in AMG decisions," and two, that all needed work be done?

IS THE REHABILITATION OF LABOR A FUNCTION OF AMG?

Since by labor is meant the labor movement, persons trained in the military tradition are not unlikely to query whether rehabilitating labor is properly a function of military government. The answer to this, logically, must derive from an analysis of its function.

The *Rules of Land Warfare* by which it lives, stress the military nature of the arrangement: "It is a government by force, and the legality of its acts is determined by the laws of war." Its primary task under the rules is to guard the rear of the advancing armies against spies, saboteurs and other varieties of enemy-planted and secretly supported resistance, and to maintain communications clear and unobstructed. But it has another task, equally important—the economic and sanitary rehabilitation of the population in the area. In the process of assuring sustained production of food and materials necessary to meet the requirements of both the occupying troops and the civilians, its jurisdiction extends over "... agriculture, manufactures, and trade of the occupied territory, its mines and oil wells, exports and imports, the supply of the inhabitants with food, fuel and other necessities, the supply of labor, strikes, lockouts, and disputes and like matters." What is more, the *Basic Field Manual* requires that its performance in this respect be anything but routine or mechanical. It "must suit the people, the country, the time, and the strategical and tactical situation to which it is applied."

The military assignment thus is a part of the total design of United Nations war strategy; it is closely linked with the broad democratic commitments of our war objectives. Technically unconcerned with postwar policies, it in effect carries to the people of the occupied area a foretaste of the peace to come. Its actions, and particularly the manner in which they are carried out, must convince the liberated populations that freedom and democratic self-government will come in the wake of the military occupation; that the occupation itself is temporary; and that the occupying authority plans no interfering influence to outlast the duration.

Obviously, then, its military function has a political content. Its performances may be directed by the military, but their effectiveness will be assessed by the civilian aspects of each situation. To the end that it may carry out its assignment well, it needs every avenue of approach to the heart of the people in the area. Close cooperation with, and continuous help from, a responsible, native labor movement should thus be eminently welcome to us, and we should spare no effort to bring about the effective functioning of such a movement. To stand by a static understanding of what is the job at hand would be merely to miss the boat.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT "POTENTIAL" IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

There is, to be sure, no functioning free labor movement in the fascist countries; none was permitted to exist. Such "labor fronts" and "unions" as were established in these countries to "handle" labor are an unmitigated fraud. Yet the situation varies from one country to another; it is different in Italy from what it is in Germany. Nor would it be a reasonable policy to generalize, on this point, even for each enemy country as a whole: conceivably, dependable elements of a labor movement may be found in the underground groupings in some parts of the Reich and not in the others.

In the pages which follow, we shall be concerned only with Germany, Austria, and Italy, among the enemy countries in Europe, leaving aside the enemy-satellite countries.

(1) *The Situation in Italy.* The strength of the fascist labor unions in Italy was reported in 1940, as follows:

Confederation of industrial workers	3,374,564
Confederation of agricultural workers	4,299,026
Confederation of commercial workers	602,285
Confederation of employees in credit institutions and insurance companies	80,000
Total	8,355,875

Eight million unionized workers for a country with a total population of less than forty-five million would be a remarkable record if the story were a true one. There were, according to the American Labor Conference on International Affairs, in Italy before fascism came to power, close to three million unionized workers in a number of bona fide organizations. Some were of conflicting orientations, such as the socialist-led General Confederation of Labor with 1,130,000 members; the Catholic unions with 990,000 members; the autonomous seamen and railway unions with 500,000 members; and the Anarcho-Syndicalists unions with 320,000 members. The fascists, although they had an insignificant following, simply took over and have ever since been collecting "dues" and enforcing discipline. The idea of the Italian underground about taking over the fascist unions in the emergency, rather than building a new labor movement from the bottom up, is presumably based on the supposition that these unions of twenty years ago have retained a hold on the mass of members.

In view of the great division in the ranks of Italian anti-fascists, however, it is doubtful whether occupying authorities can assume final responsibility for turning over the labor situation to any one labor claimant. Presumably, a tactful and expedient policy would call for the establishment of a unified front through which military government could bring its labor policy to fruition. There are in the field the "delegation of the Confederation of Labor," the *Giustizia e Libertà* movement founded in 1925, later disintegrated and lately alive again, the *Action Party* of which Carlo Sforza is a member, and the secret groups of the outlawed Socialist and Communist parties. Although not all of these groups are, strictly speaking, "labor," the ideological lines are uniting the unions and the political groups in Italy. With Soviet Russia represented as a full-fledged partner on the Advisory Council for Italy of the United Nations, it is to be expected that only such an arrangement would stand a chance of acceptance by all parties concerned with the Italian problem.

(2) *The German Situation.* In Germany, when it sets out to determine on a policy of dealing with labor, the occupying authority will face a far more taxing situation than in Italy.

In 1931, before Hitler seized the government, there were in Germany about four and a half million workers in the social-democratic or *free* trade unions, and about half a million in the Catholic trade unions—in all, some five million organized unionists. The German unions were considered as among the best organized in the world, well disciplined, and carrying on their business in the most orderly fashion. The Nazis deposed the union officers and took over the organization, lock, stock and barrel. They merged the unions with the employers' organizations, creating their "coordinated" Labor Front. A great many of the outstanding leaders of the unions were duly "liquidated," only a few having managed to get out of the Fatherland. It was reported that some fifteen thousand leading members of labor parties and unions were killed outright, and about one million members committed to concentration camps and prisons. Persecutions never were discontinued.

Underground reports tell, however, that since the German war fortunes have shown a downward trend, there has been a renewal of intensified liquidations among those laborites once known for their anti-Nazi views. Such reports would indicate that the earlier purges had not been complete, that there still remains some framework upon which the occu-

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pying forces could build. It is a plausible assumption that while most of the conspicuous leaders were doubtless killed, a great many of the once-upon-a-time union devotees, not conspicuous or known, were able to cheat the Gestapo and keep themselves and their old loyalties alive—undercover but alive. The German underground movement has rightly chosen only the least known of the union leaders and—an important fact—only the younger men and women; only these would prove capable of carrying on the clandestine activity under the all-seeing eyes of the Gestapo. Hence, elements of leadership for a coming labor movement may be expected to come out of the underground groups.

An appraisal of the possible potential of clear anti-Nazism will also take into account the fact that thirteen million Germans in pre-Hitler Germany voted social-democratic or communist. Though no one will deny that a goodly portion of that immense number must subsequently have undergone a change of heart under the impact of the extreme nationalist and "revolutionary socialist" features of Nazi propaganda and that others joined the Hitler bandwagon for safety and convenience, surely not all of the thirteen millions need to be written off the books.

A telling element in the German situation is the traditional habit of the German workers, sustained even under Nazidom, of sticking together, of organization, no matter what the aim in view. Given leadership by AMG, they will be quick to act as an organized force. Revealing in this respect is a statement made by Siegfried Aufhauser, a noted German national labor union officer and member of the Reichstag before Hitler's rise to power. In describing the situation at a Round Table of *Free World Magazine*, he said:

Loyal labor leaders continued their activities and adapted their methods to meet the conditions. Their most successful methods were to utilize the promises and slogans of Hitler to make demands for minor, almost trivial concessions. This served to unite the workers in the plants. For instance, in one factory the workers asked to have the building beautified, a demand justified by the Nazi slogan, *Schoenheit im Arbeit*. . . . The committees that led this work included all workers: socialists, communists, and even Nazis. The Nazi workers have been disappointed since 1934 by the anti-labor attitude of the Hitler regime. Today, they are more radical than other workers in the factories. This radicalism has led to the dissolu-

tion of the Nazi factory organizations, but each plant has developed a real unity of the working community. . . . The source of power for the opposition to Hitler is in the large plants of German industry.

The German situation will be complicated by the presence in occupied areas of the many millions of workers from other nations whom the Nazis brought into the Reich for work in German plants. Very likely immediate repatriation will not be possible. Hating the regime that forced them from their homelands and enslaved them, these people will present an added danger of explosion. What the real menace of this element in the situation is like, can be gleaned from an observation by Desider Benau, former Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Trade Union Federation, at the Round Table mentioned above. Said Mr. Benau:

My opinion is—and it is not only my opinion but corroborated by the messages we receive from Czechoslovakia—that there does not exist a Czechoslovakian who will speak to a German, who will see a German. Every Czechoslovakian in the country is of the opinion that every word a German says is not true. There is not a family in Czechoslovakia that has not been victimized by the Germans. We must consider that it will be many, many years before we can work with the Germans.

To direct the energies of these workers from a raging yearning for release and revenge to free participation in constructive tasks in friendly and dignified cooperation with the revived free labor movement will be an undertaking well worth the attention of occupying authorities.

As to Austrian labor, the occupying authority will experience no difficulty if democratic processes are given an opportunity. Austrian labor was militant, was not "taken over" by "telephone call" as elsewhere; it fought in a very real sense, and hard; it lost the battle, but it never accepted the loss as final. Its subjugation is of comparatively recent date. Its restoration to organized functioning will not present a major problem.

IS IT SAFE TO DO BUSINESS WITH LABOR?

In the light of American experience, the question of whether one can safely do business with labor appears to pose no great problem. We have been doing a good deal of business with labor in recent years, and Old Glory still flutters over the Capitol.

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But people feel differently when European labor is in question. Somehow, we cannot get over the idea that European labor is "ideological," committed to an assortment of *isms*, and above all things bent on radicalism. Hence it is widely feared that if the military government in occupied territory undertakes to deal with labor on anything like equal terms, without barbed wire between, revolution will break loose.

But in any such view the outstanding facts of the last two decades of European labor history, and for that matter of European history generally, are overlooked. Forgotten is the fact that the March on Rome and the Revolution of Nihilism were the handiwork of gangster leaders financed not by labor but by Big Money and "blue blood"; physically supported, to be sure, by the dregs of the population in the big cities but not by the forces of organized labor. Quite to the contrary, there proved to be not enough revolutionary stamina in labor, except in Austria, to resist the fascist onslaughts, to deal them a truly revolutionary blow. The "flaming torch of revolution," with the exception of Russia in 1917—and its revolution was basically a national, agricultural-industrial and democratic revolution, not a labor revolution—could be found in laboring hands in Europe only on the older William Morris drawings and on some undergraduate communist posters in the early twenties.

Though it was Lenin who, considering the middle class a social evil and a rapidly disintegrating phenomenon, went out to fight imperialism, it was Hitler who killed imperialism and the middle class. So much has been pointed out by Professor Edward Hallett Carr, in his brilliant *Conditions of Peace*. It was Hitler who demonstrated that imperialism was not a paying enterprise. Hitler's New Order wiped out Europe's imperialism in the days when his own was still a physical success; and now at last he has made even his imperialism a ruinous liability. Whereas Lenin was able to make revolution a goal worth not only fighting for but dying for, Hitler gave to revolutionary performance a black eye for generations to come. "Total revolution" and "national socialism" will long stand out as horror symbols in the human language, no matter what other interpretations advocates of other than Hitlerian aims may seek to give them.

A summary entitled *Post War Programs of Europe's Underground*, recently published in the semi-monthly bulletin of the Foreign Policy Association, underlines the astounding sobriety of the reputedly revolutionary elements in the Old World's social subsoil. These people are not

planning for revolution today or the day after. They want sensible law and order, constructive order, democracy as an aim of social organization and a method of achievement. It would seem to be most essential that the military heads of occupying authorities, as well as their civilian advisers, should disabuse their minds of any revolutionary fear when they think of European labor.

The interdependent relation between democracy, as a social procedure and form of social organization, on the one hand, and the labor movement on the other does not need rediscovery by us at this time. Hitler made that discovery in his day, and Mussolini a decade earlier; both made the most of it. Each in turn killed the labor movement so that democracy in his land might be thoroughly and easily disposed of. Thus, logically, any serious attempt at liquidating Hitlerism and all its works calls for the rehabilitation of labor as a starting point.

Military government *can* do business with labor, and that "business" ought to be carried on in an open, above-board fashion. The basis should be give and take: *give* the labor movement the encouragement and the recognition and status it needs to live; *take* from it the necessary machinery of contact with, and penetration into, the population in the occupied areas. Only labor has these opening wedges, so essential to the discharge of the two fundamental undertakings—guarding against subversive enemy-elements in the area and securing dependable cooperation in production and distribution of materials and services.

Behind us there is history: the experience of the American military government in occupied Germany after World War I. The military commanders of that day were ordered to carry out their tasks of occupation without in any way interfering with local laws and institutions, a general rule of conduct for occupying authorities. They carried out the orders literally. They did nothing, for example, to interfere with the fact that the Kaiserite reactionaries were entrenching themselves in local political power, after our armies had crushed the Kaiser's armed might on the battlefields. In consequence of this static, inflexible observance of basic field-manual rules, democracy in Germany received its coup-de-grace from the very men who had fought to force Germany to abandon the Junkers' rule. The result, twenty years later, was World War II, total and global. We certainly must not repeat this policy.

We did not then understand what we now know, that there was neither consistency, nor logic, nor even political honesty in allowing a

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war on the Kaiser's regime, a war to make the world safe for democracy, to be followed by American military government which welcomed the continuation in local power of the functionaries of that same Kaiserite regime.

The logic of the knowledge we have gained, twenty years later, is compelling. Our occupation authorities, both military and civilian, would be recklessly flaunting the logic of tragic experience if they interpreted their rules to mean that their duty is to act as impartial observers and non-participating guardians of the status quo. This while our airmen, at a terrific yet apparently justifiable cost in health, treasure, and lives, are blasting the status quo—Hitler's, Mussolini's, Hirohito's—to oblivion.

It is inconceivable that we should leave Nazi laws and institutions in effect in Germany. No effective rehabilitation policy could be inaugurated unless the old order is scrapped and a new organization erected—rules or no rules.

Indeed, there will be no order found at all. Nazi economic policies have practically wiped out the middle class in Germany, have proletarianized the nation. Monopoly is a characteristic of industry and business. Ownership of all valuable productive property is centered in the hands of the ruling Nazi gang. With the nation's financial structure nothing but a bookkeeping fraud, Germany's economy is certain to be in utter ruin after the Nazi leadership is sent packing. If the Nazis should duplicate in German cities the same pattern of retreat they have initiated in Italy, the ensuing chaos will be beyond repair. There will be no economy left ready to work on and no stable social stratum with which one could do business, no "alternative authority" to take things over.

Under such circumstances, common sense will suggest to the occupying authorities that they call back into being any anti-Nazi element capable of cohesive action. Such elements will not be found to any extent anywhere outside the workers' plant groupings; only these *are* likely to survive the pulverization of the plants. Just now it would be pointless to speculate as to the possible dimensions of this labor organization potential. But the German people's knack for organization and their strong sense of discipline, once authority is established, are sure to prove a valuable asset when the job of reconstruction is at hand.

We cannot and need not try to avoid taking steps that will influence the course of political and democratic evolution. The advancement

of democracy derives from the aims and from the very character of the war, from the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms, those pledges to the world made on behalf of our fighting brothers and sons, signed, and delivered. Military government is part of this delivery service.

HOW TO DO IT

Rehabilitating labor in occupied enemy territory is a complex task which must be dealt with in each situation on the terms of each situation. But such a pragmatic and experimental attitude must proceed from the assumption that labor in the occupied enemy territories is an enemy of the enemy. Unless this is assumed, and the assumption warranted, all else is pointless.

Although no general formula for labor rehabilitation can be drawn, it is possible to indicate the legitimate generalities of an approach that promises positive results. The task calls for:

(a) A staff equipped to cope with labor, the term to mean not just working in industry, but workers as a constituent of society's social dynamics;

(b) A certain amount of "administrative legislation," starting with the abolition of Nazi-restrictions and the restoration of pre-Nazi freedoms as prerequisite of rehabilitating activity;

(c) A trustworthy leadership, ready to serve the labor organization to be called to action; a leadership, not a receivership, and native, of course;

(d) A program of functional assignments for labor organizations to undertake and for which they will assume responsibility.

It stands to reason that the structure of military government may have little leeway in its accepted form of organization for discussion and bargaining. Orders are orders. Yet only such orders are worth giving as will fulfill the aim. Hence a suggestion that it invoke the advisory cooperation of the international labor union organizations might not be beside the point. In the case of Italy, for instance, there is in existence in skeleton form the Confederation of Labor of the pre-fascist period; with regard to labor rehabilitation in Germany, it may be necessary to call for help and advisory cooperation on the International Federation of Trade Unions. And there is also the International Labor Office which has an enormous body of data and some relevant experience on which it can fall back in shaping a program of approach.

Of immediate advisability is the removal of restrictions upon freedom of speech, assembly, and organization. This need in no way conflict with requirements of military security, for the groups benefited would assume complete responsibility for violations of rules. On the other hand, such freedom, giving confidence and hope to the population, would place subversive elements in the uncomfortable position of being the only groups to act in hiding and hence most exposed to detection. The unconditional granting of the right to coalesce and to seek satisfactory employment terms—what we call collective bargaining—would tend to strengthen in labor a sense of citizenship, deteriorated under Nazi-fascist oppression, and thus tighten democratic responsibility.

Labor organization needs leadership. And in the Allied effort to bring labor organization into practically spontaneous being, securing of the proper kind of leadership will present a knotty and difficult problem. One thing, however, should be understood. What is *not* wanted is an administrative receivership, an assortment of imported union general secretaries and general presidents. Such imported generalship would not possess the competence needed to deal with a local situation under exceptionally taxing circumstances, nor would it be likely to enjoy the confidence of the local and native people.

But how can native leadership be secured when the whole movement had been put on ice? The answer is—it has got to be found. And it can be found in the underground cells of the movement, in each shop group that has retained cohesion. There are the elements of leadership though without title or emoluments of office, "the seed under the snow" that has grown, and is sure to be looked up to by the native local population in each situation. We may have to test unwritten credentials before we make a decision. The job is one that will call for ingenuity.

There are sure to be contests for leadership. Old, merited refugees will return home from exile to lead; partisan heads basing their claims on having been the spokesmen of the right kind of attitude, on not having gone wrong ten years ago or twenty. Many claims will be put in, but what should weigh with us is possession of the confidence of the local people.

The crucial test of the labor rehabilitation will be the Allied ability to put the labor organizations to the right kind of work. There is sure to be no shortage of responsibilities to be meted out and to be assumed. The constructive, responsible function of unions will come in the opera-

tion of industry; perhaps first of all in the rebuilding of plants and dwellings, and in the distribution of consumer commodities, whether such undertakings be functions of public organizations or given over to private capital, as the logic of the situation will direct. And undoubtedly there will be room for labor's assuming responsibility for the safety and the security of the military and the civil authorities in charge of occupied territory. The military authority will not insist, it is to be surmised, on experiencing all headaches first hand.

In spite of the likelihood that all this will sound like a basic field manual with psychological "pointers," a few observations may be justified:

(1) Labor in occupied territories must not be approached with an air of superiority, in the manner of a missionary carrying salvation to the heathen. AMG is not a carrier of a perfect recipe for salvation. It is trying to help and will, in turn, need cooperation based on confidence.

(2) Specifically with reference to the American end of AMG: American things, far more than American ideas, are admired in the Old World. Ideas should not be forced upon the recipients of our help, not even as wrapping paper for the things.

(3) European labor in 1918 was frustrated by the distrust which the Allied governments showed to labor's attempts to assert itself in the reshuffling of social forces and the relocation of political power in consequence of the war. They still remember it, and they will look with distrust upon our best efforts if we do not make it abundantly clear that AMG 1944 does not propose to repeat the errors of 1918. We were wrong then. Having frustrated labor, we rendered democracy immaterial and impotent.

(4) European labor is "ideological." Americans shy at "ideology"; Europeans look at the matter differently. That's their right, and we must respect it. Insofar as the dealings of the occupying authority with labor are concerned, it will make little difference whether labor organizations call themselves socialist, communist, anarcho-syndicalist or Catholic. It will be their actions that will count. Our particular aversion to labels is really of no consequence.

(5) There surely will be quarreling between socialists and communists. Inevitable though this is, it need not be tragic. The Soviet Union, to which communists look for guidance, is our ally in the war and proposes to remain our ally in peace—a circumstance desired by all.

The occupying authority is an agent of the United Nations, and over-all policy will be settled in the high leadership of the United Nations, not locally. The problem will be pertinent only to the extent that it may affect the work of the occupying authority. Active practice in patience, good tact and healthy judgment should not be forbidden. What counts is that no matter what their feelings toward the Soviet Union, organized European labor will cherish more than ever, and above all things, freedom and democratic rights. These are our primary concern.

Quentin Reynolds, in a report from Sicily radioed to *Colliers*, says:

Because so many individual problems, not covered by the rule book, arise here each day, the head men in AMG keep dinning into the minds of their assistants, "Use your common sense." Common sense seems to be a good rule here.

Common sense is likely to be a good rule everywhere, particularly so if it is applied to a sound, carefully worked-out policy.



ASSESSING PUBLIC OPINION IN A DISLOCATED COMMUNITY

By LIEUTENANT ALEXANDER H. LEIGHTON
AND ASSOCIATES*

ASSESSING the state of mind, the needs, hopes, and complaints of the inhabitants of an occupied territory can be of tremendous value to the military administrator. But assessing opinion in an area as dislocated as an occupied territory is not easy. Thanks to the cooperative effort of the United States Navy, the War Relocation Authority, and the United States Indian Service, there now exists an organization—The Sociological Research Project—which has been work-

ing on the use of polling as an aid in administering a dislocated community. The Colorado River War Relocation Center for Japanese evacuees is the community. This article, by the Director of the Project and his associates, sums up their experience and applies it to problems of occupation in general.

Lieutenant Leighton was a well-known psychiatrist prior to his commission in the Medical Corps of the U.S. Navy.

DURING THE WAR and after it, this nation will have a variety of administrative problems in countries where human life has been severely dislocated and where the people are very different from the average American in racial descent, traditional values, and predominant attitudes. These problems will include such matters as outright occupation, relief and rehabilitation, the establishment of public health measures, and the supervision of plebiscites. The present article is oriented in terms of the government of occupied areas, but the points have relevancy in varying degrees to these other kinds of administrative planning and action.

In governing any area, it is comparatively easy to keep abreast of *events*; the difficulty is to understand *opinions* and *attitudes* and to follow their changes. The greater the ethnic difference between the governing and the governed, the greater becomes this difficulty. Administrators, as a rule, lack both the time and the techniques necessary for dealing with it by means of more than intuitive guessing; nevertheless, it is the opinions and attitudes of the people which often determine the success or failure of a government's acts. They are at least of equal importance with events.

For a democracy with its principle of adjusting the government to

* The personnel of the Sociological Research Project consists of: Lt. Alexander H. Leighton, (Medical Corps) USNR—Coordinator, Edward H. Spicer, Ph.D., Elizabeth Colson, M.A., Rosmond B. Spicer, M.A., Tom Sasaki, A.B., Chica Sugino, A.B., Hisako Fujii, Misao Furuta, Iwao Ishino, Mary Kinoshita, June Kushino, Yoshiharu Matsumoto, Florence Mohri, Akiko Nishimori, Jyuichi Sato, James Sera, Gene Sogioka, George Yamaguchi and Toshio Yatsushiro.

the people, this matter is vital. Even in the occupation of enemy territory, the chief aim of the agents of a democracy will not be to out-Fascist the Fascists, but, after the necessary housecleaning, to rehabilitate the country by meeting the basic needs of the people and by encouraging forms of self-rule which will lead to a peace that is more than an enforced interlude. To accomplish this end, a government of an occupied area must know what it is doing to the people and how they are reacting.

In the training now being given the potential administrators of such areas, cultural anthropology and other social sciences are providing knowledge concerning traditions, patterns of leadership, predominant ideas, and recent history. Valuable as these are, however, after occupation they will soon become secondary to another question: what new attitudes and new types of social behavior will have come into existence, and how will they affect plans and policies already inaugurated? It will be desirable to know what continuous modifications of administration are needed for the sake of effectiveness.

Applied social science has no magic formula with which to provide infallible answers. No matter what is done, there will be groping in the dark. It is possible, however, to reduce both the groping and the darkness. One can apply the concepts and methods which in the last twenty years have not only widened the horizons of social psychology and anthropology, but have proved their practical value in problems of education, land management, agriculture, industry, welfare work, mental hygiene, and in the administration of Indian tribes and colonial possessions.

With these needs and possibilities in mind, a Japanese Relocation Center has been utilized for the study of people and their attitudes in a situation bearing some resemblance to the conditions of an occupied area.

RELOCATION CENTER AND OCCUPIED AREA COMPARED

A relocation center and an occupied area will have many differences. One must, of course, beware of transferring too literally the lessons learned in one to the other. People in the occupied area will have been subjected to the bloodshed and destruction of war. For the most part they will be living in their native habitat, scattered through the country, or in towns and villages—not in compact camps where supply, supervision, and military control are relatively easy and where social relations are largely artificial and everything has an air of being temporary.

These considerations, however, should not cause one to underestimate the elements that are common to both. The following situations, significant in the Relocation Center, will be found in occupied areas to varying degrees:

The government was imposed on the people without their consent, and yet it had to work through local leaders and native or newly created institutions of self-government to accomplish its aims. Among these aims were the stimulation of work for the production of food and other necessities as quickly as possible, the maintenance of health, the distribution of relief, the establishment of law and order, and the apprehension of any persons working secretly against the interests of the government.

The people with whom the governing body had to deal varied greatly in background, education, and occupation. They were persons who, having suffered what they regarded as disastrous economic and social dislocation, were dependent on the government for food, shelter, and much of their clothing. Their attitude toward the government ranged all the way from intense hostility to a strong desire to cooperate. Among them was much conflict of opinion and a breakdown of the previous forms of social control. Juvenile delinquency, petty crime, and gang activities appeared among people who had formerly been notable for their law-abiding character. Different pressure groups sought power, each trying to convince the government that it alone represented the feelings of the people. The mass of the population, out of touch with the administration, fell a prey to widespread anxieties which ranged in expression from apathy to outbursts of violence. The wildest rumors surged through the people; intense general suspicion culminated now and then in attacks on scapegoats.

Between the government and many of the people there were formidable barriers—of language, customs, values, religion, and physical appearance. The transmission of information and point of view in both directions was a problem of first magnitude. Nor was it any less important than health, food, law and order, and physical construction, because upon it depended the success of these other things.

Integration had to be achieved among the various Government agencies concerned in the total problem. This meant a common understanding of aims, and an agreement as to methods and the division of responsibility.

Related thereto was the whole matter of adjustment to the changes of policy in Washington: the abandonment of promised programs because of inability to get the requisite supplies; attacks in the press; investigations based on misunderstanding or politics often resulting in unmerited abusive publicity aimed at the people, the administration, or both.

Although the Government's main policy concerning the treatment of the people was clearly stated, considerable confusion remained in the minds of many individuals in the Center Administration, particularly of those in the lower ranks. Some looked upon the people being governed as enemies to be punished and never trusted; others emphasized the official policy of rehabilitation. The net result was a marked inconsistency of action with consequent confusion. Such a situation was favorable to the development in the people of emotional complexes similar to those of the child who has unpredictable parents and who never knows whether he will receive approval or a slap.

And, finally, let it be remembered that the whole process of evacuation itself, including the specific conditions of movement and camp life for men, women and children, may turn out to be one of the duties the United States will have to assume in some parts of the world in the post-war period, if not before.

THE RELOCATION CENTER

The Center in which we made our study is in southern Arizona, close to the California line and about twenty miles from the nearest town and railroad station. For eight months of the year the climate is mild, but for at least four months in summer the heat is intense, reaching as high as 128° Fahrenheit in the shade. The total population of the Center—17,867 at its peak—is housed in army-type barracks covered with black tar paper. The average living unit consists in a room 20 by 25 feet, containing from five to seven persons, often several families together. Organized like a city, the community has the technical machinery of administration and record keeping, a health department, hospital, fire department, police force, a judicial commission for trying minor offenses, an elected municipal government, schools, organizations for adult education and community welfare, a newspaper, projects for land subjugation, irrigation, agriculture, some industries and stores. Less officially related to the administration, but just as important in community life,

are numerous religious, recreational, and athletic associations and activities.

In passing, it may be mentioned that a relocation center is not the same as an internment camp. All persons suspected of anti-American acts or intentions were interned as a result of vigorous and repeated investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies. The remainder of the Japanese in the Pacific coastal areas of the Western Defense Command, against whom there were no charges, were evacuated to relocation centers. Because this move was, however, of necessity a hurried affair, the evacuees suffered loss of business as well as considerable loss of property, due to forced sales.

THE RESEARCH PROJECT

From the very beginning, the research project was conceived as having three functions. First, it was to provide the Center Administration with facts and suggestions on current problems appertaining to the attitudes and sentiments of the people. Second, it was to gain experience and compile data that might be of use in the governing of occupied areas. Third, it was to train a research staff that would be capable of working in occupied areas and providing the governing body there with the same kind of service it gave the Center Administration.

The research was initiated by a psychiatrist and an anthropologist, both of whom had had some previous experience in studying communities across language and cultural barriers. Together they planned the work and built up a staff, the Japanese members of which were recruited from among the evacuees.

One of the toughest problems the research staff had to face was a community attitude of hostility toward any form of investigation or inquiry. To some extent this is a universal human attitude; to some extent it went far back in Japanese culture, to the feudal period when the spies of the Daimyo were a hazard in village life. More important, however, was a fear of informers based on experiences since the outbreak of the war. The arrests which had followed Pearl Harbor had caused much uncertainty and economic suffering as well as the pain of family separation. In popular opinion, many of those who had been picked up were innocent and the people really to blame for those "false" arrests were thought to be members of the Japanese communities who had reported

names in order to make money, to settle personal grudges, or to ingratiate themselves with the law enforcement agencies.

With this start, it was easy for the informer to become a symbol on which to discharge the pent-up aggression resulting from the whole process of evacuation and relocation. Agitation about informers was rife in the Center during the first ten months. Gangs of men in the night attacked a number of suspected persons and beat them severely, while hundreds of people received actual threats, or thought they did. The more closely a resident was associated with the Administration, the more liable he was to suspicion. There were times when many evacuees were afraid even to be seen talking to administrative officers.

What a problem this posed to a research organization, one of whose principal aims was to find out what the people were thinking and feeling, can well be imagined. Yet, because it was a parallel of what must be met in occupied areas, it provided a welcome challenge. Through a combination of luck and technique, the members of the research group obtained most of the data they sought and were never subject to any physical attack, although one was directly threatened and all received indirect threats.

METHODS OF ASCERTAINING COMMUNITY ATTITUDES

The points which the research department would like to think distinguished its work were not concerned with originality or revelation, but with the fact that they were based on methods which gave them at least a first approximation of accuracy. The five types of approach used may be described as general observation, intensive interviews, collection of records, public opinion polls, and personality studies.

1. *General Observation.* Spread about the community in as many strategic spots as possible, the research staff observed and recorded what people were saying in conversations around their homes, in the mess halls, in the shower rooms, at the doorsteps in the evening, and similar places. Casual chats with a variety of people indicated what they were feeling and thinking, but they were not directly interviewed. In each observation, it was considered desirable to note the following points: (a) What were the sentiments expressed by word and action? (b) What were the circumstances under which these occurred? (c) What were the emotional tones and implications of the principal persons expressing and

responding to the sentiments? (d) What kinds of people were involved? (e) What happened as a result?

As part of the general observation, various meetings for political, social, religious, and recreational purposes were covered and carefully described. The daily paper and other published material was also scanned and notes made on the contents.

2. *Intensive interviews.* Intensive interviews consisted of prolonged discussions with individuals, usually on topics of community interest. Those interviewed were persons who occupied positions—either in the Administration or among the people—which gave them a good view of at least one phase of community life. Sometimes they were leaders, and sometimes they were samples of various kinds of followers. The success and validity of the interviews depended not only on a good range of representative interviewees, but also on establishing the right relationship with these persons so that they felt free to express themselves.

3. *Collection of records.* As the name suggests, this step consisted in collecting from every available source data of social significance. It included material compiled in the census office, the employment division, the schools and churches, and wherever else it could be gathered.

4. *Public opinion polls.* Opinion polls were conducted according to the regular techniques that have been developed in this field.¹ Essentially, the method consists in interviewing with specific questions a cross-section of the population that is large enough to give statistically reliable results. The segment so interviewed must include all the important groups which make up the population, and they must be in proper proportion.

5. *Personality studies.* Here we had a psychiatric method modified to become an instrument for community study. Based on repeated long interviews with and observation of certain responsive individuals, it emphasized life story, interpersonal relations, mental and emotional make-up, dreams, and psychological tests. It was aimed at learning something about the dynamic processes that lay deeper than the manifest sentiments but which nevertheless affected them. Though it was necessarily limited to few individuals, an effort was made to include among them as wide a range of types as possible.

¹ We are greatly indebted to the National Opinion Research Center and its Director, Mr. Harry H. Field, for their courtesy and cooperation in training two of our members and in supervising the surveys these men organized and conducted.

FOCUS

No matter how widely and indefinitely one collects information, one can never observe everything. Breadth of study is important, but if overdone it leads to thinness of substance. In the work at the Relocation Center, the following points were kept in view.

1. *The need to understand the various groups of people within the community and the interactions between these groups.* They ranged all the way from formal organizations laid down by the Administration, such as the Community Council, to informal cliques, and factions within a block; they included groups distinguished by age, sex, language, religion, economic background, and previous geographic location. Since there were thousands of them (there were eighty-three baseball teams alone), it was impossible to study all. Emphasis was placed on those bearing on the political activity of the community and on others indicated by observation to be especially significant in the life of the Center. The rest were studied where opportunity permitted.

2. *Types of leadership change.* These were analyzed and their relationship to the various groups noted.

3. *Opinions and attitudes.* A marked stress was laid on describing the principal sentiments and attitudes in the community, their nature, their change, and their distribution among the various groups and among the different types of leaders. "Who is thinking what?" was always an important question; and whenever possible it was followed with "Why?"


Besides these general questions, there were frequently specific problems to which one or more members of the research staff would devote most of his attention, or on which the whole group would work for a time.

SAMPLES OF RESEARCH RESULTS

To give an idea of the kind of applied social science that is possible in a dislocated community, three samples will be presented. The first is a general description of important attitudes during a particular period of time, the second is the answer to a specific question, and the third consists in recommendations given regarding a major community event.

1. *Community attitudes for April, 1943.* For a graphic presentation, see Figure 1. Each of the small charts depicts variations in attitudes regarding a topic that was of common interest during the month. These

SENTIMENT CHART
COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT
 For the month of April, 1943

**Legend:**

Abscissae indicate time in weeks.

Ordinates indicate total amount of interest recorded.

▧ Indicates that portion of total interest which appeared as dissatisfaction.

▨ Indicates that portion of total interest which appeared as satisfaction.

FIGURE I

ratings were obtained in the following manner. After utilizing all the techniques for the gathering of information described above, the research staff met once a week for an hour in front of a blackboard on which were listed the dominant community feelings. Each topic was discussed in turn and a number value was assigned to it by general agreement. This number indicated the degree of interest which the research group thought the community had shown in this topic during the previous week. The main points of the discussion about each topic and the principal reasons for assigning the number selected were also recorded; in this way, a week-by-week evaluation of the community's sentiment was maintained.

For the purposes of the present article, there is no need to describe the significance of each of the charts, but three may be selected as examples.

Food. At the beginning of this month food represented the high point of community interest. People were afraid that the Center would run short of food, isolated as it was in the desert, and there were meetings with attempts to have the chief steward and his helpers removed from office. Toward the end of the first week the food improved, and interest in it correspondingly declined. The kind of fears provoked by the food situation and the extent to which they went, are indicative of a general underlying uneasiness concerning the basic securities of life.

Health. Interest in health ran high at the beginning of the month due to the appearance of a number of cases of infantile paralysis and typhoid fever, to the advent of hot weather and flies, and to the feeling of inadequate protection against them. Then toward the end of the month, with cooler weather, better housing opportunities, measures of insect-control instituted by the health department, and the failure of an epidemic to develop, public attention shifted away from health.

Leaders of the community, however, and those who had friends or relatives in the hospital were considerably bothered by the prospect of losing most of the doctors and nurses to outside employment. As a result of the activities of the leaders (Councilmen, advisers, and block managers mostly), the community at large gradually became aware of the problem.

Out-group relations. In the latter part of the month there was great concern about the attitude of the American public toward the Japanese in America. Such concern was closely linked to the thought of finding

work on the outside in non-military areas and to wondering about the whole outlook for the future. The chief stimulus was the appearance of numerous articles in various newspapers abusing Japanese-Americans and recommending harsh treatment without regard to citizenship—an attitude given great impetus by the popular reaction in the United States against the execution in Japan of the American fliers.

Summary of the month. If we take into consideration all the charts and the descriptive data that accompany each, it is apparent that during April, 1943, the community, far from being stable, was subject to severe basic anxieties. Perhaps the most fundamental of these was a concern about the things on which life depended—food, health, and housing. Equally felt was a very great concern with social relationships, specifically resettlement and relations with other Americans.

Sources of security and satisfaction were evident chiefly in the spiritual realm of religion. Although there was a fair amount of satisfaction also expressed in connection with resettlement, this was hope rather than a manifest security. Furthermore, even as a satisfaction it was disrupting, for it created family separations and diverted attention from attempts to build a secure and stable community.

Data such as these served not only as indications of current trends in the Center, but also, by registering the direction of changes over a period of time, made it possible to foresee to some extent the probable feelings and attitudes of the immediate future.

2. *The answer to a specific question.* In connection with the program of rehabilitation, it became important for the Administration to know what proportion of the people would respond readily to job opportunities outside the Center. With such knowledge it would be possible to plan the organization and work of the employment division and to prepare for the adjustments within camp that would become necessary because of population change. By utilizing the standard techniques of public opinion sampling, popularly known as the "Gallup Poll," we learned that of the American-born, English-speaking residents, 63 per cent intended to leave the Center, 28 per cent did not and 9 per cent did not know. Of the Japanese-speaking and alien residents, 18 per cent said they were going to leave, 75 per cent replied "no," and 7 per cent said they did not know.

This was, of course, not the only question in the survey. There were carefully considered related inquiries designed to reveal the reasons and

rationalizations behind the desire to go out or stay in. For purposes of illustration, however, the one example suffices.

3. *Recommendations regarding a major community event.* In November, 1942, an extensive strike took place in one of the three units of the Center. Pickets were organized and staged a continuous demonstration for a number of days. The factors leading to this situation were many and complicated; obviously there is not sufficient space in this article to discuss them. The main point, however, was that the Administration faced a decision between two alternatives: negotiating with the strikers, or suppressing the demonstration by the use of military force. In this dilemma the heads of the research project gave it as their opinion that if the Administration negotiated carefully, it would come out of the situation with much better influence in the community than it had previously wielded; whereas, if it used force, there would be violence, loss of life, the permanent alienation of many hitherto cooperative residents, and a costly disruption of the community lasting many months.

Naturally the Administration considered numerous other angles besides the advice of the research group. Nevertheless when it did eventually act in accordance with their suggestions, subsequent developments were as predicted. Within a few weeks, cooperation between the people and the governing body was markedly closer and more efficient than it had been at any time since the Center opened.

To test the other half of the prediction relative to what would have happened if force had been employed, was, of course, impossible. Some confirmatory indications, however, were found in another Center where under similar circumstances military force was used. Two deaths resulted, and for many months the Center was in a turmoil requiring an augmented staff of government employees and a marked increase in operating expenses.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OCCUPIED AREAS

The personnel doing social analysis in occupied areas should be adequately trained and should devote their full time to the job. Although much of the work is nothing but the consistent application of common sense, it does take practice to perceive social structure, to know what to observe, and to be sufficiently on guard against one's own emotions in estimating interpersonal relations. It is also helpful to have the perspective provided by a good general background in social science. Over and

above these things, there are special techniques that have to be learned, included among which are many matters related to recording data and presenting results not covered in this paper. Consequently, although closest working relations should exist between social analysts and administrators, the time and effort of the former should not be diverted to administrative operations or other activities not strictly in the analyst's field.

As to how many social scientists would be needed in an occupied area, no general statement can be made. Such a matter, depending as it does on the size, population, and nature of any given place, will have to be determined accordingly. As a basis for discussion, however, let us suppose that the organization which is to govern a particular occupied area has one seasoned social analyst and four junior assistants. The development of the work might be something like this.

1. The chief analyst should accompany the very first of the administrators into the territory either with, or immediately after, the main body of the military force. From the moment he arrives, the analyst should put into practice what has been described in this article as general observation.

As soon as possible his aids should join him. Together, they should rapidly describe the people, noting particularly any marked differences from what had been anticipated. At least once a week they should prepare a report on their findings, with comments as to its bearing on what the military government is trying to do; this they should submit to their immediate superior. Every month there should be a longer and more matured memorandum. Although at first these reports would be very rough and incomplete, they would become more penetrating and accurate with time.

2. As soon as feasible, intensive interviewing should be added to general observation. This means that responsive natives must be discovered, both willing to talk to the interviewers and at the same time so placed as to make what they have to say of value. Though they exist in every community, it takes a while to find such persons, and the right kind of rapport has to be built up with them. Once it has been established, however, they can be approached again and again. Eventually some may become members of the social analyst's staff, especially in outlying districts from which they can turn in regular reports.

3. Very early it should be possible to begin collecting records of social data. If many of the community's documents have been destroyed, it may be that individuals can be interviewed who were acquainted with them and who can give approximate statements of their contents from memory.

4. Public opinion polling will yield very important information, some of which will eventually come to replace part of the general observation and interviewing. But since polling will inevitably have a number of serious obstacles to overcome, it will be some time before it can be properly established. There will be among the natives both a fear of informers and a fear of being thought an informer; both will make them averse to being interviewed by strangers. Such interviewers, indeed, will be exposed to the danger of beatings or a shot in the back. Less dramatic but just as serious for the validity of the polls will be the tendency of those interviewed to say what they think is acceptable rather than what they feel is true.

All this means that the groundwork for polling must be well laid by analysis of the results of general observation, intensive interviewing, and collections of records. Once that is done, it will be possible to frame questions that are important without being disruptive, to secure the support of the right leaders, to carry out the necessary preliminary education of the public, to find and train interviewers who are acceptable to the people, and to make sure that the segment of the population interviewed is a sufficiently representative cross-section of the community. When this is accomplished, the government of the occupied area can be repeatedly supplied with speedy and accurate data concerning how, and often why, the natives feel as they do on specific issues that are up for administrative decision.

Harry H. Field has frequently stressed that one of the great hazards which the government of an occupied area must face will be the difficulty of distinguishing between the pressures of groups with special interests and the attitudes of the majority of the people. The experiences in the Relocation Center bore out this fear. There was a tendency for leaders and groups seeking power to attempt to isolate the Administration from the people, and by constituting themselves as go-betweens to strive for power by playing one against the other. Numerous instances in world history illustrate this propensity. An important function of the social analysts will be to provide the government of occupied areas with

information in this regard; and, if it is well established, one of the best instruments will be the public opinion survey.

5. Personality studies emphasizing the behavior patterns and characteristic sentiments of important leaders can be started early, followed by similar studies of persons representative of the major groups composing the community. Deeper-going studies will not be possible until much later; yet eventually it is probable that from them will come some of the best insight into the basic motives of the people.

All these five procedures are of course aimed at providing useful data, not accumulating archives. The problems to be met will be pressing and immediate, not academic. Some of the questions which in the long run will prove most important will unfold as matters develop in the area; but from the very first moment the following can be kept in mind as major topics for attention:

What are the principal groups in the community? What attractions and repulsions exist among them?

Who are the individuals with whom the occupied area government is dealing? Where do they fit into the community? What groups are for and against them and why?

What leaders and what groups of importance are there with which the occupied area government has as yet little or no contact?

What effect are the various acts of the occupied area government having on the different groups and leaders?

What is the state of public knowledge and ignorance concerning the plans and policies of the occupied area government, and how is this in turn affecting the plans and policies?

What are the basic anxieties of the people, and what rumors are going about? What are the predominant sentiments in regard to local leaders, the enemy, the occupied area government? In what direction are the attitudes changing? What future events do they portend?

What are the habitual, unstated, but characteristic assumptions about life, society, and government found in the people of the occupied areas which are different from those of the people in the occupying government?

Although social science so employed could include much practical knowledge that has been learned in the last fifteen years from experience in agriculture, industry, colonial administration, and similar fields,

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the conception and the common-sense basis is far from new. Probably through all history there have been individuals who have successfully applied these principles, no matter whether calculated or intuitive, and no matter by what name they went. In the last war, for example, T. E. Lawrence employed them; and in employing them eventually roused and brought together the energies of thousands of hitherto mutually conflicting Arabs to a support of Allenby's army in its march through Asia Minor.

Arab processes were clear, [said Lawrence,] Arab minds moved logically as our own, with nothing radically incomprehensible or different, except the premiss: there was no excuse or reason, except our laziness and ignorance, whereby we could call them inscrutable or Oriental, or leave them misunderstood.

They would follow us, if we endured with them, and played the game according to their rules. The pity was, that we often began to do so, and broke down with exasperation and threw them over, blaming them for what was a fault in our own selves.

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CAUSES AND CONTROL OF RIOT AND PANIC

By HADLEY CANTRIL

EUROPE has, for five years, been living under tremendous strain. Frustration and insecurity have been widespread. Before occupation there is still to come the terrific impact of invasion with all its dislocations. Conditions will be ripe for panic. In the pages which follow, the author discusses the bases and prevention of riot and panic.

In connection with this subject, Dr. Cantril will be best remembered as the author of *Invasion from Mars*, a brilliant analysis of the panic touched off by the famous Orson Welles broadcast of the same name. A well-known social psychologist, he is Director of Princeton University's Office of Public Opinion Research.

PERIODS OF RAPID SOCIAL TRANSITION are generally characterized by sporadic outbursts of some sections of the population which must be controlled as soon as possible in the interest of general order, community welfare, or the maintenance of the prestige of the governing authority. The Allied Military Governments will be face-to-face with populations that have experienced instability on the political and economic as well as the military fronts. These people may well have become confused by changing or rival authorities; they will certainly have lived through exhausting months or years of torment, worry, and emotional strain. They may even, during the early days of military occupation, feel bitter disappointment and intense shock when they find that the hopes and dreams they thought would be immediately fulfilled when the oppressor was finally ousted are not suddenly realized under the Allied military command.

All of this background adds up to chaos or near chaos in the psychological world of many people in occupied territories. It will be surprising if riots are not started by those who want to achieve specific goals quickly, or if panics do not follow in the wake of the confusion and bewilderment of suffering people.

It is therefore imperative that the personnel of the Allied Military Governments should try to understand and be sympathetic with the causes of such outbursts. For if these are dealt with ruthlessly and solely in line with an old-fashioned military tradition, the populace may find it more difficult than otherwise to distinguish between what they have

expected to be democratic occupation as contrasted to the authoritarian occupation our side has deposed.

We shall consider here two forms of mass behavior that are particularly inimical to the stability and disciplined control of a social group: riots and panics. Our approach will be the psychological one, an approach that must become part and parcel of modern military science. It is, of course, *not* our contention that the psychological approach should entirely supplant strictly military methods of handling riots and panics. But it *is* our contention that if a psychological approach is properly understood and adroitly carried out, the need for military measures will be considerably minimized.*

RIOTS

Causes.

The beginning of a mob riot is almost always the formation of a group of people into a crowd. The crowd becomes transformed into a mob when the members decide on a particular course of action which they think will achieve a specific goal. Mobs are, of course, regarded as "undesirable" by the ruling class in society. It should be remembered, however, that the small groups of people who spearheaded revolutions, including our own American Revolution, were regarded as mobsters by the members of the society which the revolutionaries overthrew. This point is of more than passing academic interest, for it shows how deeply rooted in some instances the grievances of mob members may be.

Individuals who constitute a mob always have certain common interests and common needs. Their need may be of a physical variety, such as a need for food or shelter, or it may be of a psychological nature, such as the need for a recognition of status, a feeling of superiority, or a desire for vengeance. Whatever the common source of motivation may be, it is one which has been generated in the community or society because somewhere along the line that community or that society has not provided adequately for the normal satisfaction of this need. To regard mob members as "crackpots," "bad eggs," or "the dregs and undesirables of society" is a false and too easy explanation. This does not mean that we must indulge in any soft sentimentality in our understanding or treat-

* A discussion of the military measures and techniques most useful in quelling riots will be found in *Riot Control* by Colonel Sterling A. Wood, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1942. It is obviously essential that the military personnel which might be called on to handle riots and panics if they are otherwise likely to get out of hand must be properly trained, adequately equipped, and led by alert commanding officers.

ment of mob members. But it does mean that if we are to discover why riots start and how they can be prevented, we must go beyond glib generalizations.

Naturally, the greater the similarity of interests and needs on the part of potential mob members and the greater the intensity of their desires, the more rapidly will a crowd turn into a mob which plunges headlong toward the accomplishment of its objective. In occupied territories, certain common grievances or frustrations may be slumbering but may suddenly be awakened when the rigid discipline imposed by Nazi-Fascist domination has been removed. Or common grievances or frustrations may arise after Allied Military Governments take over.

Obviously not all people with common troubles accept the mob solution of their difficulties. People who become members of mobs are further characterized by the fact that they are not aware of, or not convinced of, the really basic causes of the problems they are facing. In other words, they are more likely than not to be people who have relatively little understanding of what it's all about—unless, of course, they are members of a sophisticated revolutionary mob with a basic long-range program.

And because mob members are filled with some grievance or other and because they are less likely to know what it's all about, they are in greater need than most people for some solution, some interpretation of their problems which they can understand. For example, members of lynching mobs generally come from the poorest groups in the community. They are suffering real economic hardship and, in addition to that, cannot fathom the basic economic complexities that keep their standard of living down. In their search for some explanation of their difficulties, these people readily pounce on the possibility that getting rid of a certain Negro or that keeping the "nigger" in his place will improve their own lot. It is a significant fact that the number of lynchings increases when the price of cotton goes down.

The two basic characteristics of mob members are, then,

1. Common needs, either physical or psychological, which are intensely felt; and
2. A strong desire for some meaning or explanation of the difficulty they feel they are in.

With the psychological stage set in this fashion, a mob is finally

brought into being when some leader arises. The leader is a person who, quickly sensing the difficulties of those around him, expresses *their* troubles. He can identify himself with each person and, in turn, each person identifies himself with the leader. The leader cements his position of leadership by providing his puzzled and frustrated followers with some simple, easily comprehensible and generally superficial explanation of their difficulties. If he is particularly clever, he coins or picks up slogans and symbols or appropriate clichés. And his explanation includes, of course, some positive suggestion for action, the very thought of which begins to release the pent-up aggression of the mob members.

At this point, with the mob members absorbed in pushing ahead with action, the standards of morality, ethics, and behavior regarded as right and proper in the outside world rapidly fade into the background. In their place come new standards for action—standards which are judged good if they will help achieve the mob's goal and bad if they impede such achievement. In this new little psychological world, the mob member begins to have a feeling of self-righteousness, he loses his old sense of individual responsibility, acquiring instead a sense of participation, of belonging, and of self-importance as he moves with and helps the others around him overcome the obstacles in the common road ahead.

The mob acts, then, as a close unit, spurred on by its own sense of justice, and regarding those who try to thwart it as enemies to be overcome.

How to prevent riots.

Every mob riot will be the result of a particular set of conditions more or less peculiar to itself. Nevertheless, the fundamental causes of mob outbursts outlined above point clearly to certain measures that can be taken to keep riot-producing conditions from coming to a head. Which one or which combination of these measures is relevant will be up to the personnel on the ground to determine.

1. *Keep yourself regularly and accurately informed* of what people in all sections of the public are thinking. To be forewarned is to be forearmed. Try to uncover in some systematic and periodic fashion the major worries, interests, anxieties, hopes, and fears of all types of people. This can be done in many ways—by some polling mechanism adapted to the situation, by skillful interviewing, by overhearing conversations,

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by analyzing mail or the press, by keeping track of rumors, etc. Watch particularly for any cleavages of opinion, any piling up of complaint in any segment or area of the population.

2. Wherever possible *do all you can to satisfy the needs of the public*. And remember that these needs are psychological as well as physical. Stop grievances and frustrations before they accumulate. If it seems wise and expedient and if it is possible, do not hesitate to adjust rules and regulations or to shift emphases in order to adjust to new demands. But do not, of course, compromise your own interests or goals in the process.

Try to put into effect as soon as possible a carefully designed educational program which will establish in the minds of the majority of people that particular set of values which will provide in the long run the best framework within which to establish or to reestablish a smoothly operating government consistent with United Nations' principles.

3. *When dissatisfaction is discovered in some section of the public, carry on a specific and highly directed informational campaign* to show the people concerned the basic causes of their dissatisfaction, what is being done to remedy them, why no more or nothing at all can be done at the moment.

Think ahead of time of what over-simple solutions for complex subjects may be likely to catch hold. Show how these solutions are not solutions at all and demonstrate that to follow them out is to pursue a will-o'-the-wisp.

4. *Provide ways in which people of all classes, ages, or racial background can participate in accepted and desirable social behavior*. Try to give everyone some sense of social status, some feeling that he personally belongs to and is important as a member of an accepted social group. Teach and encourage the mechanism of democratic choice and solutions to problems. So far as possible encourage group decisions as contrasted to orders from above.

5. *Prevent the allegiance of any large number of people to potentially troublesome leaders*. Find out who these leaders might be. Try to dissolve the leader-follower relationship by showing followers and potential followers that it is against their own self-interest to follow this leader's solution and recommendations. Meet their problem but not their solution. Help them save face. Use surveillance and arrest where necessary—but in doing so watch out that you do not make a martyr of any leader you put in jail. In so far as possible discredit him ahead of time.

6. *Don't allow any important or significant section of the population to focus on any common enemy or any common grievance.*

7. *Don't let crowds get out of hand.* If danger signs appear in crowd formations, keep the crowd moving, order dispersal, clear up or remove when you can the cause of the crowd existence.

8. *In extreme cases of group tensions, enforce strict discipline and exert iron control.* But remember that this is no ultimate solution of the problem, that it is, indeed, the commonly practiced method of the Nazis in the territories they occupy today.

How to control riots once they have started.

The following suggestions for the control of riots are all psychological suggestions—to be tried wherever possible before the use of strong-arm methods. Again, one or several of them may be applicable in a specific situation.

1. *Learn all you can ahead of time* about the mob you will have to deal with. If a riot is reported, try to find out the circumstances that caused it, who its leader is, what its objective is. Plan your own strategy accordingly.

2. *Capitalize on surprise.* Most mob members know they are working against time. Show them that they have underestimated your knowledge and efficiency.

3. *Act swiftly at all times.* Mobs are encouraged by any early successes they have. Make and execute your decisions promptly.

4. *Act surely, without hesitation.* Make clear that you are completely on top of the situation. Don't allow any possibility of doubt on this point.

5. *Show discipline, self-control, and coordinated action.* All of these characteristics are usually absent in mobs. But they are highly respected and their demonstration is impressive to mob members.

6. *Never bully a mob.* A clever mob leader will rapidly sense any bluff on your part. Be able to deliver at all times. Demonstrate that you always have another card up your sleeve.

7. *Pay no attention to verbal thrusts; don't get into arguments.* Even if you do have a glib tongue, you already have two strikes against you if you try to argue with a mob.

8. *Distract the mob's attention.* Try to divert them.

9. *Capitalize on respected authority.* One of the most successful ways of dissolving mobs peacefully is to bring in some leading citizen, some

individual known to have the self-interest of the mob members at heart or known to have sufficient authority, determination, and integrity to carry out punishment for mob members who break the law. Get attention fixed on the presence of such an individual, have him talk to the mob, win their sympathy, and urge dispersal.

a. Once the mob's attention is turned to a respected outsider, one line he can take is to *demonstrate to the mob members that their objective is impossible of attainment*, that it is futile for them to continue and only trouble lies ahead for them.

b. A second useful approach for such an individual to take once he has the mob's attention, is to *meet their point of view*. He can sympathize with them, demonstrating his sympathy by rehearsing for the mob its own grievances and by carefully leading them on to accept some other solution than mob behavior as a satisfaction for these grievances. He can say, "Sure you're right, but you're going about things the wrong way."

10. *Try to separate spectators on the fringes of the mob from the actual mob members*; thus the mob will be kept to a minimum number by making it physically difficult for spectators to get caught up in its emotional vortex.

11. *If the mob or any of its members offers physical resistance which has or may have serious consequences, then act quickly* and show at once who is boss.

PANICS

Causes of panics.

Two general sets of conditions cause panics:

1. A panic occurs when people are together in a group and when no way appears of avoiding an apparent catastrophe. This is the more usual conception of panics—those resulting from fires in theatres, sinking ships, etc. The prevention of the conditions leading to panics of this sort is, of course, not primarily a psychological problem.

2. Other panics, by no means localized to people who are physically together as a group, occur among persons who for one reason or another are particularly susceptible to some suggestion when face-to-face with a situation that seems critical. Panics generated by shocking news, false rumors, terror propaganda are of this variety. The present discussion of the cause of panics is concerned with this type—panics resulting from a peculiar and often avoidable set of psychological conditions.

Many influences are likely to make people susceptible to suggestion. Feelings of insecurity and instability accompany a change from an old to a newly forming political world; ignorance often leads to the uncritical acceptance of an idea. When people have intense worries, when they lack self-confidence or self-discipline, they are unusually susceptible to suggestion. And Allied Governments may find fear playing an especially large role in certain backward areas; there the population will be seeing for the first time modern ways of doing things which, because they are not understood, may prove awesome and frightening.

The result of such susceptibility in any section of the population is that any apparently realistic threat which cannot be prevented or from which no escape seems possible is likely to create a panic. The threat may actually be serious and consequential, such as a rapid inflation or an approaching enemy; or from the point of view of the outsider it may be absurd and silly, such as a story that the Martians are invading us, or a false rumor of the effectiveness of some secret weapon. In either case the individual experiences a definite threat to himself or to something that he regards as a part of himself—his family, his property, or his reputation. If disaster is to be avoided, the situation calls for immediate action. But the individual cannot figure out any directed action which will successfully avoid catastrophe. His behavior, lacking rational direction, is characterized as panicky.

Let's suppose for a moment that a panic is being caused by an implicit belief in some "news" which has, however, no basis in fact. Why do people go into a panic? Why do they not act sensibly, check the news to see whether or not it is true?

In the first place, the "news" may so closely fit into some pattern of beliefs or attitudes already held that the suggestion seems reasonable enough; it may, indeed, fulfil some expectation already held. In such instances it never occurs to an individual that a check is necessary. For example, if a population has experienced torture and brutality at the hands of one invading army, it would not be surprising if rumors describing the torture of another invading army—even though the second is fighting against all the characteristics of the first one—were taken seriously.

False suggestions may also be accepted if people are baffled by a situation, if they are desperately seeking some interpretation or solution,

but are completely unable to find one. A person may try to act rationally but may be unable to do so.

There are important variations of this last set of conditions where people are puzzled and do not know what to do. Some individuals may simply lack any standards against which to check the situation threatening them; as a matter of fact, it may never occur to them that they should check to see if the situation really is as they have been told it is. On the other hand, other people may try to check up, but their checking may itself be false or they may check with other people who already have accepted the suggestion leading to panic. For example, a person may hear on his radio that the enemy is at the city's gates. He then looks out the window to see if anything unusual is happening outside. Seeing a crowd of people going down the street, he jumps to the conclusion that everyone is getting away. But the fact may be that the radio report was only part of some radio drama, and the crowd of people in the street may only be going to a baseball game. In still other instances, people may try to check but may be unable to do so because no reliable standards are available to make a valid check possible. For example, a crowd of people awaiting the arrival of friends and relatives on a ship may be thrown into a panic by a rumor that the ship has just gone down outside the port. Cool-headed members of the group may unsuccessfully try to check the rumor with officials who themselves may not yet know the true situation. The naturally cool-headed individual may himself become panicky.

So this futile, irrational, panicky type of behavior may be started either (1) because a false explanation is readily accepted or (2) because no solution to the situation is seen, no sensible, plausible direction is given.

Prevention of panics.

Every panic, like every riot, has its own peculiar causes. But some of the following suggestions should serve as prophylactics against panics.

1. *Do everything possible to keep down anxieties and to provide security* for all sections of the population. In the simpler cases where panics might be caused by accidents or physical catastrophes, follow every caution of the authorities in practising safety first and discipline.

A basic rule for minimizing anxiety is to give people a routine. Once tasks, habits, and expectancies have been set, do not make any more

changes than are absolutely necessary. The possible anxiety that may be caused in a population by a shift in the way of doing things should itself be an important consideration in the decision as to whether or not that change is practicable. If change is decided upon, give plausible reasons for it. Don't let anyone get the impression that you don't know what you're doing, that you're whimsical.

2. *Teach obedience to orders.* Create a respect for discipline and an ability to follow it.

3. *Keep people fully informed* on all subjects around which panics might start. Back up your informational output with demonstrable, plausible facts and events.

4. *Keep in constant and close touch with the people* to discover on what points they want and need information. Do not allow any prolonged bewilderment or perplexity to bother any section of the people.

5. *Control rumors.* Watch out for rumors, note their frequency and nature; if they seem at all serious or unusual, scotch them quickly with authoritative and widely publicized answers.

6. *In severe cases use severe treatment to avoid panics.* Threaten punishment or enforce strict discipline—but remember this is a last resort and not a permanent solution.

Control of panics once they get started.

1. *Remove the cause of the panic if that is possible.*

2. *Try to divert attention.* It may be necessary to work out quickly some dramatic way to get attention, since people will be absorbed with their own problems.

3. *Once attention is diverted, provide information quickly.* Tell people "I have just received word that" Repeat your information over and over again in as many ways as possible. Keep your information simple, direct. If people are not physically together and if the message must reach scattered individuals, use radio, telegraph, press, messengers, everything. Have your information come from authoritative, well-established sources whose integrity is beyond question.

4. *Humor or singing may sometimes be used as diversions.* They can occasionally snap people back to objectivity, give them insight, cooperation. But in such cases you must be sure of the appropriateness of these devices. They are most likely to be successful if a panic has occurred in

a fairly homogeneous group where the same thing will appear funny to people or the same song will catch hold.

5. *Once a panic has completed its course, start at once to remove both its immediate and basic causes.*

The suggestions outlined here to prevent riots and panics may require basic reformations and overhauls of communities. Such fundamental changes cannot be undertaken too rapidly without breeding more of the very psychological insecurity they are designed to destroy. Patience is required. If reform is to be accompanied with majority approval and applause, people must be convinced of its desirability. But at least AMG may help to lay down the structure upon which the people can build for themselves societies which will satisfy in some durable way their needs, aspirations, and understanding.

PATTERNS OF ASSASSINATION IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

By SAUL K. PADOVER

To the average American or Briton, political assassination is a reprehensible act—an aberration from the normal. But in every culture, some more than others, assassination has its definite place in the social pattern. To understand that place bestows, if not the power to prevent, at least the power to predict and

safeguard. Mr. Padover discusses here the manifestation of political murder as a social pattern in various cultures.

Well-known author and historian, Mr. Padover is now in London on a Government mission. His most recent book is *The Complete Jefferson*, published a few months ago.

ASSASSINATION IS THE TRUCIDATION of a political figure without due process of law.¹ Being a political act, it is not confined to any one age, culture, country, or type of government. It can take place anywhere. It has taken place everywhere.

Governmental forms and structures, as such, do not determine assassination. The assassin functions both in tyrannies and in democracies, and in neither. An autocracy such as pre-1918 Germany, for example, never experienced an assassination, while in a despotism such as Japan assassination is a common occurrence. A democracy such as the United States has suffered several political murders—including three Presidents and attempts on at least two others—while in a democracy such as England there has been no assassination for centuries.

Nor does the level of culture seem to be an index to, or cause of, assassination. Afghanistan and France are characteristic examples. In one generation two rulers were murdered in Afghanistan and two Presidents were assassinated in France. And yet Afghanistan is a pre-industrial, backward country, and France was the most sophisticated state in Europe.

Religion is no guide to the problem of assassination either. Few countries have had more assassinations than Catholic Mexico and Catholic Portugal (in the last twenty-five years assassins took the lives of one Portuguese King, one Portuguese President, and one Portuguese Premier). Assassins have also been active in Greek Orthodox (pre-Revolu-

¹ The word *Assassin* derives from *Hashshashin*, or hashish-eaters, who terrorized Persia in the Middle Ages.

tionary) Russia and the Balkans, as well as in Mohammedan Turkey, in Buddhist China, and in Shintoist Japan.

It would seem that assassination follows a curious pattern of its own. This study will attempt to trace some of its meanderings in the past with a view to determining its possible future.

MURDER AMONG THE ANCIENTS

Assassination is not only common to political societies everywhere; it also has a long and not dishonorable history. Its influence upon the course of events has been considerable, despite Disraeli's too-well-known comment that "assassination has never changed the history of the world." Apparently Disraeli did not know the history of the world.

Political murders must be reckoned among the regular, although somewhat ebullient, processes of politics. The recorded wisdom of the ancients reveals a horror of tyranny and an expectation of assassination. "A sovereign who oppresses his people," said the Chinese Mencius, "will be slain." "As a roaring lion, and a raging bear," said the Hebrew *Proverbs* (28:15), "so is a wicked ruler."

Ancient Greece, the matrix of Western civilization, considered the slaying of a tyrant as a heroic deed. The Greeks looked upon the tyrant as a high public official who exercised political power according to the rules of impulse, fear, or self-interest. This, of course, bred resentment and jealousy in the breasts of those who were either victims or who had no opportunity to give free rein to their own impulses, fears, and desires. And so they slew the tyrant. Assassins of despots, and there were many of them in the Hellenic period, were therefore praised by philosophers and extolled by poets.

Imperial Rome was often shaken by assassinations. Curiously enough, there seems to be no treatise on tyrannicide in Roman political literature. The Romans, it would seem, killed without the benefit of argument or the consolation of philosophy.

Why did the Romans slay their rulers? Their motives ran the gamut of passion, vengeance, rage, and greed. Caesar was killed (44 B.C.) in the name of Roman liberty. Caligula was assassinated (41 A.D.) as a tyrant. Domitian, whom Juvenal called "Nero the Bald," was poignarded (96) by a freedman for his excessive brutalities. Caracalla was murdered at the instigation of a man who succeeded him (217). Aurelian was slain (275) by vengeful ex-slaves. Probus had his throat cut (282) by exas-

perated soldiers in camp. Valentinian II (392) and Valentinian III (455) were slain for their positions.

But the Romans were veritable Quakers compared to the Byzantines, whose homicidal record is impressive. Between 395, the year of the founding of the Byzantine Empire, and 1453, when the Turks took Constantinople, Byzantium experienced no less than sixty-five revolutions. Of the one hundred seven emperors who reigned during this period—1058 years—eight perished in war, twelve abdicated, twelve died in prison, eighteen were mutilated and dethroned, and twenty-three were assassinated. Only thirty-four Byzantine emperors out of one hundred seven died a natural death. Despite these acts of violence the Byzantine Empire lasted over a millennium—a despotism tempered by murder. Presumably that was the only way that Byzantium could survive its monumental inefficiency.

FEUDALISM SPARES THE SUZERAIN

During the period of chaos which Europe experienced as a result of the disintegration of the Roman empire, private murders and political slayings were the order of the day. With the establishment of feudalism, however, public opinion in Christendom underwent a significant change. The Church succeeded in imposing the principle of obedience and in propagating the doctrine of the sacredness of human life. "There is," Professor James Westfall Thompson, the late distinguished medievalist, once told this writer, "no instance of the murder of a sovereign by a vassal or subject in the centuries of feudalism." The only two instances of assassination in the feudal age were family affairs; in 1208 Otho of Wittelsbach killed Philip of Swabia in an imperial election contest, and a century later, in 1308, the Habsburg Albert I was murdered by his nephew, John the "Parricide."

This, however, is not to say that the feudal age was free from violence. There was much violence, but it was organized, legal, perpetrated according to rules; and the rules were pretty strict against doing harm to a suzerain. Monks were killed, abbots were killed, sometimes bishops were killed, but hardly ever princes. For the Church, following St. Paul, established the doctrine of the inviolability of the sovereign. It was not until the twelfth century that the Pauline principle was challenged, by John of Salisbury in his *Polycraticus*. John, fearing the gradual encroachment of secular authority on the ecclesiastical, enunciated the doc-

trine that a ruler was subject to divine, although not to statutory, law. If a prince becomes a tyrant—that is, if he abuses the divine law—he may be assassinated. John stated the principle in a famous sentence: *Tyrannum occidere non modo licitum est sed æquum et iustum*—To kill a tyrant is not only licit but equitable and just. John's theory of tyrannicide, however, was not taken up by any other ecclesiastic for about four centuries: while the Church was supreme it had no need for drastic measures.

The slow-changing feudal age was succeeded by a period of rapid movement. Technological inventions and geographic discoveries revolutionized the Occident. Europe became secularized and mobile. The Reformation challenged the older religious sanctions. Commercial entrepreneurs opened new markets and opportunities. In the struggle for power and prestige, human life became cheap in proportion as the importance of the personage increased. Individuals who stood in the way of ambitions were eliminated by knife or poison. There was no time for nice rules.

This period of revolution upon which Europe now entered—known conventionally as Renaissance and Reformation—saw the fullest development of both the practice and the theory of assassination. In one case, that of Venice, systematic assassination became an integral part of statecraft.

RENAISSANCE: HEYDAY OF ASSASSINS

First the murders. Before assassination can be rationalized it has to be perpetrated. The earliest "modern" murders took place in 1407, when Duke John of Burgundy slew Duke Louis of Orleans, and in 1419, when the same Burgundy was slain at the instigation of King Charles VII. In the course of the next two centuries the number of assassinations, especially in Italy, is impressive. Political murder in the Italian Renaissance was resorted to by emperors, popes, kings, princes, and despots. "Nothing," a contemporary Neapolitan said, "is cheaper here than human life." Emperor Charles V carefully organized the assassination of the French ambassador Rincon. Alexander VI poisoned the Venetian cardinal Giovanni Michiel to obtain his wealth. In 1607 five assassins, generally believed to have been employed by Rome, stabbed Fra Paolo Sarpi, the famous Venetian anti-papal publicist. Sarpi miraculously recovered and made an illuminating comment: "The customs of our country are of

such a nature that those who are in a position like mine could not lose the favor of government without at the same time losing life."¹

In Italy the brutality of the pre-Mussolinian despots produced homicidal reactions in their subjects. Savonarola, in his great speech, "Of the Wickedness and Evil Disposition of the Tyrant," said bitterly: "The tyrant incurs practically all the sins of the world. First, because he is guilty of pride, luxury, and avarice; which are the root of all evil. Secondly, because his whole end is to maintain his position, and he leaves nothing undone to that end." Tyrants were in the habit of murdering their opponents without qualm or concealment. Hence popular sympathies were on the side of the tyrant-slayer. People grew so accustomed to murder that they refused to attribute the death of any eminent person to natural causes. "He who gives his own life," so ran a popular Italian proverb, "can take a tyrant's." And the city of Florence erected Donatello's statue of Judith—the Biblical slayer—in a public square and inscribed thereon these remarkable words: *Exemplum salutis publicae cives posuere*. Tyrannicide as an example of public safety! Let, indeed, the tyrant beware!

Consider, for example, the slaying of the Milanese despot, Galeazzo Maria. Three young nobles, imbued with the classic Greek notions of liberty, resolved to kill the tyrant as a holy offering before the patron saint of Milan. They went to San Stefano church, prayed, received the sacrament, and quietly waited for the heavily-guarded despot; when Galeazzo entered the church, the three consecrated young men plunged their daggers into his breast, back, and belly. Two of the assassins were killed on the spot by the despot's body-guard; the third, Olgiati, twenty-two years old, was seized and tortured, but refused to repent. He said: "As for the noble action for which I am about to die, it is this which gives my conscience peace; to this I trust for pardon from the judge of all. Far from repenting, if I had to come ten times to life in order ten times to die by these same torments, I should not hesitate to dedicate my blood and all my powers to an object so sublime." Then he was torn to pieces.

The Italian technique spread northward, to France, the Netherlands, England, and even Sweden. In 1575 the Swedish bishops decided that it would be wise to poison their king. In England, where numerous

¹ For further details, see J. W. Thompson and S. K. Padover, *Secret Diplomacy*. London, 1937.

plots were hatched against Queen Elizabeth, "Killing is no Murder" (the title of a pamphlet) was made popular by John Knox. At least two kings, both of France, were stabbed to death, Henry III in 1589 and Henry IV in 1610. The most typical murder, however, was that of the Prince of Orange in 1584. Orange was not himself a model of virtue, having offered a handsome reward for the assassination of his enemy, King Philip II of Spain. But the Habsburg was luckier than the Orange. Balthazar Gerard, a fanatic in an age of religion-mad individuals, slew the Prince of Orange in the same manner as the Milanese nobles killed Galeazzo Maria. The only difference was that Gerard struck his knife in the name of God. Like Olgiati, Gerard was fearfully tortured and, again like the Italian, he refused to repent. He was "beaten with ropes and his flesh cut with split quills, after which he was put into a vessel of salt and water, and his shirt was soaked in vinegar and brandy." Gerard's only comment was that he had done "an act acceptable to God" and that he—*Ecce Homo*, he referred to himself—would be "sanctified and received into the heavens near to God." The assassin was executed in the following manner:

His right hand pressed and burnt off with a hot iron engine made to that end, afterwards the flesh pulled from his legs, arms and other parts with fired pincers and then his body cut open and quartered alive; during which torments he continued resolute, and so little moved as was wonderful and incredible. (Report of the English agent Gilpin to Secretary Walsingham, July 6, 1584.)

THE THEORY OF ASSASSINATION

What, then, did the publicists, lay and clerical, have to say on the subject of assassination? Long before Hegel enunciated the comfortable doctrine that *Der Gang der Weltgeschichte steht ausserhalb der Tugend, des Lasters, und der Gerechtigkeit*—"The course of world history lies beyond virtue, sin, and justice"—theological and secular writers justified the universal practice of assassination on the ground of religion and in the name of expediency.

The best known theorist on tyrannicide is the Spanish Jesuit, Juan de Mariana, but he was not the first. This dubious honor belongs to John Petit who laid down the abstract doctrine of assassination early in the fifteenth century, when he defended the slaying of the Duke of

Orleans by the Duke of Burgundy (1407). Machiavelli likewise discussed the subject before Mariana, but the Florentine did so with his usual chilly detachment, neither praising nor disparaging. But Mariana's immediate predecessors were the Huguenot advocates of resistance, especially Francis Hotman and Hubert Languet. Hotman, in his *Franco-Gallia* (1574), argued that since the king derived his power from the people, the latter have a right to get rid of him when he becomes tyrannical. Languet's *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* (1577)—a title that speaks for itself—was published under the ominous pseudonym "Brutus." This neo-anti-Caesarian likewise developed the doctrine of the social compact and the right of resistance. And, be it remembered, in the following century another Protestant scholar, Hugo Grotius, expressed it as his mature opinion that "to slay your enemy wherever you find him is sanctioned not only by the law of nature, but also by the law of nations."

Mariana, who lived to be almost ninety (1535-1624) was, therefore, not original. Nevertheless, he deserves to be honored for his candor. He did not hide his thoughts behind terms of "ambiguous reference." His book, *De rege et regis institutione* (1599), dedicated, with perhaps conscious irony, to Philip III of Spain, has not inappropriately been called a "Handbook of King-Murder." The work, publicly burned by the Paris Hangman, was probably responsible for at least one royal assassination, that of Henry IV by Ravaillac (1610). Like his Protestant opponents, Mariana accepted the contractual theory of the State and held that royal power was based upon popular sovereignty, not derived from God. Monarchy, Mariana pointed out, tends to degenerate into tyranny, and when that happens the people have a right to dispose of the tyrant. The first step, however, the cautious Jesuit warned, should not be taken by an individual but by an assembly. Should, however, the tyrant prevent a popular assembly from meeting, then any private citizen is justified in slaying the tyrant. But the murder should be perpetrated in a Christian manner—dagger or pistol, presumably—and not by means of poison, which Mariana held to be unchristian.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF VENICE

While Mariana rejected poison as unchristian, the Most Serene Republic of Venice utilized both poison and dagger as a regular method of statecraft. Venice was guided, not by ethics, but by expediency. The ruling idea was: *Uomo morto non fa guerra*—A dead man wages no war.

Venice adopted assassination as a political weapon in periods of crises, more as an alternative to wholesale violence than out of love for murder. Between 1415 and 1768 the omnipotent Council of Ten considered over ninety proposals for assassination.

By the authority of this Council [so read the first general decision to use murder] be it decreed that the chiefs of the Council be charged to inform themselves in the most cautious and secret manner as to the ways and means by which we can put to death, through poison or otherwise, certain bitter and implacable enemies of the State.

Some of these plots were aimed at the following: Emperor Sigismund, Emperor Maximilian I, King Matthias Corvinus, Filippo Maria Visconti, Francesco Sforza, the Turkish sultan (five times between 1471 and 1504), Charles VIII of France, Cesar Borgia, Pope Pius IV, Pope Leo X, the false Czar Peter III.

The Venetian Republic appointed a professional poisoner as an official of the State. Before that, it had to rely on voluntary and very inefficient assassins. In 1419 one Biagio Catena, Archbishop of Trebizond, offered his services as a general poisoner. "Be it resolved," the Council of Ten decreed, "that for making the poison, for necessary expenses, and for buying a horse for said archbishop . . . the sum of fifty ducats out of our treasury be given to the archbishop and his companion." Later another cleric, Fra John of Ragusa, appeared before the Serene Council and declared that he would "work wonders in killing anyone they chose by certain means of his own invention"; as a compensation John asked for an annuity of 1,500 ducats for life. The Council accepted Fra John's offer and enjoined him "to go and make his first experiment upon the person of the Emperor." The "experiment" on the life of Maximilian I failed. John then drew up a tariff schedule at so much per anointed head. For the Grand Turk, 500 ducats; for the King of Spain, 150 ducats and traveling expenses; for the Duke of Milan, 60 ducats; for the Marquis of Mantua, 50 ducats; and for His Holiness, "only 100 ducats." "As a rule," John concluded his businesslike offer, "the longer the journey and the more valuable the life, the higher would be the price."

The frequent offers for assassination led the Republic to institute a separate register recording such proposals. Afterwards, when the government employed a poison expert at a regular salary, it set aside a special

cupboard containing poisons in the ducal palace; there was also a secret book listing the drugs and explaining "the nature and dose of each one."

The method of administering the poison [so reads a contemporary report written by an expert] is this. In every tumbler of wine put a scruple. If you wish to poison a flask of wine, one scruple to every tumblerful the flask contains. You must take care, however, that the patient does not drink more than one or two glasses. If he does he will be sick, and the poison will not have the desired effect. You must know, that should the victim be sick, a violent fever will ensue, and will last five or six days; after the fever passes he is safe, but on the appearance of the symptom of sickness you must repeat the dose, and continue to do so until he has kept at least one glass on his stomach. The infallible way is the tumbler. The wine flask sometimes fails, the tumbler never. You must leave no airhole in the stopper of the jar, otherwise in the space of four hours the whole will evaporate, leaving nothing. I send two qualities, one in a round and the other in a flat jar. If the victim be young and robust, use the round; if he be old, use the other.

There were two types of poisons, slow and rapid, and two ways of applying, by means of meat and drink.

Sometimes other methods were used. Caterina Sforza tried to poison Alexander VI by touch—through her ambassador she sent poisoned credentials to the pope. Once, in an attempt on the life of a French king, poisoned seals were used; the seals killed three slaves on whom they were tried. On one occasion the Venetian government made an attempt to destroy the whole Turkish army by means of poisoned cloth.

As regards the moral justification of assassination, the Italians frankly took the realistic attitude that the exigencies of the State were above individual morality and that, furthermore, it was more merciful to kill a person in a responsible position than to cause the deaths of many innocent people. A conspiracy organized by the Captain-General of Charles V against the Duke of Ferrara, who was an ally of the King of France, brought forth a remarkable booklet, entitled *Of the Right that Princes Have to Compass the Lives of Their Enemies' Allies*.

In every State [writes the anonymous author] political expediency rules absolutely in its own right; but in the powerful States it acquires a peculiarly extended jurisdiction and authority . . .; and,

therefore, we see the moral laws contravened and superseded. . . . Hence for great princes that is lawful and customary which is absolutely forbidden and impossible for others. . . .

By the murder of his ally you effectually rob your foe of his forces, counsel, and support. . . . I will even venture to declare that conspiracy may be the least impious method you can use. For sieges, which by their long-drawn cruelty drive to a miserable end so many innocent lives, the ravage of fields, the poisoning of wells, which destroy, as in a lightning flash, such wealth of earth's produce, and send irrevocably to death so many beasts and hapless folk whose lives were free from blame, the sack of cities, and their surrender to the soldiers' license, wherein they commit such unspeakable atrocities, the sowing of revolution, and the disturbances of governments on the pretext of religion—all these, I say, are actions far more vicious and detestable than those which any possible conspiracy could bring to birth. For, pressed to its last issue, a conspiracy only results in the slaughter of one man . . . , while the mass of persons who perish in the incidents of a campaign are for the most part entirely innocent.

EUROPE TURNS TO MASS CONFLICT

Outside of Italy, attempts were made on the lives of James I, Cromwell, Eugene of Savoy, but few assassinations took place in France, England, and Austria during the *ancien regime*. In these centralized monarchies war—that is, organized violence—gave an outlet for social hostilities. For example, Germany—the land of obedience, as Herder called it—remained singularly free from individual acts of violence until the World War. *No German ruler has ever been assassinated*. The essential reason was that in Germany social animosities tended to take an organized form. The Reformation conflicts and the Thirty Years' War generated enough hate and killed sufficient people to satisfy even the most bloodthirsty. Ordinary social animosities found an outlet in witch burning, a pastime which in Germany continued until the eve of the French Revolution. When in 1627 the German Jesuit Frederick Spee had to prepare two hundred condemned witches for the funeral pile, his hair turned white with grief.

Until the French Revolution the monarchies were successful in keeping individual acts of violence to a minimum. Ritual, symbolism,

tradition, and occasionally efficient administration, enabled crowned heads to preserve a maximum of social stability. Sanctioned by the Church, the class system on which monarchical society rested functioned with little internal violence. But the rise of a new class, challenging the supremacy of the older elite, undermined the social foundations of Europe. Like the sixteenth-century Reformers and Catholics, the bourgeois-democratic movement utilized every weapon to gain power; but where the Huguenots and Jesuits had advocated individual assassination, bourgeois liberals championed mass-revolutionary action. First, however, they devalued the ideals of the established regime, and by placing the social conflicts on a mass basis, they reduced the sanctity of individual lives. The French Revolutionary Terror killed victims by the thousands. The French Revolution showed that it was possible to carry on social war without recourse to paltry assassination; all that was needed was a public tribunal with justices condemning dissenters in the name of sacred symbols. By the end of the nineteenth century the tendency throughout all Europe was toward mass conflict, toward organization rather than assassination.

To illustrate: In Russia social struggles took the form of individual terrorism, a type of activity favored by conditions and tradition. In 1801 the half-mad Czar Paul was strangled with a sash by a group of officers and when the news was announced, "the people"—to quote the British minister—"were seen embracing, and giving each other joy in the streets." Commenting upon the Czar's death, a Russian noble said: "Despotism tempered by assassination, that is our Magna Carta." Czar Alexander II, in 1881, was torn to pieces by bombs. No less than three attempts were made on the life of Alexander III. Indeed, until the revolution of 1917 not a single Russian emperor was safe. Russian nihilists and revolutionists stabbed, bombed, and shot high governmental officials wherever possible. In October, 1906, for example, in the Caucasus there were no less than 121 terrorist acts, 47 conflicts with the police, and 362 executions.

In the rest of Europe terrorism was carried on only by anarchists, and then mainly in Latin countries. They had no competitors, for the Socialists, who believed that the enemy of mankind was the "system" and not the individual, scorned to use violence as a bourgeois prejudice. Not so the Anarchists.

The Anarchists were generally miserable marksmen. The amount of energy and ammunition they expended was sufficient to wipe out all the rulers of the world. Yet, after numerous attempts on almost everybody, they succeeded in killing only President Sadi Carnot of France (1894), Empress Elizabeth of Austria (1898), King Humbert I of Italy (1900), and President William McKinley of the U.S.A. (1901). The latter was shot, "because," as the Anarchist who slew him parroted, "he was the enemy of the good people—the working people." In 1908 Carlos of Portugal and his eldest son were slain with revolvers, but the killers, as one may guess from their excellent marksmanship, were not Anarchists but republicans. Among the attempts that failed, one may mention the Shah of Persia, King George of Greece, King Alfonso of Spain, Presidents Loubet and Fallières of France, King Leopold II of Belgium, the Mikado of Japan.

The World War showed the supreme value of large-scale organization in killing. Individual assassinations were paltry affairs compared to what an organized party or group could accomplish in the way of eliminating opponents. After the War, Europe's assorted Chekas, Iron Guards, Blackshirts, and Gestapos showed the world how to liquidate opponents with skill and dispatch.

Germany was one of the ablest pupils in the school of killing. The post-War Reich was honeycombed with secret murder organizations, *Fehmes*, which worked with military precision. They killed, in the first four years after the Armistice, 354 prominent persons, mostly liberals and laborites, among them Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Kurt Eisner, Matthias Erzberger, and Walter Rathenau. These slayings were executed by members of the Right, Hitlerites, and other fascist gangsters. It is worthy of note that the German Republic treated these killers with patient understanding and tender consideration. The average term of imprisonment per assassination in republican Germany was three months.

EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS

The two decades between the outbreak of the peace in 1918 and the resumption of the War in 1939 were marked by political effervescence which, not infrequently, erupted in assassination. A select inventory of the more prominent known victims, listed by countries, shows that the addiction to assassination has not abated anywhere in Europe:

Austria:	Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss	Assassinated in 1934
France:	President Paul Doumer	Assassinated in 1932
	Minister Jean Louis Barthou	Assassinated in 1934
Ireland:	Vice President Kevin O'Higgins	Assassinated in 1927
Portugal:	President Sidonio Paes	Assassinated in 1918
	Premier Antonio Granjo	Assassinated in 1921
Poland:	President Gabriel Narutowicz	Assassinated in 1922
Roumania:	Premier Ion G. Duca	Assassinated in 1933
	Premier Armand Colinescu	Assassinated in 1939
Yugoslavia	King Alexander I	Assassinated in 1934

To paraphrase a Frenchman's comment about Ireland in 1919, Europe between the two World Wars was a wonderful place where they took life so easy and so often.

AFTER THE WAR: ASSASSINATIONS?

From this survey it would appear that there does not seem to be an easy solution to the problem of political murder. Governors and administrators must reckon with its possibility any time and anywhere, both in the Occident and in the Orient.

The imposition of blind obedience does not always prevent assassination (except in Germany), as is shown in the case of Japan. Japanese polity, as a matter of fact, has been characterized as "Government by Assassination," and there is considerable justification for the label.² In the course of eleven recent years no less than three Japanese premiers—Hara, Hamaguchi, and Inukai—have been assassinated. Many other high Nipponese officials have committed self-assassination. One February day in 1936 saw the sudden termination of the lives of four Japanese leaders, including two admirals and a general. Such things do not shock Japanese public opinion. On the contrary, Japanese assassins are often treated as national heroes. As one Tokyo gentleman remarked, "Assassination is like voting. Things get settled."

Although it would be rather utopian to hope to eliminate the possibility of assassination altogether, it should be possible, on the basis of the historic record, to chart the areas where political murder may be most or least expected. A few tentative conclusions may be ventured in this hazardous field.

² Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (New York, 1942), a book that students of government should not miss.

In the Pacific, if the Japanese run true to tradition and character, one should expect a crop of political murders in the lands of Hirohito. To dampen the ardor for murder and suicide on the part of young Japanese, it might be wise to execute assassins as common criminals and with shame-stirring methods. In Europe governors or administrators would do well to be most watchful in Latin countries and in the Balkans. As regards Germany, if the past is any indication, high governmental officials may feel comparatively safe. Germans usually derive such solid satisfaction from obeying their rulers that they do not take their lives. But to make doubly sure, the administrators of Germany would be wise always to wear a military uniform. It is not easily conceivable that the average German would lift a finger against a military figure, even if it be a foreign military figure.

A few simple conclusions emerge from this study of assassination. A man who assumes political responsibility in a situation created by violence should and must know that assassination is never out of the question. He should keep in mind that mere violence or reprisal has not prevented assassination in the past. He should keep in mind that there are cultures where the assassin has been honored as a patriot (ancient Greece and modern Japan, for example). He should keep in mind that, in general, one way of minimizing assassination is to devalue the deed in the public mind—a process which, unfortunately, takes more time than the life span of the average administrator.

This study has attempted to trace the pattern of assassination in various areas in the world. Although knowledge is not necessarily the power to prevent, particularly in this case, it is certainly a compulsory safeguard. In any culture assassination follows a set pattern. It would be desirable to learn the pattern.

SELECTION AND TRAINING OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS

By COLONEL JOSEPH P. HARRIS

CHOOSING military personnel for the administration of civil affairs in occupied territory is a challenging exercise in wisdom and ingenuity. How such selection is being carried out by the Army at the present time is the subject of this article.

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THE IMPORTANCE of the administration of territories occupied by the Allied military forces was early recognized in the present war by the United States and Great Britain, and suitable steps are being taken in planning for this responsibility, including the selection and training of officers with special qualifications for the supervision of civil administration.

This fact is in great contrast with the experience in previous wars. Despite the fact that every war since the War of 1812 has required the establishment of military control over the civil government of occupied territories—including the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and parts of Mexico, the Southwest, California, and several southern states in our Civil War—little thought or preparation was given to the matter during World War I prior to the actual occupation of a part of Germany. To the contrary, when our army occupied a part of the Rhine Province, following the Armistice of 1918, there had been little preliminary planning, and no prior selection and training of officers for the military government of the occupied area. Untrained in the general functions of civil affairs, the officers assigned knew practically nothing about the governmental institutions, laws, and customs of the area to be occupied. Very few could speak the language. The responsibility for the control of local officials was delegated to military commanders in the areas where their troops were garrisoned. Each division commander handled the matter as he saw fit, utilizing one or another member of his staff. Inasmuch as the territory assigned to the divisions was determined by military rather than political factors, it did not conform to the boundary lines of the

major local political subdivisions. Divisions were, in most instances, garrisoned in a territory covering parts of several German *kreise* or counties. As a result, the civil affairs officer of the division had to keep in touch with the officials of several counties, while these civil officials received other and often different instructions from other civil affairs officers.

The plan did not work well. As soon as the civil affairs officer of a division became somewhat familiar with his duties and with the local officials and problems, he was likely to be given another assignment or the division to be moved; and a new officer, untrained and unfamiliar with civil affairs problems, took over. These defects were fully recognized, but because of the lack of a group of specially selected and trained officers for civil affairs duties, the system was the only practicable one that could be used. In due course, as certain divisions were withdrawn, Colonel I. L. Hunt, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs of the Third Army, was able to set up a better organization with specially selected, experienced civil affairs officers, each team assigned to a German *kreis*.

It was never possible, however, to set up this form of organization (which has come to be known as a "territorial" form of military government, as distinct from the "tactical" form) throughout the occupied territory. At one time, when it looked as though Germany might refuse to sign the peace terms and the Allied armies would advance into Germany, it was planned to use a tactical organization for military government of the advanced area, despite its disadvantages, because the Army did not have the necessary number of qualified, trained civil affairs officers to establish a territorial form of military government. This lack of trained officers made it imperative to delegate the responsibility for military government to military commanders to handle as best they could with untrained officers of their commands.

It should be noted, however, that the record made by the American Army in the military government of its section of the Rhine Province, despite the lack of planning and the prior selection and training, was, on the whole, much better than could have been expected. This was due in part to the great wisdom and ability of Colonel Hunt. While some mistakes were made, and a few officers given civil affairs assignments had to be relieved, by and large, the good judgment, common sense, and adaptability of the American officers given these assignments served them well.

The conditions then were far different from those which will face an army of occupation in Germany today. The problems of control of the population and civil authorities were relatively simple. The cities had not been bombed and the area had not been fought over. In spite of shortages of food and materials, and some disruption of the transportation system and local municipal service, the economic, political, and social conditions were still relatively good. The population was quite ready and willing to cooperate with the occupying army; the local bureaucracy was intact and prepared to carry on their normal duties and to obey the orders of the Allied army. The people, happy that the war was over, showed little ill will toward the Americans. Cities and other local units were prepared to go ahead with essential services without assistance or direction from the occupying army. Broadly speaking, there were few threats to the maintenance of law and order, despite the fact that Germany had undergone a bloodless revolution. Military government at the local level was primarily concerned with the supervision and adjustment of relations between the civilian population and the American troops garrisoned in the area. At the higher level, numerous inter-allied commissions were established to handle the larger problems involved in the armistice terms, including the delivery of specified stocks and equipment, various economic matters, transportation, imports and exports, and the like.

That such favorable conditions for military government will obtain again in the occupation of the remaining Axis countries is not to be expected. Already the cities of Germany are being destroyed by bombing; after they have been subjected to military operations, they, like the cities of Russia, Italy, Sicily, and North Africa, will be in serious condition. The economy of Germany and Japan will be severely disorganized and in many respects destroyed prior to military occupation. It is highly probable that a great wave of lawlessness, disorder, famine, pestilence, and chaos will attend the collapse of both Germany and Japan. The maintenance of law and order, the reestablishment of essential services, the feeding of starving populations, the maintenance of health and the suppression of epidemics, and initiation of the healing processes of rehabilitation—these will constitute tasks of the greatest magnitude.

And the success with which these tasks are accomplished will determine in large measure whether the war will have been fought in vain. It will likewise affect the length of time necessary before the world can

recover from the disastrous destruction of the war, and will have a mighty influence on the preservation of the future peace of the world. The United Nations will be judged on their administration of occupied areas as well as on their military operations. The assault is soon over, but the occupation and administration of the territory last much longer, often with more permanent effects.

The administration of occupied territory has been of much less importance in previous wars than in the present one. We are today in the midst of a total war in which whole nations are engaged. The skill with which occupied territories are administered is a highly important factor in the winning of the war itself. Modern armies cannot operate effectively from bases which are poorly administered. Lines of communication of the army must be protected, and the economy of the occupied area directed into the channels necessary for support of the armed forces. How long it may be necessary to maintain military control over the Axis countries after the end of hostilities, and the extent and nature of the control, no one can now predict; but that control is certain to be essential to the accomplishment of the war aims of the Allied nations.

TRAINING PROGRAM

Recognizing all this, the War Department, a few months after the outbreak of hostilities, established the School of Military Government, located at the University of Virginia under the direction of Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham, for the training of officers for the higher administrative positions in occupied territories. The function of selection and training of officers in civil affairs was assigned to the Provost Marshal General of the Army, Major General Allen W. Gullion. The first class started in May, 1942, with fifty officers. This beginning has since been expanded, and other training schools in military government have been established. At the Training Center of the Provost Marshal General at Fort Custer, Michigan, a series of related training programs is being conducted. There is one course for enlisted men, another for company military police officers, another for civil affairs officers who on completion are assigned to one of the Civil Affairs Training Schools which have been instituted at the following universities: Harvard, Yale, Michigan, Chicago, Boston, Pittsburgh, Wisconsin, Northwestern, Western Reserve, and Stanford.

The several training courses at Fort Custer are all relatively brief.

While varying in content and emphasis, depending upon the needs of the students and the type of work for which they are being trained, all of these courses contain some training in the following subjects: army organization, tactics, and staff work; police and security; and government.

The course of instruction at the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, which runs for twelve weeks, is divided into the following principal types of instruction:

1. Army organization and procedure, including staff work, tactics, supplies, etc.
2. Principles of military government and the administration of occupied territories.
3. The law of land warfare applying to occupied territory, and the conduct of military commissions and tribunals.
4. Experiences in military government, including brief historical accounts of previous military occupations, and actual experience in the present war.
5. Training in the major Axis countries and special areas, including geography, population, economic, political, governmental and social institutions, psychology, history, and recent trends.
6. Language training.
7. Miscellaneous training relating to economic, social, military and other problems in occupied areas.

At the School of Military Government and also at the Civil Affairs Training Schools in the various universities, officers are assigned to sections of from eight to twelve for problem work. These sections make surveys, prepare plans for setting up military government in specified areas or countries, and work out solutions of hypothetical problems. Given specific, practical situations or problems which have arisen in the field, the sections are asked to prepare plans, actions, orders, proclamations, and ordinances to deal with the situation, making use of the instruction on military government and the special study of the area.

The training programs of the Civil Affairs Training Schools at the cooperating universities are similar to that at Charlottesville, with somewhat more emphasis on area and language instruction. The course of instruction runs for eight weeks, each university specializing in a particular area and the language of that area. The officers assigned to the universities are of the ranks of second lieutenant through lieutenant

colonel, while those assigned to Charlottesville are of the ranks of captain through colonel. In general, the training offered at the School of Military Government at Charlottesville is designed for the principal administrators and headquarters staffs, while the universities train officers for specialist, staff, and field positions.

The cooperating universities draw upon available personnel in their own faculties and outside for teachers and lecturers who have expert information on the areas for which they are training. In all instances these universities have faculty members who have made a special study of the history, economics, geography, people, and institutions of the area. All of the universities are located in or near a great metropolitan area which has in its midst persons with detailed knowledge of the particular area. These persons, usually former residents of the area, and in many instances its prominent officials, professors, or business men, are being utilized as special lecturers or consultants. A number of the universities are supplementing the customary historical, social, political, economic, and cultural instruction with practical information about the country and its institutions—highly useful to its future military administrators. The area instruction at the university civil affairs schools, being limited to a particular area, is more intensive than the corresponding instruction at Charlottesville, which includes instruction on the major Axis countries and Axis-occupied countries. At best, however, because of the limited time available, the area instruction must consist largely of general background material. A more intensive study, with attention to particular cities or areas, is provided overseas after the officers have been definitely assigned to a city or area.

Since the School of Military Government started a year and a half ago, the content of the instructional program has been substantially changed. On the actual problems of administering occupied territories in this war more and more information has become available. At the start there was no actual experience in this war to go on. The School has been particularly fortunate in having two distinguished British officers with considerable experience as military government administrators in Africa to serve as visiting members of its faculty.¹ The problem work has been greatly improved and made more realistic in the light of field experience, and the instruction now given draws on recent experience in Sicily and Italy.

¹ Lieutenant Colonels T. R. Blackley and W. J. Miller.

In addition, more emphasis is being given to instruction in language, not originally considered a part of the instruction. The Civil Affairs Training Schools at the universities devote nearly one half of the course to language instruction, utilizing the intensive method of instruction in conversation which has been developed by the American Council of Learned Societies. This method involves the use of assistants or "informants," who carry on conversation with small groups of students for two or more hours daily. These assistants, although they speak the language fluently, do not give instruction in grammar, which is given by a language instructor. The results have been very good, most students acquiring a considerable proficiency in the language during the short course of eight weeks.

In addition to the training in military government given in this country, officers on arrival overseas are given further training. The course of instruction at these schools embraces intensive language training, and further instruction in the particular country, as well as military government. Officers with field experience frequently lecture to the School. When the officers are given definite assignments to a particular city or area, usually as a team or group, they then make a special study of that city or area.

Through all of these related programs for the training of administrators of occupied territories runs a fundamental philosophy—expressed or implied—that while the first and primary purpose of military government is to advance the cause of our arms and to promote the military objectives, there is also a secondary purpose and responsibility, under international law, to maintain law and order in the occupied area, to feed the starving, to protect the population against pestilence and disease, and, as far as military operations will permit, to aid the area to bind up its wounds, reestablish essential services, and start the healing processes of economic rehabilitation. Our purpose is not to loot or to despoil, but to lay the groundwork for the eventual restoration of the political and economic life of the area under conditions which will provide the basis of a lasting peace. Military and humanitarian considerations are not necessarily opposed to each other, though they may be so at times; and at those times military necessity must be the prime consideration.

Another basic philosophy of the training programs is that that military government is best which governs least. A cardinal principle which is always stressed is to utilize responsible local officials to the

maximum extent possible, and to leave in their hands the actual administration of government, reserving to the military authorities only that control and supervision which is necessary to protect our armed forces and to accomplish the purposes of the occupation. The essential role of civil affairs is thus supervision rather than detailed administration, though at times detailed administration may be necessary. The cooperation and good will of the inhabitants is always sought.

THE SELECTION OF OFFICERS

The degree of success in the administration of occupied territories will depend largely on the ability of the officers in charge. The task is one which requires officers of unusually high qualifications. Even in peace time, the position of the executive head of a large German or Japanese city, province, state, or other governmental unit is one requiring great administrative ability and experience, great wisdom, diplomacy, and qualities of leadership. The burgomaster of Berlin and other large German cities, the presidents of the states and Prussian provinces, and corresponding positions in Japan command the highest talents of the country. It must be remembered that government in these countries occupies a much larger role than in America. In both countries the top positions of the bureaucracy are achieved only after years of training and advancement up the administrative ladder, and they carry great prestige. While the American military officers charged with the supervision of the government of these countries cannot be expected to have such expertness in the law, customs, practices and techniques as the chief administrators of the country possess, nevertheless they should have equal experience and stature in the management of men and affairs.

The British have drawn heavily on the colonial service, as well as the civil service at home, for their chief civil affairs officers. Many of the top administrators of the Italian colonies of Africa were officials with years of experience in the colonies. The United States, having no equal source of officers with governmental experience, necessarily has to rely largely on officers drawn from business, industry, law, the regular army, and the other professions. Few of these men have had foreign experience or speak a foreign language.

Before describing the method of selection of officers for civil affairs training and assignment in the United States Army, it is well to consider briefly the several types of positions involved, and the qualifications

which are desired. The positions may be classified into the following broad categories:

1. The military governor of territories and countries, who ordinarily is the commanding general of the armed forces in the area. The actual supervision of the local authorities is exercised in his behalf by the chief civil affairs officer who is a member of his staff.

2. The top executive or administrative positions, including the chief civil affairs officer on the staff of the theater commander, or of the commanding general in charge of the forces in an occupied country or territory, his chief assistants, and the chief civil affairs officers in charge of large regions, states, provinces, or cities. These officers should be persons with great administrative and executive ability, and with broad experience in the management of men and affairs. They should have tact, diplomacy, and a high sense of political acumen; and the ability to deal effectively with people of a foreign race. Since they are members of the staff of the military commander, they should have had military experience.

3. Subordinate administrative positions, such as chief assistants or deputies to the chief civil affairs officers. As stated in the Joint Basic Field Manual on Military Government, these officers are used "to investigate problems . . . to collect information, to prepare plans, policies or decisions for consideration of their chief, to prepare orders . . . , and to see to it that the orders are carried out. They are the eyes, ears, and leg men of their chief, and have no authority except that expressly delegated to them." These officers should have similar qualifications to those listed above, but will necessarily be younger and less experienced. This will be the largest group of civil affairs officers.

4. Specialists in such fields as public health, safety, public works and engineering, money, banking, welfare, civil supply, agriculture, law, public finance and taxation, and others. These officers should have professional training and experience in their respective fields. They will act as advisers to the chief civil affairs officers, and be charged with the supervision and assistance of local officials in their special field. In unusual circumstances it may be necessary for them to take over and administer local offices, but ordinarily such administration is left to local officials who remain at their posts.

5. In addition to the above classes, a final group of officers will be needed to take care of the internal administration of the civil affairs

headquarters and local offices, to handle the correspondence, files, transportation, supplies, billeting, maintain financial and other records, and do a thousand other things which are essential to any administration. These officers should be acquainted with army methods, regulations and procedures.

Officers selected for civil affairs training and assignment come from several sources. (It should be noted that, in addition, a certain number of officers are selected in the theaters of operation and assigned directly to civil affairs duties. After the end of hostilities, other officers may be released from combat units for civil affairs detail.) In 1942 the Provost Marshal General was authorized to build up a pool of Specialist Reserve Officers for civil affairs assignments, and many specially qualified persons were commissioned from civilian life. A large part of the officers selected for training at the School of Military Government and at the Civil Affairs Training Schools at the universities have been drawn from this source, but, except in rare instances, commissions are no longer being granted to persons in civilian life. Officers are now being taken from those already commissioned by the army. Each of the three branches of the army is required to submit monthly a quota of officers recommended for civil affairs training and assignment. In addition, applications may be made by individual officers, such applications being forwarded through military channels. Up to the present, by far the largest number of officers assigned to the School of Military Government has come from those who have submitted individual applications.

The directive of the Adjutant General of the Army calls for the recommendation of officers for civil affairs training and assignment in each of the following fields: administration, public works and utilities, transportation, public safety, fiscal, supply, economics, public health, public welfare, education, public relations, communications, legal, liaison, and cultural. Several of these fields are further subdivided, as for example, the fiscal field is divided into the following subclasses: public finance, currency and exchange, banking, accounting, social insurance.

In each of these fields, high standards of professional training and experience are required. In the field of public welfare, for example, the following qualifications are specified:

Head or a principal officer of a large welfare organization such as a large city, county, State, or Federal Government agency, or a large

private welfare organization in a position involving broad administrative experience; administrative experience in foreign relief or disaster relief, food or clothing distribution; or a junior officer of demonstrated experience. At least five years' experience in the field of skill is desirable.

In addition to the professional and administrative qualifications, and military experience, the directive calls for officers who have the following attributes:

Civil affairs officers must have high personal qualifications and experience in handling men and affairs. Among the personal attributes desired are the ability to deal effectively with high civilian officials in difficult and complex situations; ability to get along with people in all walks of life; tact; diplomacy; imagination; a broad social outlook; and adaptability to new and unusual customs; ability to analyze governmental, economic, and related problems and to formulate and carry into effect necessary policies; high professional standing in his own field; unquestioned integrity; and ability to assimilate a wide variety of complex subject matter in a short, rigorous training program.

Officers are selected for the School of Military Government and the university civil affairs schools by a board in the Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office. Final decision is made by the Provost Marshal General. The selection process is based largely upon a review of the education, employment experience and military record of applicants or nominees, as indicated by a personal placement questionnaire. Only in exceptional cases is an interview utilized, though it is agreed that an interview of all candidates would be highly desirable. Particular attention is paid to education, language training, employment experience, the kinds of positions held, whether the candidates are qualifying for positions in the field, and whether they indicate progressively responsible, executive experience in civilian life or in the Army. As a rule, college instruction in a foreign language is required. Special consideration is given to persons who are able to speak a foreign language fluently. Many officers selected have also resided in one of the major Axis countries. No attempt, however, is made to require foreign residence and language proficiency of all applicants, since that would not be practicable.

The qualifications which are required for civil affairs training and assignment are high, and an able group of officers has been selected. The list includes many able executives and leaders in business, industry and government, and the professions, as well as promising younger officers. Among those who have been selected for civil affairs training and assignment are several former governors of states, members of Congress, many successful business executives, heads of state, city, and federal departments, city managers, university presidents, deans of law schools, and officers prominent in other walks of life.

The results of this program of selection and training are already evident in the experience in Sicily and Italy, where the officers trained in this program had their first test. The consensus of all observers has been that an extremely able job was done by the American officers and their British colleagues. Civil affairs officers went into cities and towns as quickly as possible after they were captured, and immediately started to restore law and order and to reestablish the essential local services. In some instances cities of 25,000 population were found with only a few hundred people remaining within the city, the other inhabitants living in caves and hillsides nearby in near starving condition. Not only had the larger cities been seriously damaged by the effective bombing of Allied planes; they had in addition suffered destruction and pillage by the army of the retreating enemy. Electric power systems were usually knocked out, water supplies were generally crippled, and all trucks and other vehicles had been carried away by the armies of both sides. Food was short in all of the larger coastal cities. The most urgent problem was that of locating food supplies, principally wheat, and making arrangement for its transportation and milling, as well as for its distribution to the populace through the rationing scheme. The local Sicilian officials, long accustomed to dictation from party leaders, and uncertain of what was expected of them by the occupying army, lacked the initiative to go ahead without orders. Order was quickly restored, looting ended, the people fed, transportation facilities repaired, and the enthusiastic cooperation and good will of the Sicilians secured. The American and British officers alike proved themselves to be resourceful, energetic, and fully equal to the occasion. They have set a record for wise, effective, and humane administration of a type which has proved to be a great strength to our Army and has paved the way for the establishment of a new day in Italy.

The program of the War Department for the selection and training of civil affairs officers for the administration of occupied territories is notable in many respects—in its breadth and scope, the care with which officers are selected, and the training program which has been developed. Considering how tardy this country has been in the selection and training of men for the higher administrative positions in all levels of government, it is all the more noteworthy. The program promises to afford the Army of the United States the means with which to discharge its responsibilities in the administration of occupied territories.



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DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF PROPAGANDA THROUGH REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE—II*

By BRUCE LANNES SMITH

IN THE FIRST INSTALMENT of this article, the writer discussed some of the possible uses of the federal Acts requiring registration and disclosure of propaganda and propagandists. These Acts were regarded as possible instruments, not of "suppression of civil liberties, but [of] extension of free speech and clarification of the methods by which it can get the best results."¹

Freedom of discussion, subject to the public availability of plenty of disinterested information concerning the backgrounds and connections of leading propagandists and pressure groups, was viewed as probably the best means of protecting the public from the dangers of one-sided propaganda, and also from the dangers of suppression and censorship. Yet the position was taken that we are by no means certain how all this may work out. Analysis of efforts in this direction can be considered as part of a developing "science of democracy."²

* This is the second instalment of an article by Mr. Smith on the application of the federal statutes calling for full and fair public disclosure of the activities and connections of propagandists and pressure organizations. (See this *QUARTERLY*, Spring, 1942, 6, 27-40.) On leave from New York University, where he is an instructor in economics, Mr. Smith was from 1941 to 1943 a social science analyst on the staff of the Special War Policies Unit of the Department of Justice. This Unit has, among other functions, responsibility for administering the policy of registration and disclosure. The views expressed in this article, however, are

entirely personal, in no sense to be taken as an official expression of the policy of any government agency.

¹ Bruce Lannes Smith, "Democratic Control of Propaganda Through Registration and Disclosure," this *QUARTERLY*, 1942, 6, 27-40. In connection with both instalments of this study, the writer is greatly indebted to his alert fellow-workers in the Special War Policies Unit for many highly entertaining discussions. They must, however, be absolved of responsibility for any errors of fact, tact, or political judgment.

² "By a science of democracy I refer to a clear, concise, empirical analysis of our social structure from the special point of view of anyone who seeks to establish a substantial equality of social opportunity, substantial mutual respect among all members of the community, substantial educational equality (access to all the basic facts of social organization), and substantially just and equitable incomes (incomes proportional to socially approved sacrifice, and not due to inherited privilege, luck, or unearned increment)." Bruce Lannes Smith, "Propaganda Analysis and the Science of Democracy," this *QUARTERLY*, 1941, 5, 250-59.

Realists may object that, despite the pro-democratic political rhetoric of recent charters, pacts, and declarations, we can have small assurance of the survival of democracy in the United States. The present writer is keenly aware of this possibility. A social scientist can scarcely assume that democracy here will survive unless prompt and energetic steps are taken toward equality of incomes and inheritances, public control of monopolistic business and of dictatorially controlled labor unions, and widespread federal aid for pro-democratic education. The present paper does not discuss the probability that any such steps *will* be taken. It simply assumes that *if* they are taken soon enough, a discussion of democratic control of propaganda will not be out of place.

This second instalment may be regarded as a sort of year-end report on some of the steps that have been taken under the policy of registration and disclosure during the twelve months ending about midsummer 1943.

The two main statutes under consideration, it may be recalled, were the Foreign Agents Registration Act (also known as the McCormack Act)³ and the Voorhis Act.⁴ The Foreign Agents Registration Act requires the registration and full and fair public disclosure of "persons" who engage in propaganda activities and certain other activities in the United States on behalf of a foreign principal. (The legal term "person" includes "an individual, partnership, association, corporation, organization, or any other combination of individuals.")⁵ The Voorhis Act, on a literal reading, seems to require the registration and disclosure of all organizations, whether foreign-controlled or domestic, which propose to use force and violence, or threats of force and violence, to overthrow any government anywhere. It may be thought, however, in the light of its legislative history, to require such registration only in the case of groups threatening the Government of the United States.

Both Acts require each registrant to submit to the Federal Government a complete description of his existing and proposed aims, activities, connections, personnel, finances, by-laws, regulations, legal powers, and all other information and documents that may be needed to give the general public an understanding of his goals and actions.

Both laws require that the contents of the registration statement be fully and fairly disclosed to the public. Both laws assume that if the public can get all the

facts about the connections and actions of a propagandist, it will withhold from the extremist and anti-democratic propagandist, whether he be of the Left or the Right, its gifts of money, or services, or votes, even though his right of free speech remains unrestricted.

During the past year, administrative emphasis among those responsible for enforcement of these two Acts has shifted away from the Voorhis Act, focussing more and more upon the adequate implementation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

AMENDMENTS TO FOREIGN AGENTS ACT

In the Spring of 1942 the Foreign Agents Registration Act was very extensively amended, and a wholly new set of Regulations has been issued under its authority. Some of the essential amendments are as follows:

(1) At the joint request of the State and Justice Departments, administration of the Act has been transferred by Congress from the State Department to the Department of Justice.⁶

(2) Every registrant who transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any "political propaganda" (as defined) is required to send two copies of such

³ Approved June 8, 1938; amended 1939-52 Stat. 631; U.S. Code, Title 22, Sec. 233 (a) to 233 (g). Extensively amended 1942. Public Law 532, 77th Congress, 2d session. See also Regulations issued under the latter (Office of the Attorney General, Order no. 3695, June 23, 1942). Copies of these Acts and Regulations may be obtained free of charge by writing to the U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

⁴ Approved Oct. 17, 1940. 54 Stat. 1201; U. S. Code, Title 18, Sections 14-17.

⁵ Public Law 532, 77th Congress, 2d session, Sec. 1 (a).

⁶ Public Law 532, 77th Congress, 2d session, Sec. II.

propaganda to the Library of Congress, and further, to send to the Attorney General one copy and a statement of "the places, times, and extent of such transmittal."⁷

(3) Every registrant is prohibited from transmitting his political propaganda in interstate or foreign commerce, in any form reasonably adapted to being circulated among two or more persons, unless it is—

"conspicuously marked at its beginning with, or . . . accompanied by, a true and accurate statement, in the language or languages used in such political propaganda, setting forth that the person transmitting such political propaganda or causing it to be transmitted is registered . . . as an agent of a foreign principal, together with the name and address of such agent . . . and of each of his foreign principals; that as required by this Act, his registration statement is available for inspection at and copies of such political propaganda are being filed with the Department of Justice; and that registration of agents of foreign principals required by the Act does not indicate approval by the United States Government of the contents of their political propaganda."⁸

(4) The registration statement and other statements filed under the Act are public records, and copies are to be "furnished to every applicant at such reasonable fee as the Attorney General may prescribe."⁹

(5) Penalty for willful violation of the Act is a fine up to \$10,000 or imprisonment up to five years, or both; or, in the case of aliens, the penalty is deportation.

(6) Exempted from disclosure under the amended Act, as before, are state-

ments filed by duly accredited officials of foreign governments recognized by the State Department, while such officials are engaged *exclusively* in activities recognized by the State Department as *bona fide* consular or diplomatic activities or as activities other than those of "a public relations counsel, publicity agent, [or] information-service employee."¹⁰

Exempted also from registration and disclosure, as under the former version of the Act, is "any person engaging or agreeing to engage only in activities in furtherance of *bona fide* religious, scholastic, academic or scientific pursuits or of the fine arts"; and "any person engaging or agreeing to engage only in *private*, non-political, financial, mercantile, or other activities in furtherance of the *bona fide* trade or commerce of his foreign principal or in the soliciting or collecting of funds within the United States to be used [as provided in the Neutrality Act of 1939 (54 Stat. 48)] only for medical aid . . . or for food and clothing to relieve human suffering. . . ."¹¹

NEWLY CREATED EXEMPTIONS

A new class of exemption is created by the amended Act, however, and this, even more than the filing and labeling of propaganda, represents a major change effected by the amendments. Exempted from disclosure now, for the first time, under Section 3 (f) is—

⁷ *Ibid.*, Sec. 4 (b).

⁸ *Ibid.*, Sec. 4 (b).

⁹ *Ibid.*, Sec. 6. Under the new Regulations, the statements may be read by the public in the Public Relations Office of the Justice Department, and photostatic copies may be obtained at ten cents a page.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Secs. 3 (a), (b), (c).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Secs. 3 (d), (e).

"any person, or employee of such person, whose principal is a government of a foreign country the defense of which the President deems vital to the defense of the United States while (1) such person or employee engages only in activities which are in furtherance of the policies, public interest, or national defense both of such government and of the Government of the United States, and are not intended to conflict with any of the domestic or foreign policies of the Government of the United States, (2) each communication by such person or employee which he intends to, or has reason to believe will, be . . . circulated among any section of the public . . . within the United States, is a part of such activities and is believed by such person to be truthful and accurate and the identity of such person as an agent of such foreign principal is disclosed therein, and (3) such government of a foreign country furnishes to the Secretary of State for transmittal to . . . the Attorney General such information as to the identity and activities of such person or employee at such times as the Attorney General may require."¹²

In practice, this provision exempts from public disclosure any agent of one of the Lend Lease governments who is viewed by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State as exclusively engaged in activities of the types described above. But such an agent is not relieved of the obligation to furnish privately, as it were, all information the Attorney General may require concerning his identity and activities.

A measure of control by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State over the registrant is obtained from the following:

• "Upon notice to the Government of

which such person is an agent or to such person or employee, the Attorney General, having regard for the public interest and national defense, may, with the approval of the Secretary of State, and shall, at the request of the Secretary of State, terminate in whole or in part the exemption herein of any such person or employee."¹³

Naturally Section 3 (f) has evoked controversy in informed circles. It confers upon the Attorney General and the Secretary of State—particularly the latter—a very broad discretion indeed as to what the public is to be told through registration statements about those governmental propagandists who are deemed by these officials to be acting in furtherance of the policies both of the Lend-Lease governments and the Government of the United States. A number of individuals who are emphatic admirers of the policies of the Attorney General and of the Secretary of State have nevertheless commented to the writer that in their opinions it would have been more demonstrably in the interest of democracy to have disclosed without these restrictions the propaganda being carried on among our home population by our Lend-Lease allies.

If the activities of these foreign agents are indeed wholly pro-democratic and wholly "in furtherance of the policies, public interest, or national defense" of both countries, it is asked, what harm could there be in a disclosure of these activities? In fact, so that argument runs, should not a thoroughly pro-democratic propagandist be delighted to have a detailed testimonial of his views and connections placed on public file in the Department of Justice, where it will

¹² *Ibid.*, Sec. 3 (f).

¹³ *Ibid.*, Sec. 3 (f).

attract the attention of the press and of like-minded fellow-citizens and will bring him additional publicity, money, and mass support?

To continue the argument: If, on the other hand, there are any Lend-Lease beneficiaries who are not wholly pro-democratic in their present or ultimate programs, would it not be advisable, from the standpoint of pro-democratic politics, to have such individuals registered and disclosed, so that public opinion may be prepared for withdrawal of American support to them as soon as military expediency permits?

It is also pointed out, by opponents of this part of the Act, that registration and full disclosure are required of propagandists who are agents of *private* principals in Lend-Lease countries. Yet it would seem even more essential to disclose the propaganda and connections of *governmental* agents. The governments have both funds and facilities to engage in far more propaganda and pressure than any private citizen or private group.

Finally, in support of the disclosure of friendly governmental propagandists, it is urged that the Foreign Agents Registration Act amendments, as passed by Congress on January 28, 1942, did not contemplate the exemption of these classes of foreign agents, and would not have exempted them had the President not vetoed the bill on February 9 and sent it back with a request for these classes of exemptions.

SECTION 3 (f):

A NEGLECTED OPPORTUNITY?

It is possible, say these friendly critics, that the President did not have time available on that occasion for consideration of the more fundamental meaning

of the Act as an instrument of democratic government. Possibly he did not think of it at that moment as a means of allaying possible suspicion of our allies on the part of "isolationist" sections of the country. Certainly, the fullest possible candor and freedom from ideological censorship is the goal of the other agencies of the Administration's information policy, according to repeated statements by such authorities as Elmer Davis, Director of the Office of War Information, and Byron Price, Director of the Office of Censorship.¹⁴

Had more time been available to the President to analyze the use of the Foreign Agents Registration Act as a means of achieving this goal and also gaining additional good will and publicity for pro-democratic beneficiaries of Lend-Lease, it may be reasonable to suppose that the President would have seized the opportunity. It may be argued that no more impressive manifestation of the sincerity and dependability of our allies could have been found than their willingness to report their activities for the scrutiny of American public opinion.

If this line of reasoning is accepted, it may be possible to secure a new amendment to this part of the Act, or, failing this, to secure, under the broad discretionary powers of the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, the termination by these officials of a number of exemptions. The opposing arguments may prevail, however, and they are certainly worthy of serious consideration. They are as follows.

As the Attorney General said to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in

¹⁴ A collection of such statements: Elmer Davis and Byron Price, *War Information and Censorship*. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943. 79 pp.

support of the views expressed in the President's veto message suggesting the exemption of the governmental agents in question:

"We are now in a fighting partnership with 25 United Nations and in active cooperation with a number of other nations whose defense is vital to our own. As a result, we are constantly sending our representatives to, as well as receiving representatives from, countries with which we are collaborating, and, in the interests of the war effort, there should be the minimum of interference with this exchange. Accordingly, the suggested amendment has been designed to afford different treatment to official representatives of these countries than is accorded under the present bill to all other types of foreign agents. Thus, instead of requiring the detailed public registration and labeling, an alternative and less onerous type of registration has been provided, which it is believed will not alter or weaken the fundamental purposes of the act . . .

"With the shortness of time available and the strenuous demands upon individual efforts, it is neither practical nor desirable to require these representatives of friendly governments, frequently arriving and departing, to take time out to fill in detailed registration forms. Nor is it wise in many instances to disclose such information to our enemies."¹⁵

NEED FOR CAUTION

Undoubtedly there is much to be said for the view that efficiency and military security might be jeopardized if the time and energy of military missions, security officers, and technological missions were seriously taken up with filling out and notarizing long registration forms and with filing and labelling all their

documents which deal with politics and are reasonably adapted to reaching two or more persons. Yet, it may be noted that not only military, security, and technological personnel are exempted, but "any person, or employee of such person, whose foreign principal is [one of the governments in question]."¹⁶

"It is also important to realize," continued the Attorney General's statement to the Committee on the Judiciary, "that the United States is likewise sending representatives to many other countries, and it would be unwise to subject them to the risk of the imposition of similar requirements in the prosecution of their difficult tasks."¹⁷

The writer does not see that the imposition of *similar requirements* (i.e., full and fair registration and disclosure of American agents other than diplomatic, military, technological and security officers) could do anything but add to the popular prestige and goodwill accorded those agents, assuming them to be *bona fide* agents of democracy. There is, however, the possibility that régimes which happen to be our allies for military reasons but not out of a love for democracy might impose *other requirements* upon our agents. A régime which is out to "get" a foreign emissary can delay his property at the customs, keep him waiting in line for hours to receive "clearance" papers, intimidate those who call on him, find that hopelessly uncomfortable living quarters are the "only ones available," and block his work in a hundred other ways. When

¹⁵ U. S. Senate, 77th Congress, 2d session, Report no. 1227 from the Committee on the Judiciary, to accompany S. 2399. Pp. 2-3.

¹⁶ Public Law 532, 77th Congress, 2d session, Sec. 3 (f). My italics.

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 3.

time is precious, as in a total war, all this can spell the failure of a mission.

HOW MUCH DEMOCRATIC CONTROL?

Here is a many-sided issue. In passing the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and in trusting that informed public opinion will serve as a more adequate check on socially dangerous propaganda than would suppression and censorship, the United States is far more advanced, from the standpoint of democratic theory, than any other country. Now, just how far can a relatively democratic country go in applying principles of registration and disclosure in its relations with countries practicing different degrees of democracy? Our emissaries may be sent to countries that in terms of democratic practice, are less advanced, equally advanced, or more advanced than we. Certain countries, also, may be less democratic in certain sectors of their social structure, equally democratic in some, and more democratic in still others. It is easy to imagine that one of the conspicuously less democratic Lend-Lease countries or factions might impose insuperable barriers to the work of our own delegations in retaliation for our disclosure of the anti-democratic activities of its agents in the United States. Whether this would happen or not, and whether it would vitally impede the rest of the war effort, are questions for factual inquiry at each stage of our relations with each country. Probably no one has better access to the facts than the offices of the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. According to this argument, therefore, it seems reasonable to grant these officials authority to use their own best judgment, subject to the general policy of

disclosure laid down by the Act as a whole.

VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION

BY LEND-LEASE GOVERNMENTS?

From a balancing of these two arguments, it may appear that Section 3 (f) is definitely justifiable, but goes too far. Under Section 3 (f) as now drawn, there is no ready means of gaining for those allies whom we assume to be relatively democratic (such as England) the prestige and goodwill (and the reduction of isolationist suspicions) which would flow from a full and candid registration and disclosure of their propaganda in this country. Perhaps the same result could be accomplished through some such friendly and reassuring gesture as voluntary registration and disclosure on the part of information agents of these nations. Perhaps the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, after discussions with them to clarify the issue, might terminate their exemptions with respect to political propagandists and information agents. At all events, an opportunity is now being missed, according to one view, to employ the Foreign Agents Act, with its philosophy of candor and democracy, as the basis for a positive, constructive public relations campaign.

While the *positive use* of Section 3 (f) of the amended Act may seem to have been neglected, its *negative safeguards* appear to the writer to be adequate. As the Attorney General's message pointed out—

"if any persons subject to this section make any public statements, they must, in addition, identify themselves as agents of a foreign government, must tell the truth, and such communications or expressions must be part of the activities

permitted by the amendment. . . . In any event, the application of the section to the representatives of any particular country will be terminated whenever the President no longer finds its defense vital to our own."¹⁸

ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT

When the amended Act, with its new Regulations, went into effect on June 28, 1942, the registration statements on file under the old Act were annulled, and new (and more elaborate) statements were required to be filed.¹⁹

The amended Act confronted the enforcement personnel with an administrative problem that was very new to them in most respects. Not only were the requirements of the Act broadened and tightened, and certain new classes of registrants and exemptions created, but additional enforcement personnel were required, most of whom had not previously been acquainted with the philosophy or the provisions of the Act. "Tooling up" of such an enterprise always takes much longer than the layman would suppose. Consequently, it is still too early to attempt a quantified evaluation of the administrative results obtained under the Act. It is the writer's opinion, furthermore, that in general the most objective reports on administrative agencies are likely to be obtained from independent social scientists not so directly concerned as he has been in the operations of the government, and not bound by its "security" regulations.

It may, however, be useful to venture a few general considerations for the possible guidance of those who are interested in conducting objective inquiries "from outside."

The first stage of administration is that of surveying the field and obtaining the registrations of the more obvious candidates. The second stage involves the detection of the less obvious candidates—those who are unwilling to register or do not know they are eligible. The third stage is that of checking and amplifying the answers to questions on the registration statements, with a view to clarifying ambiguities, achieving complete disclosure, and making it as easy as possible for the registrant to comply with the requirements. This procedure may involve a considerable amount of patient conference, for the "tradition of privacy" is still irrationally strong in many quarters—even in matters so unequivocally affected with a public interest as the sponsorship of political propaganda. (In general, of course, the "shadier" the registrant, the stronger his devotion to the "tradition of privacy," as we have learned by experience under the Securities Acts, the Corrupt Practices Acts and the Income Tax Laws.) The fourth stage is that of securing adequate disclosure by all methods consistent with the purposes of the Act.

The administration of the amended Act is still, to all intents and purposes, in the first stage. This is due in part to the relatively short period during which the amendments have been in effect, and in part to the small number of trained personnel thus far made available to administer the Act.

The numbers and classes of persons actually registered, those prosecuted, and other details of activities under the Act, will no doubt be made public in an annual report that should appear at about the same time as this article. Con-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁹ Regulations, Rule 4.

sequently, those details will not be repeated here. Instead, an attempt will be made to state some of the more basic administrative issues.

In the administration of the Act, a wide range of possibilities presents itself. In the matter of compelling the production of "more information" from a registrant, the discretionary powers of the Attorney General are so broad that the Act could be administered at almost any level, from that of a mere nuisance act, annoying and embarrassing a few unpopular registrants, to that of a strong but impartial instrument for the clarification of public opinion on American foreign policy. It could be treated as a purely negative instrument, for the policing and intimidation of a few presumably anti-social pressure specialists; or it could be used in this way and also as a strongly positive means of securing favorable publicity, good will, emoluments, votes, and mass support for the promoters of presumably honest and benevolent causes.

Just how far the Act will be pushed along the scales from a negative nuisance act to a positive agency of democracy will depend to a very large extent on (a) the interpretation given the Act by federal attorneys and federal courts; (b) the caliber of the legal, analytic, and public relations personnel available for the positive aspects of its administration; and (c) the amount of effective public support aroused in favor of disclosure and discussion as alternatives to suppression and imprisonment. We may consider each of these three factors in turn.

INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT

BY ATTORNEYS AND COURTS

Inasmuch as there have been no court actions of importance under the amend-

ed Act, we have no very definite basis for saying how broadly the attorneys and the courts will construe the fact-finding powers of the Attorney General. Analogies and precedents could of course be drawn, as mentioned in the writer's previous article, from the administrative histories of closely similar acts employing the principle of full and fair disclosure—the Postal Registration laws, the Securities and Exchange Acts, the Federal Corrupt Practices Acts, the Pure Food and Drug Acts, and the portions of the Neutrality Act requiring disclosure of those who solicit money and supplies to be used for alleged humanitarian purposes in foreign areas.²⁰

A careful analysis of the disclosure principles and the fact-finding powers employed under these other statutes remains to be written.²¹ It should be remembered that the precedents established under them are peacetime precedents, and that public administration under wartime conditions may be a vastly different problem. Citizens, pressure groups, attorneys, and courts are under extreme emotional tension, as shown by Chafee's dispassionate analysis of irrational prosecutions and convictions in our federal courts during the first World War.

"We can no longer cherish the delusion," Chafee wrote in 1941, "that the first Amendment protects open discussion of the merits and methods of a war. We can predict with certainty what will happen in the next war from what happened in the last war, because exactly

²⁰ See the writer's previous article, this *QUARTERLY*, 1942, 6, 36-38.

²¹ Here, incidentally, is an excellent task for a team of specialists in legal and social research.

the same statute [sedition sections of the Espionage Act of 1917] is in force. Although on its face it does not seem to make discussion criminal, yet the sweeping interpretations of it which the government lawyers obtained from the Supreme Court, and wider still from the District Courts, will constantly be cited as precedents for punishing expressions about the merits and conduct of the next war, or about the justice and wisdom of continuing it beyond any given stage."²²

The facts show that Chafee was right. Since about July 1, 1941, some 139 individuals have been indicted for violating, or conspiring to violate, the sedition sections of the Espionage Act.²³ Evidently faith in the ability of disclosure and truth to overcome the presumed falsehoods circulated by these individuals is not as great as faith in the federal penitentiary.

One may well suppose that the inevitable sacrifices yet to be made in the war will greatly increase the activity and popularity of law enforcement officials and judges who seek to limit free speech and differences of opinion.

Much is likely to depend, therefore, on the integrity, energy, and competence of the administrative personnel—and their willingness to forego popularity, if necessary, in order to use disclosure as a means of strengthening the democratic policy of fighting subversive ideas with socially useful ideas instead of with jails, fines, and deportations. Probably this task cannot be carried out unless the Foreign Agents Act Administration is able to secure the best social science and legal talent in America in the field of the measurement and control of propaganda and public opinion.

RECRUITING ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL

For best results, the specialized technical skills of such personnel should be accompanied by a broad and thorough acquaintance with political and economic institutions and ideologies—especially Fascism and Communism—in all parts of the world. Preferably this knowledge should be based on a period of residence abroad. It certainly should include a fluent command of at least one or two foreign languages, if the administrators are to make it easy and agreeable for registrants from all corners of the world to comply with the Act.

These criteria have been followed as closely as possible in the selection of the social-science analysts and translator-analysts already on the staff; and the extreme care taken in personnel recruitment has been well rewarded.²⁴ It can be asserted with confidence that the procedures and information developed by these analysts are a distinctive contribution to public administration in Washington. The continued recruitment of such personnel, both on the legal staff and the social science staff, appears to the writer to be crucial in determining whether the Act will fulfil its social purposes.

If there is erratic and impulsive administration, or if the administration is not fully equipped with the best technical devices and the necessary personnel for maintaining a steady, quantita-

²² Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States*. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1941, p. 103.

²³ Tabulation by the writer. Most of these indictments have been secured with a minimum of national publicity.

²⁴ The functions of these analysts were described in the writer's previous article in this *QUARTERLY*, 1942, 6, 38-39.

tive trend analysis of the exact extent to which significant political symbols and slogans (including subversive symbols and slogans) are being diffused among the population, public opinion is all too likely to regard the democratic procedures fostered by the Act as not strong enough to stem the tides of subversion.

In the writer's opinion, there are probably not more than a dozen attorneys in the United States who are familiar with the technical procedures involved in such an approach to the safeguarding of free speech, and not more than a few dozen social scientists.²⁵

The writer is aware that this statement could easily be misunderstood, and that there is no point in fixing personnel standards at such a high level that intra-professional controversies develop and able men are deterred from giving their best. In this case, the factor causing the difficulty is not the deficient professional training of available personnel, but the fact that scientific analysis of public opinion and of its control is such a very recent discipline that it is almost impossible to get *enough personnel*. Little or no high-grade training in this field was offered in the universities and law schools before 1930. Signs of the recentness of public opinion analysis are the fact that the first Gallup and Roper polls were not taken until 1935, and the fact that this *QUARTERLY*, the first scientific journal in the field, did not bring out its first issue until January 1937.

Since the science has been so recently developed, it is natural that a large percentage of those who have specialized in it are relatively young. Under the present draft system, which emphasizes age rather than skill, a major-

ity of them have been or will be drafted. Consequently the problem of staffing is a very serious one. It is too early to say whether it can be solved during the war.

PUBLIC SUPPORT OF REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE

We turn to the third major factor that may affect the social use of the Act: public support of its philosophy. It seems clear that the Act is receiving very little informed public support. As readers of this *QUARTERLY* are aware, public opinion about public opinion is not very alert as yet in this country. Efforts to teach "propaganda analysis" in the schools and in the agencies of adult education have not gone far. Thinking, as usual, is lagging far behind events. Mystic expectations still cling to a mystic phrase: "free speech." Most people assume, passively, that "free speech must be preserved." But very few of our fellow citizens can yet give us a clear program, other than force and violence, for dealing with those who seek to use free speech to overthrow free speech.

The idea of balanced discussion has not yet "percolated." We insist, to be sure, that the Opposition shall be allowed to speak in Congress and in the State Legislatures, but orators, agitators,

²⁵ The writer's tentative conception of the type of analytic literature with which a qualified social scientist or attorney would have to be familiar is indicated in his "Scientific and semi-scientific literature on war information and censorship," *Journalism Quarterly*, 20: 1-20 (March 1943). For specifications of a law school curriculum capable of producing socially responsible attorneys, consult Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, professors in the Yale Law School, on "Legal education and public policy: Professional training in the public interest," *Yale Law Journal*, 52: 203-95 (March 1943).

and demagogues are still permitted on the public platform and on the radio without an Opposition and without disclosure of their backers and connections.²⁶ The same conditions that sapped away the prestige of free speech in Republican Germany and Republican France²⁷ are allowed to sap its strength in our own country. A period of inflation and a post-war depression, probably inevitable under the present tax and income policy, is likely to make this clear to those who cannot see it now.

Even the American Civil Liberties Union, the leading pressure group devoted to strengthening free speech, has taken no stand, either on the principle of balanced discussion (no public discussion in the absence of the Opposition) or on the principle of disclosure.²⁸ Nor has a stand been taken, as far as the writer knows, by the Public Relations Office of any government agency or by the Office of War Information.

Over the long run, in a democracy, administrative agencies cannot move much faster than the public opinion that supports them. It seems likely to the writer that American public opinion, if led by responsible independent investigators and by citizens' groups, would now support a definite program, intended to strengthen and clarify the institutions of free discussion.

For one thing, the country is apparently moving, whether it likes to or not, toward participation in some form of hemispheric or continental government, or even a world government. Through scores of "Free Movements" and self-styled representatives of European and Asiatic peoples, our hemisphere has already become a battleground of Old World hatreds, ideologies, and propagandas. Many a "post-war plan" is be-

ing promoted. Which of the promoters are proven friends of democracy? Which are crackpots? Which are effective public enemies? To which of the rival claimants shall we give Red Cross relief, military aid, diplomatic recognition? Surely nothing less than a very full disclosure of their records and a very balanced hearing of the claims of rivals can put us on safe ground in answering such questions.

A PROPAGANDA REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE COMMISSION?

It seems very possible that public support for disclosure and balanced discussion could be aroused more fully by a somewhat more impressive administrative structure than the present Foreign Agents Act appears to authorize. In some cases, at least, the power to disclose may be the power to destroy. Even in the case of a highly disreputable or unpopular propagandist, this type of power is not lightly to be bestowed, in a democracy. Nervousness over its possible dangers is likely to persist unless the agency's integrity and prestige are above suspicion. Probably the Foreign Agents Act Administration would command more support if it were a multi-partisan quasi-judicial commission like the Federal Communications Commis-

²⁶ For a discussion of the dangerous consequences see my previous article. Also, Harold D. Lasswell, *Democracy through Public Opinion* (Menasha: Banta, 1941), especially pp. 96-116.

²⁷ A survey of legal institutions affecting this situation: David Riesman, "Democracy and Defamation," *Columbia Law Review*, 42: 727-80 (May 1942).

²⁸ American Civil Liberties Union. *The Bill of Rights in War and Freedom in Wartime* (Annual reports of the Union for the years ending June 1942 and June 1943). New York, 1942, 1943, 80 pp. each.

sion, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Perhaps such a Propaganda Registration and Disclosure Commission could be staffed with men having the prestige (and the long tenure) of Federal judges, as an impressive guarantee of their integrity. Perhaps also it could be given the power to hold public hearings—a power in whose absence the Act, as now written, cannot always be applied very promptly to a “shady” propagandist.

In view of the rising demand, in Congress and among the State governments, for the registration and disclosure of trade associations, trade unions, lobbies, “race-hatred” organizations, and other propaganda agencies,²⁹ it is likely that domestic as well as foreign propaganda agents could eventually be brought under the jurisdiction of a Disclosure Commission.

Of course the disclosure principle is also applicable in other relatively democratic parts of the world. Some of the writer’s colleagues in the Justice Department have already suggested a Hemisphere Propaganda Registration and Disclosure Agency as a means of enabling our twenty-two republics and Canada to avert the disunity which some of the Axis pressure groups, and even the “Free Movements,” may be creating.³⁰

There is hope, therefore, for the future of propaganda disclosure as a public policy. Its coming could be speeded by the promotional activity of genuinely

pro-democratic citizens’ groups, exerting eternal vigilance on behalf of a specific program:

- (1) To secure registration of the facts the public would need in order to exercise informed judgment in supporting or ignoring a given propagandist or propaganda group;
- (2) To see that the relevant facts are made public through each of the major channels of communication (press, political parties, radio, pulpit, movies, school system);
- (3) To secure popular adoption of the principle of balance in discussing these facts.

Especially amid the fog of war and the coming storms of economic hysteria, it would be timely for grass-roots citizens to promote the principles of disclosure and balanced discussion, of candor and clarity—in forums, in unions, in schools, in conventions, on the radio, in the press, in the newsreels—wherever men seek to practise democracy.

²⁹ Space is lacking here for a list of the dozen or more significant proposals of this type that have emerged during the past few years. If possible, the writer will survey these suggestions in a later article.

³⁰ At Montevideo, Uruguay, May 24, 1942, the Inter-American Committee for Political Defense of the Hemisphere approved a proposal requiring all Axis nationals and the organizations they dominate to disclose complete information about their activities. “The step was aimed at stamping out fifth column activity throughout the Americas. . . .” *New York Times*, May 25, 1942, p. 7.

BOOKS IN REVIEW • Edited by Daniel Katz

AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE GREAT DEBATE

By Hans Ernest Fried

NOTHING ILLUMINATES the situation of the United States in this war more strikingly than does the continuous discussion of war aims. First of all, it impressively affirms the fact that the country did not want war. When Americans, from the highest to the lowest are eagerly searching for the best use to make of the approaching victory, there is proof that the United States did not enter, to say nothing of precipitate, the war with any preconceived designs for gains or conquests.

But although the war is a defensive war, it cannot be won and, indeed, can hardly be conducted, without positive, constructive aims which go far beyond the range and impetus of defense.

And yet, paradoxically enough, it is in defensive rather than in offensive war, that the effort culminates in victory; victory, it seems, is the ultimate sign that the defender has prevailed over the aggressor. In a war of conquest, the termination of the fighting is a mere prerequisite for the really essential task—namely, the absorption of the conquered land; similarly, if the war aim is the political or religious conversion of the enemy's population, the end of the battle will again mean for the victor only the beginning of his real task. This fact, in combination with certain peculiarities of the American political scene, makes it possible that the international scene may, after the end of hostilities, suddenly lose much of its fascination,

and thus bad counsel prevail—perhaps almost unnoticed.

The fact that America did not want the war is bound to have implications of transcendent importance. It is an important key to the interpretation of present and future happenings in this country.

One of its results is that American discussion on international post-war problems frequently moves on a lofty plane. Dislike of "theories" cannot prevent the country from mulling over—more than any other belligerent—diverse proposals for the post-war period; and most of them, however good or bad, are the expression of a genuine concern about moral principles and are dictated by genuine belief in the possibility and necessity of general progress. This concern and this belief both strengthen and honor America. But, on the other hand, that very non-existence of previous commitments which makes the loftiness possible and sincere, which gives America seemingly such a wide choice, and which creates in many parts of the world a "reservoir of good will" toward the United States, also creates a lack of steadiness interspersed with violent fits of fear at being "taken in." Thus everything may be undone for lack of what the Latins called the *opinio necessitatis*—the conviction that what I do is necessary.

For these reasons, authors of books and articles on international affairs act under

the heaviest responsibility. Whenever a discussion of world politics leaves the ordinary citizen in a state of bewilderment and frustration, an atmosphere is created propitious for wire-pullers and demagogues. And for these reasons, the considered opinions of the men whose writings on post-war problems have been collected in the symposium *Prefaces to Peace*¹ should be pondered with great respect. All five distinguished authors are intensely aware of the burden of the decisions which the United States will have to make and is, in fact, making even now. All of them start from what they sincerely believe to be the people's hopes for a good and lasting peace. They try to articulate the people's, not the diplomats' aspirations, seeking to combine them with the specific requirements of the professional peace-makers and men of public affairs.

Although the space allotted to the five authors in the symposium differs widely, the reader will be impressed to find virtual consent among all five on some of the most fundamental issues.

(1) They agree that it is possible and necessary to build the peace on the basis of the legitimate aspirations of the peoples.

(2) They are convinced that peace will to a large degree depend on the determination of the United States of America to take an active part in maintaining it. "So long as our cooperation is effectively offered, so long can one hope that peace can and will be maintained" (Welles, 437). "This world demands the full participation of a self-confident America" (Willkie, 148).

(3) They all deny, though with different accents, that the world of 1939 was so good that we should return to it. Should we, asks Mr. Welles with dis-

gust, return "to poverty and want, to social upheaval and economic chaos, to the same gray and empty years of confusion and bitterness, so barren in vision and in human accomplishments, which marked the decades after the termination of the last war?" (419) Mr. Willkie: "A great process has started which no man—certainly not Hitler—can stop. Men and women all over the world are on the march, physically, intellectually and spiritually" (147). "The peoples of the world want to be free not only for their political satisfaction but also for their economic advancement" (135). Mr. Wallace: "The people, in their millennial and revolutionary march toward manifesting here on earth the dignity that is in every human soul, hold as their credo the Four Freedoms. . . . The revolution of the past hundred and fifty years . . . cannot stop until freedom from want has actually been attained" (372).

(4) These American leaders share, indeed, great optimism about the immediate future of this country and the rest of the world, as the reward of an enlightened international policy. The "march of the peoples" of which both Mr. Wallace and Mr. Willkie speak, will, in the words of the former, lead "to an even fuller freedom than the most fortunate peoples of the earth have hitherto enjoyed" (372). And the professionally restrained diplomat, Mr. Welles,

¹ *Prefaces to Peace*, a symposium consisting of the following: "One World," by Wendell L. Willkie; "The Problems of Lasting Peace," by Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson; "The Price of Free World Victory," by Henry A. Wallace; "Blueprint for Peace," by Sumner Welles. Cooperatively published by Simon & Schuster, Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., Columbia University Press. New York, 1943, xii and 437 pp.

exclaims: "There is no limit, then, to the natural prosperity which is within the reach of the United States and of mankind. It is technically possible to produce and to distribute on this planet the basic physical necessities of health and decent living for all of the world's people" (436).

(5) Although the future will be brighter after this war if wise and firm decisions are taken, it will be gloomy indeed if the "dreadful alternatives" are chosen: "We confront the alternative prospect of suffering from a disillusionment . . . which will end inevitably in World War Number Three . . . if not in a collapse sooner . . . or the sinking into a state infinitely more static and regimented than the life of the Middle Ages" (Welles, 402). "A policy of expediency . . . will lose us the invaluable spiritual and practical assets that come from faith of the people of the world in our ideas and our methods" (Willkie, 119).

(6) The authors agree about the vital importance of maintaining close and cordial relations with the other United Nations. "The United Nations must become a common council, not only for the winning of the war but for the future welfare of mankind" (Willkie, 129). The need for a trustful collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union is most strongly affirmed by both Wallace and Willkie. "So let me say once more: I believe it is possible for Russia and America, perhaps the most powerful countries in the world, to work together for the economic welfare and the peace of the world" (Willkie, 78). "The American and Russian people can and will throw their influence on the side of building a new

democracy which will be the hope of all the world" (Wallace, 381).

(7) There is complete agreement about the necessity of general access to raw materials. Welles, enumerating the "basic facts" for sound relations in peacetime, begins with "the universal necessity of access to raw materials" (366-7). Hoover's and Gibson's axioms 16 and 17 are: "All quotas everywhere in the world should be abolished," and "All monopolies and cartels which limit foreign trade should be prohibited by the peace" (303). Welles, asking "What is access?" answers that "the real problem of consumers has always been the means of payment" (435). Hence he goes all the way to ask for "removing discrimination in the treatment of international trade and reducing unwarranted and artificial tariff barriers" (436).

(8) Finally these men, well-versed in political realities, strongly emphasize how important it is to devise workable machinery for peace-making. Welles wishes to distinguish between the problems "which will present themselves as the immediate aftermath of the war and those involved in the creation of a more permanent economic order" (432). Hoover and Gibson advocate that "peacemaking be divided into three stages: (1) That instead of the usual military 'armistice' . . . there should be substituted a 'conditional' peace . . . ; (2) an intermediate period—a breathing spell—for the rebuilding of political life and economic recovery; (3) a further period for settlement of the long-view problems. . . ."

There exist, to be sure, important differences among the authors of this symposium on the world's legitimate aspirations. But the convictions which these men have in common are more funda-

mental than those in which they differ. There is, for example, agreement between Wallace and Hoover about the necessity for continuing the capitalist system. Where the Vice President believes, however, that simply in order "to prevent the sudden and complete destruction of the capitalist system" it will be necessary, after the war, to use "Government investment capital on a very large scale" (396), Mr. Hoover is afraid of "some sort of collectivist world economy" (297).

Hoover and Gibson base their analysis on a philosophy, or rather eschatology, of history. They see in the course of human events, especially in the Western world since 1648, "seven dynamic forces" at work which, they insist, "will continue to shape the world." These are: "ideologies; economic pressures; nationalism; militarism; imperialism; the complexes of fear, hate, and revenge; and the will to peace" (158). The first two forces are at least potentially and the third, fourth, fifth and sixth are always and necessarily dangerous to the seventh, which is the only unconditionally beneficial." Against all the forces which stand for war stands the will to peace." The authors readily admit that "other students may prefer different divisions and different designations for these parts of world anatomy." In fact, the application of this unusual scheme sometimes leads to contradictions. For example, it is said that the victorious Powers will "with military might jointly dominate the world for so long as their interests do not clash. They will need to do so at least during a period for political and economic recuperation" (339). But, in another connection, their basic disbelief in

the use of force leads them to assert that if military expenditures "could be reduced to small dimensions immediately with the end of the war, that alone would ensure the recovery of economic life and civilization" (322).

The main difficulty of the analysis of these two authors is that they do not solve the problem of the relation between determinism through social and psychological forces on the one hand, and personal responsibilities of statesmen and citizens on the other. The explosion of 1914, for example, is largely traced to "the failures of statesmanship in attempting to allay" the dynamic forces, a conclusion which is definitely questioned later on: "It is a matter of speculation whether with more capable or more clear-minded statesmanship, crises could have been allayed." These questions are more than topics for theoretical disquisitions on the metaphysics of history: they will determine the post-war attitude toward the leaders and peoples of the Axis and toward neofascism. The assertion that "great explosions in civilization do not have their origins in single men or a perverse nation" is, in a war against Hitler, loaded with concrete political implications. It is to be hoped that, before the war ends, public opinion in the United Nations will, on the basis of an analysis like this, produce something more substantial than a wavering moralism.

Walter Lippmann's sensationaly popular study on United States foreign policy deliberately refrains from discussing "post-war problems."² His emphasis is rather to advise the people of the United

² Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1943, xvii and 177 pp.

States that, *whatever* their post-war solutions will be, they must never allow themselves to forget what he considers the basic relationship between their "foreign commitments" and "the power to balance them." In two paragraphs which have been widely quoted ever since the book was published he says: "I mean by a *foreign commitment* an obligation outside the continental limits of the United States, which may in the last analysis have to be met by waging war. I mean by *power* the force which is necessary to prevent such a war or to win it if it cannot be prevented" (9).

After having thus defined his concept of "foreign policy" he emphasizes that the U.S. must have "a settled and generally accepted foreign policy"—and this, he maintains, it did not have for nearly fifty years. This settled and generally accepted foreign policy should consist of a nuclear alliance of the three powerful military states, the United States, Great Britain and Russia; after China will have become a powerful state, the alliance should be extended to her. Mr. Lippmann expects Germany and Japan after the war to be no serious match. They are "in their last phase of their last attempt at world empire" and "may never again be great powers of the first magnitude" (145). Hence if the United States were to ally itself with the other big military powers, such an alliance would remove the danger, however remote, of attack from that quarter.

In all great nations, the conduct of foreign policy is, likely, as controversial an issue as in the United States—perhaps even more so. The same holds true likewise for many small nations; and the unrest among small nations should not be underestimated as a source of world-wide repercussions. For

Great Britain, Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin in 1912 (had it not failed) would have led to a complete reversal of her position in world politics. The controversies about the very foundations of the British Empire have never subsided. British-Japanese relations have gone the whole circle from full-fledged alliance to war. In France, the pro-British, pro-Russian and pro-Little Entente currents were constantly competing with each other until, at France's most decisive hour, the pro-German undercurrent revealed its strength. In Soviet Russia, with her supposedly dogmatic outlook on international affairs, enormous changes have taken place between the German-Russian Treaty of Rapallo of 1922 and the British-Russian treaty of 1942. In Germany, the expansionists could never agree amongst themselves; some wanted *Mittel-Europa*, others a Berlin-Bagdad axis, others the annexation of the Ukraine, others the acquisition of colonies. Even *Mein Kampf* followed the trend, then widespread amongst Pan-Germanists, of considering colonial aspirations as stupid. And *Anschluss* was by no means popular with the traditional militarists who were attracted by Polish farmland more than by Vienna's factories.

These well-known facts do not, of course, decrease the validity of Mr. Lippmann's demand for a well-defined and firmly upheld U.S. foreign policy for the post-Hitler period; but they do show that a "settled and generally accepted foreign policy," if it is to live for any length of time, must provide answers to manifold and changing problems. Mr. Lippmann's brilliant formula about the balance (or better-than-balance) between commitments and power is incomplete: it does not give the country,

and it does not give the world, any cue about what the United States would actually do in the thousand and one concrete situations of which the pattern of war and peace is woven. His formula sheds no light on the question of currency agreements, or immigration, or airways, or international systems of social security, or even on questions more traditionally within the orbit of "foreign affairs" such as boundaries, or ruled for the recognition or non-recognition of foreign governments, or decisions about whether federations should be encouraged, etc. Most important of all, this system does not consider a machinery for international collaboration and conciliation, beyond the "nuclear alliance." It gives no hint about what the United States—or, indeed, the big alliance—should do about France, or Spain, or whether and how the alliance should intervene if, to take a theoretical example, war breaks out between two South American countries and spreads over the continent; or if war breaks out between France and Germany and spreads all over Europe, or between Turkey and Greece. The principle of the indivisibility of peace is expressly dismissed.

In other words, there are three paramount points in Mr. Lippmann's argument. The first point is that it would be dangerous and perhaps disastrous for the United States not to have, after the war, a consistent and wise foreign policy (based on considerations of military power). The second is his brilliant plea for an alliance with Great Britain and Russia and, with qualifications, with China. The third point is that the second answers the first; i.e. that alliance would in itself constitute a settled and wise foreign policy.

The last point is open to grave objections. To make an alliance means to commit oneself and the ally or allies to a course of action or, at least, of behavior. The commitment to a course of action or, at least, behavior, *comes first*. The commitment to a course of action or, at least, behavior, is the basic and most indispensable prerequisite for forming an alliance.

Hence we are entitled to an elucidation of the concrete ideas and principles which alone will decide the possibility and strength of such an alliance. But only at the end of the book does Mr. Lippmann make a passing remark to the effect that the consolidation and perpetuation of the nuclear alliance is necessary because it is "to establish and maintain order" and that the "great powers must become the organizers of an order in which the other peoples find that their liberties are recognized by laws that the great powers respect and that all peoples are compelled to observe" (175). What a program in these few lines! To establish and, on top of that, to maintain order (which must, at least, mean to prevent wars and punish warmakers); to organize an order for all the peoples of the globe; and to compel all these nations to behave—this, then, would be the task of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and, in due time, China. One is inclined to quote Mr. Lippmann's warning against exaggerated international commitments. Here it is where his concrete proposal would have to stand the test. But here he declares that "the structure of the order which the nuclear allies could or should institute" is a matter which lies "outside the province of this inquiry" (176).

Mr. Lippmann's approach is well ex-

pressed in the subtitle of his book. With characteristic preciseness, he defines foreign policy as "the shield of the republic." It is certainly significant that so penetrating a thinker as Mr. Lippmann should consider the shield to be the republic's most important bit of equipment. But the best shield is not a complete garment, just as the best fire-extinguisher is no house. The book is a brilliant plea for a close and lasting collaboration between the big four allied powers—with the other elements needed for the formation of a peaceful world and a firm U.S. foreign policy missing.

ROBINSON, T. P. *Radio Network and the Federal Government*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1943.

In March of 1938 the Federal Communications Commission initiated hearings "to determine what special regulations applicable to stations engaged in chain or other broadcasting are required in the public convenience, interest or necessity." In May 1941 it published its report, embodying new regulations which provoked the sharpest controversy in all the troubled history of relations between the Industry and Government.

Radio Networks and the Federal Government offers a critical review of this controversy. Its author contends that many of the FCC regulations were impracticable and that the main purpose of the report (to check monopolistic tendencies in the radio industry) was ill conceived, being based on a false and shortsighted premise regarding the limited "frequencies" available for use in domestic radio. He believes that it is technically possible to accomplish "the very thing that the FCC is inclined to

maintain is impossible, namely, making available for commercial network broadcasting a greater supply of frequencies in the present standard band," and devotes an interesting chapter to explaining how this can be done. The author believes in competitive radio by networks and local stations, accepts the necessity for revenue secured through advertising, while admitting the need for some form of regulatory control.

The organization of the book is on the conventional lines of a doctoral dissertation and, as a book, suffers accordingly. It covers too much ground, touches, all too superficially, on a vast range of subjects (the chapter on censorship and free speech is particularly weak) and leaves aspects of the main problem, implicit in the title, all but untouched. For those unfamiliar with the complexities of radio's organization, however, it offers valuable and informative chapters on "Networks and advertising," "Artists' contracts," "Transcriptions," "Exclusivity," and "Option time." Arm-chair critics of commercial radio will profit by reading and pondering these chapters showing the practical difficulties, in management and operation, which confront those who have made of radio broadcasting one of the most complex and significant of modern industries.

The author makes out a good case in arguing that in its 1941 report the FCC was perhaps too much preoccupied with the nightmare of monopoly to observe the consequences of its regulations to the smooth-working operation of radio as an essential social service. Many friends of the present Federal Communications Commission regretted the ground it chose for a "show down" with the industry and, more particularly, the

timing of its great offensive. But no fair-minded observer questioned the growing urgency for a testing of its powers and responsibilities, the need for action on the side of government before the radio industry became too strongly entrenched to be any longer subject to control, or the absolute integrity of the commissioners in their efforts to safeguard the true interests of the listening public.

On this last point the author does less than justice to the present Commission. He suggests, by implication, that its shortcomings in action are partly due to its being tarred with the same brush as previous and less worthy Commissions. "The FCC can be fairly charged with political bias and favoritism *in the past*. [*Italics mine*] . . . It is difficult for the Commission to escape this inheritance and, even though an entirely new leaf has been turned, such a background is not reassuring." It is true that the regulations "were discussed and weighed in an atmosphere of acrimony" and it may be true that they were "adopted in haste." But only those with a political axe to grind would try to smear the Commission by allusion to doubtful practices on the part of its predecessors.

An honest attempt was made to put radio's house in order. That it failed was due more to circumstances over which the Commission had no control than to any inherent defects in the regulations which were promulgated, inadequate and even ill-conceived as some of these may have been. Two such circumstantial considerations must be cited. To the first the author properly draws attention. The regulatory powers of the FCC have never been defined other than with vague reference to "the

public convenience, interest or necessity." What powers and responsibilities this equivocal term was supposed to embrace the law makers never attempted to explain. Indeed a hilarious irresponsibility seems to have affected their deliberations, as one of them, quoted in Chapter 9, discloses with reference to another section of the Act under which the FCC was set up. "I do not wish to undertake," says Senator White, "to say precisely what we meant by Section 303 (i)."¹ The FCC's 1941 report, whatever its defects, did constitute a challenge to the law makers and to the courts to tell the Commission exactly where it stood. And the challenge was in fact taken up by the law makers, as witness the various bills since drafted to redefine the powers and status of the Commission.

Unfortunately, a second circumstance intervened to prevent full discussion of these bills in Congress and in the limelight of public interest and press publicity. War broke out. Congress became engrossed in more urgent matters, and public interest, notoriously lethargic at the best of times, was distracted for the duration. But for this fact the indirect consequences of the FCC report might have made history. Congress and public alike might have been forced to realize that for nearly twenty years radio, as an industry and as a powerful influence on society, has been virtually unregulated except on its purely technical side. Control by public opinion, as even the most ardent advocates of the "democratic process" must admit, is wholly inadequate in a field of action fraught with such potential dangers to the true interests of Society. It was not, for instance, public opinion alone which gave us a "Pure Foods and Drugs Act." A democracy looks to its *leaders* to safe-

guard its interests, and in the field of radio the people have been poorly served by their representatives.

Of this truth the author is plainly aware, though in concentrating on the shortcomings of the FCC he fails to disclose the continuing inadequacy and irresponsibility of Congress. The FCC continues to be the victim of politics, as witness the scandal of the Cox Committee of enquiry to which certain editors have had the courage to draw public attention. Radio, Robinson rightly claims, stands in need of a new Bill of Rights. "When the war is over radio broadcasting will stand on the threshold of a dynamic future. Only through opening our minds and exploring the challenge of this expanding science can the possibilities of that future be fulfilled." But it is primarily of its scientific future—of the scope offered by new invention for solving the dilemma of restricted frequencies and similar technical problems—that he thinks and writes. His contribution on this side is stimulating and encouraging. But to those concerned with the social implications of the use and control of radio he offers little that is new and does little to allay anxiety and fear. With reference to such matters he belongs to the *laissez faire* school, and his analysis lacks penetration and social vision.

In addition, the inclusion of chapters not strictly germane to his main theme seems to have crowded out of the picture one important aspect of the problem of relationship between networks and the federal government to which the war has given heightened significance. Even before the war the major networks had pioneered in the international field of radio. Both NBC and CBS were broadcasting to foreign countries.

Wartime developments have necessitated a rapid expansion of shortwave transmission to South America, to Europe, and to the Near and Far East. For the time being, these transmissions are limited to wartime propaganda and are under government control. What will happen when peace comes? What limitations on the use of international broadcasting for commercial advertising will be necessary, and what interest will government still wish to retain in radio as an aerial ambassador of good will? On this important subject the author is silent.

CHARLES SIEPMANN

NEWCOMB, T. M. *Personality and Social Change*. New York: Dryden Press, 1943.

Absolutely essential to the growth of the psychology of public opinion, from a mere record of unrelated testing and polling results to the stature of a set of ordered principles, is research in the etiology of attitudes. Dr. Newcomb's book represents an important addition to this central area.

The conclusions which his study reaches are the more important in that they flow from a long and careful record of changes in attitude—not simply of statistically measured attitude-distributions—and that they were made possible only by the accessory use of richly dynamic material descriptive of the personality traits and developments of his subjects. No less significant to the conclusions was a successful intention to understand these subjects in lively functional relation to the college community in which they underwent change and development.

The fundamental variable which was measured repeatedly in these students

over the years of the research is that of the liberal-conservative dimension of their orientation toward timely social issues, as shown by attitude questionnaires of familiar form. As in most other colleges, though here (at Bennington College) to a more striking degree, students become on the average more and more liberal between freshman and senior years. And that this is tantamount to an acceptance of the community's ways of thought is evidenced by the fact that students rate the community itself, leaders in it, and the faculty of the college all as agreeing upon liberal values and according these values prestige.

Examination of individual students shows, however, that around this trend there are clearly deviant individuals; and when these subjects' personality data are considered, certain large explanatory generalizations emerge. Fundamental to the problem of whether the individual accepts or fails to accept the modes of thought of his community appear to be two personality variables: awareness of the trends of thought which in fact inhere in the community and of one's own position relative to them, and the degree to which one wishes and is able to attain a cooperative role in the community structure. The operation of the latter variable is seen in the tendency of those who seek and find roles of leadership and prestige to become, in attitude, almost "more typical of the community than the community itself"; just as, conversely, those who come for any reason to renounce a role of cooperation show concomitantly a rejection of the community's cherished attitudes. Further variations are introduced by the fact that some sense exceptionally keenly the nature of the community

which they reject or accept; others less so, even to the point of strong misconception—so that even when they consciously reject what seems a community attitude, they may in fact adopt it.

The major conclusion of the study—that the degree to which the individual interiorizes the attitudes in his community is inextricably bound up with, and of the same nature as, his general role-seeking and relation-finding in society—is not only amply demonstrated by the study, but carries implications for all other studies in opinion formation. It makes it appear likely not only that attitude formation and change cannot be understood without prior understanding of personality patterns, but that the personality patterns must further be understood in strong relation to equally various social communities. Thus are excluded such absolutistic hypotheses as that "radicalism goes with a neurotically asocial personality," or that "conservatism is the consequence of strong parental ties." Neurotic traits and parental ties are important in the genesis of attitudes; but what they produce by way of attitudes is utterly ambiguous unless we can see their possessors trying to come to terms with some describable social environment. That the prediction of attitude is possible when, and only when, certain aspects of personality *and* of the surrounding culture are known, is precisely the broad thesis.

A not unimportant further implication is one which Dr. Newcomb but briefly and subordinately treats: that the attitudes whose genesis may thus be explained can be of such generality as, in turn, to make predictable many specific opinions and orientations. Not only were his tests of attitude extensive in the range of their component issues, but on

at least one occasion he was able to demonstrate consistently liberal or conservative reactions to a new and relatively unexpected situation—specific attitudes toward which were not already existent in the community. Dr. Newcomb's understandable reluctance, in a highly self-critical report, to invite the unjustifiable charge of entertaining absolute standards of "liberalism" and "conservatism" should not prevent appreciation of the consistency of the broad attitudes which he dealt with.

Finally, it may seem that to have demonstrated that the interiorization of attitudes is so much a matter of learning-to-conform makes the genesis of public opinions a dismayingly irrational matter in a world where reason is so much to be desired. But Dr. Newcomb's concept of conformity is not so simple: it is the whole intricate process not alone of becoming, but of learning how to become, a cooperative member of society. The book affords regrettably little space for the protocol case material upon which its argument rests. But even in what is presented, there is ample material to suggest an entire subordinate study—that of tracing not simply the interiorization of final attitudes but the adoption, too, of methods of thought and of inspection of events—the precise point of impact between education and public opinion.

DWIGHT W. CHAPMAN
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CHILD, IRWIN L. *Italian or American? The Second Generation in Conflict.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943, 208 pp.

The explicit aim of the author of this study is "to contribute toward the de-

velopment of systematic knowledge" of "certain general processes which the social scientist designates as 'acculturation.'" Soon after one begins to read the book, it becomes apparent that Dr. Child thought he could best implement existing facts and theories on the subject (hitherto gathered principally by sociologists and anthropologists) through "the psychological approach," the application of "a number of generalizations about learning and motivation."

The objective is commendable. So is the size of the job Child cut out for himself. For a year and a half he "engaged in social interaction" (as he modestly describes it) with the male inhabitants of New Haven's Little Italy, the objects of his study.

Whatever his difficulties of interpersonal relations, Dr. Child's observations were systematically reported, accurate insofar as the reviewer's own impressionistic contacts with the targets of the study can be used as a standard, and in notable instances amazingly intimate. (There are some errors but of varying minor significance; e.g., Italian cuisine is not less but more expensive in the United States than American food, nor have the traditional dances of the South Italians disappeared in this country, while as a matter of fact they have virtually died out in Italy.) For this reason it may be worth while to recount and appraise his methodological procedure.

Four methods of investigation are employed—participant observation, life-history interviews, informal interviews, and standardized interviews.

In an introductory chapter, the author states his own methodological evaluation: "The standardized interview," he says, "proved the most generally useful

to this study." Despite Dr. Child's preference for this method (which appears to be based mainly on its ease of application), it turns up very little in the way of unusual data about Italian-Americans. In question after question in the interview (such as, "How do you think of yourself, as an Italian, as an American, or as an Italian-American?") the thought comes to mind: What would have been the response to this query if the interviewer were patently an Italian-American himself?

In the estimate of the reviewer, the method which unearthed the data that makes the publication of this book worth while is participant observation. The findings from this method are incorporated in Chapters II and III, "The Social Situation" and "Psychological Significance," which alone of all the chapters contain information either unstated or unemphasized in the academic literature on the psychological environment of Italian-Americans.

In this portion of the book, the author describes the differences between American and South Italian culture as they appeared in the course of his participant observations. Reported observations in the sections on the family, sex, and aggression in this chapter are very good. It is in this general sector of the book, too, that the author displays the greatest proportion of personal insights (especially into American culture) which are scattered through the study. To take an example of one of the best:

"A very high value indeed is placed upon a girl's coming to marriage as a virgin. This double standard has an important effect upon the sexual behavior of the men. If he accepts the mores of the group, a young man must not make sexual advances to

women whom he respects or whose families he respects; that is, he must not make sexual advances to the sort of women he is encouraged to feel affection for or to consider as a possible wife. . . . There is a tendency to regard bad women as the primary means of sexual gratification and to regard the good women as primarily serving other functions, even though they be married to the individuals concerned. The family appears to be somewhat more of an economic and status institution, and somewhat less of a sexual institution, than is generally true in America. Of course, the same tendencies are very much present in American culture, but there they are in conflict with certain of the romantic love ideals which are directed toward focusing sexual and other interests on the same individual."

Undoubtedly what contributed greatly to the success of the participant method in this case were the very real feelings of friendliness the author had toward his subjects as a nationality. Part of the reason for his choice of Italians as a study group was his belief that "they would be among the more hospitable and communicative of the minority groups." Besides, Dr. Child "tried to make known in unobtrusive ways the favorableness of his own attitude toward Italians." Being thus *simpatico*, "he was generally regarded (while using the participant standpoint) simply as a participant and very rarely in any way as an observer."

The sequential use of the participant and formal interview methods, proves to be a highly interesting and rewarding procedure. A lengthy period of applying the first method enabled Dr. Child to find and formulate questions on sensi-

tive scores. Afterwards these questions were embodied in the formal questionnaire. The standardized interview was thus extended over a larger and presumably different group of individuals. It would be worth while to practise this plan more often in similar studies.

It should be clear from illustrations already stated that the investigator's observations and insights could not have been so well recorded by a person not trained in the social sciences and, in particular, psychology. In his case a general social science background added a welcome contribution to understanding. But where the author goes astray most regretfully is in his efforts to apply his formal psychological hypotheses systematically and in his attempts to categorize the reactions of Italian-Americans through an analogistic psychology.

In his conscious application of a formal psychology, the author makes a precise statement of four extremely elementary behaviorist principles. But the propositions are so rudimentary as to be "common sense." The avoidance-learning principle, for instance: when an individual in a specific situation is punished, he will tend in the future to avoid similar situations and those acts which led him into the situation. There seems to be little merit to bringing these rules in, since they are not employed as a foundation for the author's more complex hypotheses and serve merely to introduce distracting material.

Incorporating the Hovland-Sears experiment on the types of reaction to motor conflict as a basis for analogy is more of the same fault. That study, since its principal components were a board, a stylus, red and green lights, and some training, largely involved simple ego conflict. On the other hand,

acculturative difficulties of second-generation Americans, as the researcher admirably succeeds in demonstrating, run the gamut of emotional tensions. The analogical terms used are not only inapplicable but completely unnecessary logically to vindicate the author's choice of a typology of response. It would have sufficed to state that in their resolution of the acculturative conflict (1) some individuals made marked attempts to dissociate themselves from Italian culture, (2) others showed tendencies to accept Italian culture, (3) some made efforts to suppress the realities of serious cultural differences, while (4) still others exhibited mixed tendencies. Analogy to motor conflict adds little light. Instead of discourses on introductory psychological propositions or analogies, more time could have been spent on either the psychological causes for these types of reactions (e.g., externalized vs. internalized personalities) or the sociological causes (e.g., residence on the peripheries of the Italian community). Had this been done, it would not have been so hard to find concrete suggestions leading out of this research for the concluding chapter.

Or time might have been better consumed in weighing the importance of the various cultural disparities so well delineated in the earlier part of the book. There is one notable instance of such an evaluation, which also exemplifies the author's proficiency in uncovering difficult-to-obtain information on cultural differences by the participant method.

"Italian culture demands that the unmarried adult living with his parents should turn over his pay to them; American culture normally grants to such a person much greater control

over his earnings. The individual cannot conform to both of these customs; the fact that a sort of compromise may sometimes be made does not negate their basic incompatibility. . . . Adherence to the Italian trait here is a good symbol of adherence to Italian culture in general and, specifically, to the solidarity of the Italian family. Immigrant parents sometimes feel that if this custom were not adhered to, the family would no longer be a family. Because of cultural differences in notions of what money should be spent for, moreover, many Italian parents are not willing to give back to their children much of their wages. The son is consequently frustrated in his effort to act like other American youths."

It is something of a puzzle whether *Italian or American?* was designed for social scientists or for laymen. The opening chapter on objectives and methods, the formally applied psychology and the systematic style tend in one direction, whereas an over-explanatoriness, elimination of possibly significant obscurities in interview responses, and a careful concealment of all statistical data point the opposite way. Perhaps the growth of the book from a doctoral dissertation accounts for the difficulty.

In conclusion, it can be said that the book deserves to be praised for its systematic accuracy in locating generally overlooked areas of cultural difference, skill in describing the psychological impact of these differences, methodological suggestiveness, and for its flashes of insight. A balance-sheet would leave the recommendation: If one wishes to read a single book to help him most clearly understand the acculturative difficulties

confronting second-generation Americans (and specifically the Italian variety), this is the book.

SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA

Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service

FRIED, HANS ERNEST. *The Guilt of the German Army*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942, 417 pp.

Although this book was published some months ago, to the extent that it poses questions on the relationship of the German Army and the National Socialistic government in Germany it is of current interest, especially as the question becomes more immediate and less academic.

The author's thesis is that National Socialism is the most recent manifestation of German militarism and as such represents a fusion of the older Prussian form of militarism and the demagoguery of National Socialism. The "guilt of the German Army" lies in the fact that it deliberately fostered the growth of National Socialism for its own ends and purposes.

"When the First World War was over, the German militarists took stock. They saw in Germany a feeble regime with traitors and opportunists and cowards in many places; with labor stubbornly fighting in its own ranks; with the foreign powers disunited. Still they did not deceive themselves. Just as they calculated the strategy and number of tanks and bombers necessary to give their future assaults on foreign countries a great chance of victory, they decided that they needed nothing less than the destruction of that Germany. Weak and undisciplined as the Republic was, they required this because in order to have their way, they had to change the politi-

cal climate, the vocabulary, the thinking habits of an era.

"The very fact that this has been an age of prevailing pacifism accounts for the militarist's need of a fascist political movement. Had the popular mood been different they could have arisen as a nakedly militarist movement, finding spontaneous mass support."

The German military aided and abetted the development of National Socialism because, unwilling to accept the reality of defeat in 1918, they were themselves politically bankrupt. In the first chapters of the book, the author examines the psychological mood of the German people as a whole, and of the militarists in particular—the mood which made possible the development of the idea of the "unreality of defeat."

The concept that "wars are senseless" and its corollary that wars have no victors, only victims—widely accepted by pacifists within, as well as outside Germany after the last war—proved to be advantageous to the militarists. It helped to spread the notion that the war was "without significance," to create a mood of cynicism and disillusion within Germany. Thus the doctrine of the "unreality of defeat," held by influential militarists, by constant reiteration gained popular credence.

"The most influential part of the military based their personal and political attitude on the notion that the defeat of Germany had not 'really' taken place, and since the *political* reconstruction of Europe after 1918 was only a consequence of the unreal defeat, it, too, was unreal. Therefore, everything that followed the loss of the war, such as the abdication of the Emperor, the limitation of the German armed forces—all this

was, in some higher sense, 'unreal,' a falsification of history. . . ."

From this doctrine emerged the theory of the "stab in the back" as an explanation at once of Germany's defeat and of the unreality of her defeat. Germany lost the war, not because the army was beaten, but because traitors on the home front cracked. Since the "real nation"—that is to say, the front-line soldiers and the non-traitors on the home front—was not beaten, Germany really was not defeated, and events after 1918 were simply a "falsification of history."

It was also this doctrine which enabled influential militarists to betray the Republic, notwithstanding the fact, as the author demonstrates, that they were well served by the Republic. They abandoned their former tradition of non-participation in politics for a policy of political action—but outside the framework of the Republic, not within it. Thus the participation of influential militarists in the Kapp affair of 1920 and in Hitler's abortive Beer-Hall Putsch of 1923. The failure of these attempts demonstrated the political bankruptcy of the militarists. Accordingly the decision was made to support the National Socialist Movement as providing the political acumen which the military lacked. The National Socialists, in turn, needed the support of the military to succeed in their intended seizure of power.

It is regrettable that the book does not fulfill the promise of its first chapters. Although it contains much exceedingly interesting material (notably the chapters on the economic position of the officer class during the Republic, and that on the impact of the "shock-troop" psychology on German life), the author fails to clarify sufficiently the relationship of the German army to the Nazi

government. For example, he adds little to previous knowledge about the "blood purge" of 1934, and adduces Hindenburg's telegram of congratulation to Göring as evidence that the Army desired the purge. Nor does the fact that Nazism has taken over the trappings of German militarism, and is in fact primarily a militaristic movement—not a new interpretation in any case—throw much light on the actual relationship of the armed forces to the Hitler government. This is not to deny that the relationship is a close one. Rather it is to

point out that the author does not explain the role of the German army in Nazi Germany. He emphasizes the part played by certain officers and the significance of militarism in the Third Reich. But only by inference does he answer the question: "Does Hitler rule the generals, or do they rule Hitler?"

Notwithstanding, this is an important book. It is recommended reading for anyone who thinks that the defeat of Adolf Hitler *per se* will mark the beginning of a new era.

HEDVIG YLVISAKER

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

This section contains a compilation, topically arranged, of poll results released by the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO), by *Fortune* (For.), by the British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO), by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO), by the Australian Public Opinion Poll (APOP), by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), and by the Office of Public Opinion Research (OPOR).

Questions recorded below cover the period from September through November 1943. Date lines after each question indicate the date of release and not necessarily the date on which questions were asked. In considering these poll data, the reader should bear in mind certain salient points of reference set forth on pages 75 and 76 of the March 1940 issue of the *QUARTERLY*.

For their cooperation in making these survey results available in convenient form to other students of public opinion, the *QUARTERLY* wishes to express its appreciation to George Gallup and the American, Canadian, British, and Swedish Institutes of Public Opinion, to the Australian Public Opinion Poll, to the Editors

of *Fortune* and Elmo Roper, to Harry H. Field of the National Opinion Research Center, and to Hadley Cantril of the Office of Public Opinion Research. For the compilation of these results the *QUARTERLY* wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Hermine Hall.

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Part One: Domestic Issues

1. POLITICAL

THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION

Asked of Republican voters:

Which one of these men would you prefer as the Republican candidate for President next year? (Sept. 18, '43—AIPO)

Dewey	35%
Willkie	29

MacArthur	15
Bricker	8
Taft	6
Stassen	4
Saltonstall	2
Warren	

By region:

	New England	Middle Atlantic	East Central	West Central	South	Mountain	Pacific Coast
Dewey	33%	45%	32%	34%	27%	29%	29%
Willkie	41	30	20	28	38	35	34
MacArthur	13	14	16	16	21	19	14
Bricker	2	3	19	5	5	6	3
Taft	1	5	9	7	6	5	4
Stassen	*	1	4	9	1	5	5
Saltonstall	10	1	*	1	1	1	1
Warren	*	1	*	*	1	*	10

* Less than 1 per cent

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

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Which one of these men would you prefer as the Republican candidate for President next year? (Oct. 24, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Today</i>	<i>Last Month</i>
Dewey	32%	35%
Willkie	28	29

MacArthur	19	15
Bricker	8	8
Stassen	6	4
Taft	5	6
Warren	1	1
Saltonstall	1	2

Sectional standings of the four most popular candidates are as follows:

	<i>Dewey</i>	<i>Willkie</i>	<i>MacArthur</i>	<i>Bricker</i>
New England	30%	40%	15%	2%
Middle Atlantic	41	29	17	4
East Central	30	18	19	19
West Central	30	26	20	5
South	24	35	26	5
Mountain	26	33	22	6
Pacific Coast	25	32	17	4

Asked of Republican voters in Missouri:

Which one of these men would you prefer as the Republican candidate for President next year? (Oct. 20, '43—AIPO)

Dewey	28%
MacArthur	26
Willkie	25
Taft	7
Bricker	7
Stassen	5
Warren	1
Saltonstall	1

Should it narrow down to a race between Willkie and Dewey, supporters of the following candidates would vote as follows:

	<i>Willkie</i>	<i>Dewey</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
MacArthur	24%	56%	20%
Bricker	17	69	14
Stassen	38	50	12
Following of all three men (MacArthur, Bricker, Stassen) divided	26	57	17

By section:

New England & Mid-Atlantic	40	52	8
East Central	23	69	8
West Central	32	57	11
Southern	45	36	19
Far West	42	48	10

Asked of Republican voters:

If you had to choose between Dewey and Willkie for the presidential nomination of the Republican party, which would you prefer? (Nov. 14, '43—AIPO)

<i>Willkie</i>	<i>Dewey</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
35%	55%	10%

Republican voters in the ten states with the highest Republican vote were asked to name their choice for their party's candidate for the Presidency. (Sept. 17, '43—AIPO)

	<i>Dewey</i>	<i>Willkie</i>	<i>M'Arthur</i>	<i>Taft</i>	<i>Bricker</i>	<i>Saltonstall</i>	<i>Stassen</i>	<i>Warren</i>
New York	51%	29%	11%	3%	2%	2%	1%	1%
Pennsylvania	39	30	16	7	5	1	1	1
Illinois	39	20	20	10	6	*	5	*
Ohio	16	14	12	9	47	*	2	*
California	27	35	14	4	3	1	3	13
New Jersey	43	30	14	8	3	1	1	*
Michigan	46	21	16	5	8	1	3	*
Indiana	30	30	13	11	12	*	4	*
Massachusetts	29	45	9	*	1	16	*	*
Missouri	32	27	23	7	5	1	4	1

* Less than 1 per cent

Do you think Mr. Willkie would be good at handling problems which will come up after the war concerning our relations with other nations? (Oct. 31, '43—AIPO)

	Yes	No	No opinion
National	53%	24%	23%
Republican	62	22	16
Democratic	46	28	26

Do you think Mr. Willkie could handle big problems like unemployment better than Roosevelt, as well as Roosevelt, or not so well? (Oct. 31, '43—AIPO)

	National	Republican	Democratic
Better than FDR	16%	30%	5%
As well as FDR	30	36	24
Not so well as FDR	41	23	58
No opinion	13	11	13

We would like to find out what things people like and dislike about Wendell Willkie. What do you, yourself, like most about him? Now what would you say you like least about him? (Oct. 31, '43—AIPO)

Best Liked Qualities

Sincerity
Frankness
Ability
Aggressiveness
Winning personality
Open-mindedness
Progressiveness
Knowledge and interest in world affairs
Wholehearted interest in America

Least Liked Qualities

Too changeable
Talks too much
Too much like Roosevelt
Too cocksure
Lacks political experience

THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION

Asked of Democratic voters:

Which one of these men would you prefer as the Democratic candidate for President next year? (Oct. 22, '43—AIPO)

	Today	Last May
Roosevelt	84%	79%
Wallace	5	8

Farley	4	5
Byrd	3	*
Byrnes	2	1
McNutt	2	4
Douglas	*	2
Winant	*	1

* Less than 1 per cent

TRIAL HEATS FOR THE PRESIDENCY

If the Presidential election were being held TODAY, and Roosevelt were running for President on the Democratic ticket against MacArthur on the Republican ticket, how do you think you would vote? (Sept. 20, '43—AIPO)

	Roosevelt	MacArthur
Total	58%	42%
<i>By section:</i>		
New England	60	40
Middle Atlantic	60	40
East Central	54	46
West Central	49	51
South	69	31
Rocky Mountain	51	49
Pacific Coast	60	40

By income:

Upper Income	50	50
Middle	55	45
Lower	62	38

By age:

21-29	71	29
30-49	59	41
50 and over	51	49

Farmers:

All farmers	44	56
Farmers outside the South	42	58

MacArthur's relative strength against Roosevelt as compared with Willkie's and Dewey's can be seen from the following:

	Roosevelt	Willkie
Total	59%	41%
<i>Farmers outside the South</i>		
	48	52
<i>Roosevelt Dewey</i>		
Total	55%	45%

Voters were asked to state their choice if presented with Henry A. Wallace as Democratic candidate for the Presidency against Thomas E. Dewey as Republican candidate. (Sept. 27, '43—AIPO)

Dewey	60%
Wallace	40
Dewey	45
Roosevelt	55

If the war is still on by election time next November, which of these eight men would you choose for President? (Nov. '43—For.)

Roosevelt	51.5%
Dewey	12.0
Willkie	9.8
MacArthur	8.3
Bricker	3.4
Wallace	1.0
Byrnes	1.0
Douglas	.4
None	2.5
Don't know	10.1

If the war is over by election time next November, which would you choose? (Nov. '43—For.)

Economic Level

	Total	High	Upper middle	Lower middle	Low	Negro
Roosevelt	22.1%	11.2%	13.2%	21.8%	27.2%	43.5%
Dewey	16.3	17.2	21.9	17.0	12.9	5.2
Willkie	15.7	25.4	22.7	13.7	9.2	15.0
MacArthur	13.3	9.0	9.6	14.9	17.8	7.6
Bricker	4.3	8.5	6.4	4.2	2.3	1.4
Wallace	2.6	1.9	2.0	3.4	2.5	1.6
Byrnes	2.3	5.2	2.9	2.7	.6	.2
Douglas	1.1	1.4	1.3	.9	1.5	.2
None	3.6	3.0	4.6	3.6	3.8	.9
Don't know	18.7	17.2	15.4	17.8	22.2	24.4

If the war is still on by election time next November, which of these eight men would be your second choice for President? (Nov. '43—For.)

Those whose first choice was Roosevelt

	All the people	Those whose first choice was Roosevelt
Willkie	16.3%	21.3%
MacArthur	16.2	20.1
Dewey	13.9	10.0
The five others and "none"	30.6	29.8
Don't know	23.0	18.8

PARTY PREFERENCE FOR 1944

Leaving the question of candidates aside, if the Presidential election were being held today, which party would you vote for—the Democratic or the Republican? (Oct. 17, '43—AIPO)

	Democratic	Republican
Total	54%	46%

By section:

New England	51	49
Middle Atlantic	52	48
East Central	49	51
West Central	46	54
South	76	24
Rocky Mountain	55	45
Pacific Coast	53	47

Looking ahead to the next Presidential term, that is, from 1944 through 1948, what do you think will be the greatest problem facing this country? Which party will be best able to deal with this problem—the Republican or the Democratic? (Oct. 3, '43—AIPO)

<i>The issues in order of importance</i>		<i>The party best able to deal with them</i>
1. Post-war employment and economic readjustment	58%	Republicans and Democrats about equal (American soldiers favor Democrats)
2. Problem of drawing up a lasting peace	13	Democratic
3. Post-war financial problems of government, taxation, national debt, etc.	11	Republican
4. Post-war food problems	6	Democratic
5. Labor problem, regulating unions, dealing with strikes	4	Republican
6. Centralized government, bureaucracy, invasion of states rights	3	

LOWER VOTING AGE

Congress may be called upon to consider a constitutional amendment to allow persons 18, 19, and 20 years old to vote in elections. Would you like to have your Congressman vote for or against this proposal? (Sept. 6, '43—AIPO)

	For	Against	Undecided
June 1939	17%	79%	4%
January 1943	39	52	9
April 1943	42	52	6
Today	52	42	6

By section:

New England & Middle Atlantic	53	41	6
East Central	50	45	5

West Central	50	45	5
South	52	40	8
Far West	53	40	7

By states:

New York	55	40	5
Pennsylvania	53	40	7
Illinois	48	47	5
Ohio	51	43	6
California	52	42	6
Michigan	52	44	4
Massachusetts	47	46	7
New Jersey	58	36	6
Missouri	48	47	5
Indiana	49	44	7

2. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

LABOR

In some plants, workers are paid on a piece-work basis, that is, they are paid for what they actually turn out, and not on an hourly or daily basis. Would you favor or oppose putting such a plan into operation in all war plants in this country? (Nov. 13, '43—AIPO)

	Total	Employed persons only
Favor	54%	46%
Oppose	33	42
Undecided	13	12

People who:

- (1) are not now engaged in essential war jobs;
- (2) are in favor of having Congress pass a national service act;
- (3) think they would be called if such an act were passed

were asked whether they would be willing to take a specific job in a war plant far away from home. (Sample job cited by field reporters was a job running a machine at \$40 for a 48-hour week in a city 200 miles away.) (Oct. 10, '43—AIPO)

Number willing to take a war job

Total	2,500,000
-------	-----------

By section:

New England	50,000
Mid-Atlantic	330,000
East Central	450,000
West Central	430,000
South	1,000,000
Rocky Mountain	70,000
Pacific Coast	170,000

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

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Do you think there is a shortage of workers in war plants in this country? (Oct. 16, '43—AIPO)

	Total	Areas suffering acute shortage
Yes	36%	46%
No	42	43
Undecided	22	11

Do you think the wages now being paid in industries producing war materials will continue to be as high when these same industries produce peace-time goods? (Nov. 10, '43—AIPO)

Yes	9%
No	85
No opinion	6

What do you think the average weekly wage will be for these same workers after the war?

\$30 a week, 40% decrease

Asked of 500 American soldiers in and around London:

Do you have a definite job ready for you when you return after the war? (Sept. 29, '43—BIPO)

Yes	62%
No	27
Plan to continue schooling	3
Don't know	8

Asked of those who said they had no definite job in mind:

Do you think it will be hard to find a job?

Yes, it will be hard	24%
No, it will not be hard	56
Undecided	20

Which way do you think there will be more jobs after the war—if the Republicans are in power in Washington, or if the Democrats are? (Sept. 29, '43—BIPO)

More jobs with Republicans in power 11%

More jobs with Democrats in power 45
Makes no difference 23
Undecided 21

Do you feel that as a whole the people in charge of factories—the *executives*—are doing all they could do right now to help win the war? How about the *workers* in the factories? How about the *leaders of labor unions*? (Sept. '43—NORC)

Percentage who think they are doing all they can*

	Executives	Factory workers	Labor leaders
March '42	69%	64%	31%
June '42	80	81	47
July '42	74	72	37
Aug. '42	72	68	37
Dec. '42	75	73	41
June '43	75	71	29

* Excluding "No Opinion"

PROHIBITION

Asked of 500 American soldiers in and around London:

If the question of national prohibition in the United States should come up again, would you vote wet or dry? (Oct. 9, '43—BIPO)

Would vote wet	85%
Would vote dry	9
Undecided	6

If the question of national prohibition should come up again, would you vote wet or dry? (Aug. 30, '43—AIPO)

	Dry	Wet
February 1942	36%	64%
September 1942	38	62
December 1942	36	64
Today	34	66
Men	27	73
Women	41	59

RATIONING AND SHORTAGES

Aside from food, what things that you need very much right now for your home or family would you buy if you could get them? (Oct. 29, '43—AIPO)

Number of families needing them

Tires and tubes	2,700,000
Stockings (silk or nylon)	2,300,000
Refrigerators (electric or gas)	2,100,000

(About 400,000 more need parts or repairs)

*Number of families
needing them*

Automobiles	2,000,000	(About 200,000 more need parts or repairs)
Washing machines	2,000,000	(About 300,000 more need parts or repairs)
Electric irons	2,000,000	(About 300,000 more need parts or repairs)
Shoes	1,900,000	
"Bobby pins," hair pins	1,900,000	
Stoves (coal, gas, or electric)	1,600,000	(About 200,000 more need parts or repairs)
Kitchen utensils (aluminum pans, pressure cookers, tea kettles, cof- fee pots, etc.)	1,400,000	
Elastic articles (garters, girdles, suspenders, etc.)	1,300,000	
Radios	1,100,000	(About 500,000 more need parts or repairs)

Do you think there is a serious rubber shortage in this country now? (Oct. '43—NORC)

	December '42		Today	
	6-gallon area	16-gallon area	6-gallon area	16-gallon area
Yes	74%	67%	61%	55%
No	16	23	26	31
No opinion	10	10	13	14

Do you think that gasoline rationing is the best way to save tires? (Oct. '43—NORC)

	December '42		Today	
	6-gallon area	16-gallon area	6-gallon area	16-gallon area
Yes	84%	82%	80%	81%
No	11	14	15	15
No opinion	5	4	5	4

Do you think that gasoline rationing throughout the nation is necessary? (Oct. '43—NORC)

	December '42		Today	
	6-gallon area	16-gallon area	6-gallon area	16-gallon area
Yes	79%	67%	74%	62%
No	14	26	18	30
No opinion	7	7	8	8

FINANCES

If the government decides to raise taxes, which would you prefer—that the extra amount be raised by a national sales tax on everything people buy, or that the extra amount be raised by increasing everybody's income taxes? (Nov. 3, '43—AIPO)

	Prefer national sales tax	Prefer increasing income tax	No opinion
Total	53%	34%	13%
Vote of income-tax payers	57	31	12
<i>By occupation:</i>			
Prof. and businessmen	61	30	9
White-collar workers	57	31	12
Skilled workers	55	32	13
Other labor	46	37	17
Farmers	53	37	10

If the government needs to increase taxes, which would you personally prefer? (Nov. '43—FOR.)

	Total	High	Economic Level		
			Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Low
To increase the withholding tax on your salary	33.0%	25.1%	34.3%	34.4%	34.5%
To put sales taxes on all things you buy	52.3	66.7	57.7	52.6	43.6
Don't know	14.7	8.2	8.0	13.0	21.9

War bond purchases. (Oct. 12, '43—AIPO)

12,000,000	families bought extra bonds and stamps during the war bond drive in September
18,500,000	families altogether bought war bonds and stamps in September
7,000,000	families own no bonds or stamps
6,500,000	families have only stamps

By section:

New England & Middle-Atlantic	12%	88%
East Central	15	85
West Central	18	82
South	32	68
Mountain States & Pacific Coast	15	85

Percent owning
no bonds or stamps

Percent owning
bonds or stamps

By education:

Grade school	27	73
High school	9	91
College	6	94

Are you now able to buy or do things that you could not afford a year ago? (Nov. 5, '43—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total	29%	71%

By age:

21-29 years	43	57
30-49	30	70
50 years and over	19	81

By occupation:

Prof. and businessmen	23	77
White collar	31	69
Skilled labor	30	70
Other labor	31	69
Farmers	30	70

Democrats
Republicans

1 out of 4
3 out of 10

Best able to define the term, from a percentage point of view, are professional and business people, including teachers, small shopkeepers, etc. About half among these can give a satisfactory definition.

CURRENT DOMESTIC WORRIES

If you could sit down and talk with the Congressman from your district before he returns to Washington, what questions would you like to ask him about problems here in the United States? (Sept. 3, '43—AIPO)

Chief worries in order of importance:

1. High cost of living
2. Gasoline rationing
3. Post-war problems (particularly post-war employment)
4. The draft (particularly drafting of fathers)
5. Labor disputes
6. Government bureaucracy

FREE ENTERPRISE

Will you tell me in your own words what you understand by the term "free enterprise"? (Nov. 6, '43—AIPO)

Number who can give
correct definition

Women	1 out of 4
Unskilled workers	1 out of 6

People were asked what problems they would like to talk over with their Congressmen, if given the opportunity. (Oct. 30, '43—AIPO)

Chief worries of the nation in order of importance:

1. Post-war employment
2. High cost of living
3. Rationing
4. Taxation
5. The draft

In general, do you think the government has gone too far or not far enough in asking people to make sacrifices for the war? (Sept. 11, '43—AIPO)

Too far	8%
Not far enough	44
About right	40
Undecided	8

Have you had to make any real sacrifices?

Yes	31%
No	69

	Too far	Not far enough	About right	Undecided
By income:				
Upper	7%	55%	30%	8%
Middle	7	48	40	5
Lower	8	39	44	9

VEGETARIANS

Some people in the United States are vegetarians, that is, people who eat no fish, fowl or meat of any kind. Do you happen to be a vegetarian? (Oct. 2, '43—AIPO)

Adults, excluding members of armed forces, who claim to be vegetarians 2,800,000

3. ATTITUDES OF BUSINESS LEADERS

(Based on FORTUNE Management Poll)

PREDICTION OF POST-WAR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

It seems likely that immediately after the war there will be a mixed condition of economic expansion and contraction, depending on the area and the industry. Granted a period of two years for this condition, do you think we will eventually go into: (Oct. '43—For.)

	All business	Your business
A general boom	70.3%	66.7%
A general slump	17.6	18.6
Don't know	12.1	14.7

Allowing for a period of reconversion, do you believe reasonably full employment after the war can be maintained by private business?

Yes	73.7%
No	22.4
Don't know	3.9

If we have a depression after the war, what do you think is likely to be the reaction of the American public? (Oct. '43—For.)

Demand for relief from government	72.4%
Rapid growth of a political labor party	41.1
Attitude of grin and bear it	29.4
Rioting and disorder	12.4
Rise of a new type of leader in the tradition of Huey Long, Father Coughlin, et al.	11.8

Increase in Socialist or Communist vote

All other	6.9
	10.5
	184.5%*

* People giving more than one answer account for totals, here and elsewhere, that come to more than 100 per cent.

In the event of a new depression what one or several of these means would you advocate to alleviate it? (Oct. '43—For.)

Economy by government departments	77.3%
Lower corporate taxes	61.9
A cooperative credit and employment effort on the part of business	53.6
A huge public-works program	27.1
A spread-the-work program	24.1
Liberalization of consumer credit	17.8
Liberalization of bank credit	15.2
Government subsidies to business	3.4
Greater government regulation of business	1.3
Devaluation of the dollar	1.3
Other	13.2
	296.2%

POST-WAR COMPETITION AND OPPORTUNITY

Do you think that, as compared with 1939, business in the U.S. after the war needs: (Oct. '43—FOR.)

About the same amount of competition within business	76.2%
More competition	19.2
Less competition	4.6

In your own business field, do you think after the war it would be a good thing if there were: (Oct. '43—FOR.)

About the same number of competitors as now	74.5%
More competitors	11.6
Fewer competitors	13.9

After the war, do you believe that small manufacturers will have: (Oct. '43—FOR.)

	<i>All management</i>	<i>Manufacturing</i>
About the same opportunity	45.1%	46.1%
Less opportunity	31.8	31.8
More opportunity	23.1	22.1

GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS

After the war, do you think business will have: (Oct. '43—FOR.)

Less freedom than in 1939	63.4%
About the same	23.0
More freedom than in 1939	13.6

Do you believe that legislation requiring compulsory patent licensing: (Oct. '43—FOR.)

	<i>All management</i>	<i>Manufacturing</i>
Would hurt the U.S. economy	31.2%	37.3%
Would benefit the U.S. economy	27.8	28.8
Don't know	41.0	33.9

After the war, do you think price ceilings in general should be: (Oct. '43—FOR.)

Abolished immediately in the interests of a free economy	51.8%
--	-------

Maintained until adequate consumer stocks are built up	46.9
Don't know	1.3

FINANCES

A reduction in which of the following elements in the tax structure would in your opinion do the most to stimulate business expansion after the war? (Oct. '43—FOR.)

Excess profits	81.5%
Corporate income	78.7
Personal income	65.6
Capital gains	58.1
Inheritance	32.5
Real estate	32.5
Excise taxes	28.9

377.8%

With which of these two statements are you more nearly in agreement? (Oct. '43—FOR.)

There is no difference between government and private debt. In both cases, current budgets should be balanced as soon as possible; otherwise ruin follows 86.2%

Provided we have an expanding national income, it is not necessary to fear the expansion of government debt in the way that we fear an unbalanced private or business budget. 13.8

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Which one of these statements comes closest to what you would like to see us do when the war is over? (Oct. '43—FOR.)

	<i>Management Poll</i>	<i>FORTUNE Survey June, 1943</i>
Take an active part in some sort of international organization with a court and police force strong enough to enforce its decisions	70.6%	56.6%
Try to keep the world at peace but make no definite agreements with other countries	23.0	25.2
Stay on our side of the oceans and have as little as possible to do with Europe and Asia	5.1	13.0
Don't know	1.3	5.2

After the war, would you in general favor: (Oct. '43—FOR.)

	<i>For the sake of all business</i>		<i>For the sake of your business</i>	
Lowered tariffs	39.3%	} 54.8% for re- vision down- ward	27.9%	} 46.8% for revision downward
A policy of free trade	15.5		18.9	
Continuance of present U.S. tariff structures	38.5		43.7	
Increased tariffs	6.7		9.5	

SOCIAL SECURITY

Do you think a "cradle-to-the-grave" program of minimum security for all in the U.S. is:
(Oct. '43—FOR.)

Impossible and undesirable	44.0%	} 59.2% undesirable
Economically possible but undesirable	15.2	
Desirable but impossible	21.0	} 40.8 desirable
Economically possible and desirable	19.8	

4. IN CANADA

POLITICS

In the recent Ontario election, about a third of the voters in that province voted for the C.C.F. party. What is your own personal opinion as to why these people voted for this party rather than for the Liberals or Progressive-Conservatives? (Sept. 15, '43—C.I.P.O.)

Negative answers

Tired of promises of the other (old) parties	20%	} 53%
Voters wanted a change	17	
Protest vote	5	
To give a new party a chance	4	
Because it's something new	2	
A vote against the Liberals	2	
Protest against wartime restrictions	1	
Other negative answers	2	

Positive answers

Will get more from the C.C.F.—better government	5	} 22%
More work and more money for working man	5	
It is labor's party	4	
Because of C.C.F. policies	3	
It was the best party	2	
It was the party of the average man	1	
Other positive answers	2	

Miscellaneous

World conditions and general unrest	3	} 25%
Other miscellaneous	4	
No opinion	18	

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

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Results of successive polls on the popular strength of political parties in Canada. (Sept. 29, '43—C.I.P.O.)

	<i>Lib.</i>	<i>Pro-Cons.</i>	<i>C.C.F.</i>	<i>Bloc Pop.</i>	<i>Others</i>
1940	55%	31%	8%	•	6%
Jan. '42	55	30	10	•	5
Sept. '42	39	23	21	•	17
Dec. '42	36	24	23	•	17
Feb. '43	32	27	23	7	11
May '43	36	28	21	10	5
June '43	35	31	21	8	5
TODAY	28	28	29	9	6

• Not polled as a separate party.

	<i>Lib.</i>	<i>Pro-Cons.</i>	<i>C.C.F.</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>New Dem.</i>
Ontario only	26%	40%	32%	2%	
West only	23	23	41	2	2%

Which political party, if elected, do you think would treat labor, farmers, white-collar workers, businessmen, and industrial leaders best? (Oct. 9, '43—C.I.P.O.)

	<i>Progressive-Conservative</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>C.C.F.</i>
Farmers	23%	25%	25%
Labor	11	17	42
White-collar	24	26	19
Businessmen and industrial leaders	44	21	5

Some people say the present government has not been as fair to labor in handling wages and taxes as it has been to farmers, office workers, and other groups. Do you agree or disagree? (Oct. 23, '43—C.I.P.O.)

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Total	25%	52%	23%
Union	34	43	23
Others	23	54	23

It has been suggested that voting requirements be changed to allow persons 18, 19, and 20 years old to vote in elections. Would you approve or disapprove if this were done? (Nov. 10, '43—C.I.P.O.)

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Total:			
Canada	37%	56%	7%
U.S.A.	52	42	6

The 25% who agreed with the proposition were asked in what way they thought the government was being unfair.

	<i>24%</i>
Laborers' wages not high enough, etc.	24%
Farmers given too much favoritism	16
Government clamps down on unions	12
Taxes too high on labor	12
Cost of living bonus not equitable	8
Capital given too much favoritism	4
Wages frozen lower than salaries	4
Miscellaneous	12
Undecided, or no answer	8

100%

By politics:

Liberal	36	59	5
C.C.F.	42	54	4
Pro-Cons.	30	65	5

By age:

21-29 years	43	49	8
30-49	38	56	6
Over 50	34	59	7

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

After the war would you like to see many changes or reforms made in Canada, or would you rather the country remain pretty much as it was before the war? (Oct. 1, '43—CIPO)

	Canada	Britain	U.S.A.
Reform	71%	57%	32%
No reform	23	34	58
Undecided	6	9	10

It has been suggested that a course in sex education be given to students in high schools. Do you approve or disapprove of this plan? (Sept. 1, '43—CIPO)

Approve	76%
Disapprove	15
Undecided	9

By income:	Approval
Upper	83%
Middle	80
Lower	72

By education:

College	84
High school	81
Public school	70

By age:

21-29	85
30-49	76
50 and over	73

Same question asked in the United States by AIPO in June '43.

Approve	68%
Disapprove	16
No opinion	16

Some people say we should do away altogether with capital punishment—that is, executing a person for murder. Do you agree or disagree? (Oct. 6, '43—CIPO)

Agree	18%
Disagree	73
Undecided	9

Have you heard of the regulation which makes it illegal for you to borrow or lend any rationed goods? (Oct. 27, '43—CIPO)

Yes: 75% No: 25%

Asked of 75% who said they had heard of it:

Do you approve or disapprove of this regulation?

	Approve	Disapprove	Undecided
Total	45%	51%	4%
Men	49	47	4
Women	41	54	5

Asked of national cross-section, excluding farmers:

There is a price and wage ceiling law to keep Canadian prices from going higher and also to keep wages and salaries from going higher. In general, do you approve or disapprove of this law? (Sept. 25, '43—CIPO)

	February, 1943	Today
Approve	80%	69%
Disapprove	14	20
Undecided	6	11

Canadian vote excluding Quebec

	February, 1943	Today
Approve	82%	77%
Disapprove	13	16
Undecided	5	7

If you had a choice, where would you personally live after the war—in a city, town, village, or in the country? (Nov. 3, '43—CIPO)

	Poll replies	Census
City	30%	38%
Town or village	34	34
Farm	34	28
Undecided	2	—

Those who wanted to live in a city or town were asked whether they personally preferred to live in a duplex, an apartment, or a separate house.

Separate homes	82%
Apartments	10
Duplexes	5
Undecided	3

Do you think car owners should be free to decide whether or not to carry insurance to pay for damages or injuries they may cause, or should they be forced to carry such insurance? (Aug. 28, '43—CIPO)

	<i>Forced to insure</i>	<i>Free to decide</i>	<i>Unde- cided</i>	Would you favor or oppose a law to prohibit the sale of all alcoholic beverages (including wine and beer) in Canada? (Aug. 30, '43— CIPO)		
Total	75%	21%	4%			
Car owners	75	22	3		<i>Dry</i>	<i>Wet</i>
Non-car owners	76	20	4	Men	18%	82%
Upper income	87	11	2	Women	33	67
Middle income	78	19	3			
Lower income	72	24	4			

5. IN AUSTRALIA

POLITICS

If a Federal election were held today, which party would you like to win? (June '43—APOP)

Of the 92% who made a selection:

- 38% would like Labor to win
- 35% favor U.A.P. or C.P.
- 3% select Communist, and
- 24% name other parties

Of those who had voted for Labor in 1940:

- 69% would like Labor to win again
- 6% favor Communists
- 4% would change to U.A.P.-C.P.
- 4% prefer Servicemen's
- 3% favor Independents, and
- 1% is for Douglas Credit

Of those who had voted U.A.P. or C.P. in 1940:

- 69% would like U.A.P.-C.P. to win again
- 18% select "One Parliament"
- 5% would change to Labor
- 4% prefer Servicemen's, and
- 4% favor Independents

After distributing second preferences of those who gave first preferences to minor parties, the results show that:

- 81% of both Labor and U.A.P.-C.P. voters in 1940 have not changed sides
- 7% of both groups have changed sides
- 12% of both groups would now give their first and second preferences to minor parties and Independents, or are undecided

If a Federal election were held today, which party would you like to win? (July '43—APOP)

- Would like Labor to win 51%
- Favor U.A.P. or C.P. 49

Each person was also asked how he had voted at the last Commonwealth election in 1940.

83% of both Labor and U.A.P.-C.P. voters in 1940 would have voted for the same parties again last week

9% of each group would have changed sides
8% of each group would have had difficulty in deciding whether to vote the same way or not

Of those who had voted for Labor in 1940:

- 70% would like Labor to win again
- 14% select "One Parliament"
- 5% favor Communists
- 4% would change to U.A.P.-C.P.
- 4% prefer Servicemen's
- 2% favor Independents, and
- 1% is for Middle Class Party

Of those who had voted U.A.P. or Country Party in 1940:

- 62% would like U.A.P.-C.P. to win again
- 19% select "One Parliament"
- 6% prefer Servicemen's
- 5% would change to Labor
- 5% would favor Independents
- 3% are for Middle Class Party

People were asked to choose the statement closest to their usual attitude at election time. (June '43—APOP)

1. I always vote Labor if the man is right.
2. I may change from Labor if another man is exceptional.
3. Independent candidates are my choice.
4. I may change from U.A.P. (or C.P.) if another man is exceptional.
5. I always vote U.A.P. (or C.P.) if the man is right.

Labor supporters:

- Always 33%
- Usually 14
- 47%

U.A.P.-C.P. supporters:

Always	26
Usually	15

Speaking generally, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the present Government is directing our war effort? (April '43—APOP)

	41		Feb. '42	June '42	Now
People preferring Independents	6				
Those "Not interested in politics"	6	Satisfied	56%	66%	58%
		Dissatisfied	28	20	33
	100%	Undecided	16	14	9

RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS

Do you think price control has been reasonably successful or not? (April '43—APOP)

Yes, it has been successful	43%
No, it has not	47
Undecided	10

After the war, should the Government own and operate more factories than at present—or do you prefer private ownership? (April '43—APOP)

	<i>Prefer private ownership</i>	<i>Favor Gov. factories</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Total	56%	33%	11%
<i>By occupation:</i>			
Owners, managers & professional	75	16	9
Farm owners	62	24	14
White collar	59	31	10
Skilled & semi-skilled workers	46	44	10
Unskilled workers	39	44	17
Farm hands	35	48	17

People who would like more factories to be owned and operated by the Government were also asked: Which factories in particular?

All factories	12%
Heavy industries, steel engineering	6
Those making essentials	5
Textiles	3
Munitions	3
Monopolies	2
Food factories	2

During the war, should the coal mines be operated by the Government—or should the owners be left in charge? (July '43—APOP)

By Government	62%
By owners	24
Undecided	10
No answer	4

After the war, do you think the coal mines should be owned and operated by the Government—or by the present owners?

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Labor voters</i>	<i>Non-Labor people</i>
By owners	46%	49%	33%	61%
By Government	37	41	49	26
Undecided	13	10	18	13
No answer	4			

Do you favor private or Government ownership of the trading banks? (July '43—APOP)

	<i>Gov. ownership</i>	<i>Private ownership</i>	<i>No answer or no opinion</i>
Total	41%	39%	20%
Artisans	50	28	22
Better-off people	32	54	14

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

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If you ran the Government, what would you do about stoppages at the coal mines? (April '43—APOP)

Answers showed that:	Total	Labor voters	U.A.P.-C.P. voters
Blame miners	53%	42%	65%
Favor miners' cause	9	12	6
Blame miners and owners, or system	20	26	14
Offer no suggestion	18	20	15

EMPLOYMENT

If service men receive preference for jobs after the war, should it be permanent, or for only a few years after discharge—or do you oppose any preference? (June '43—APOP)

Favor permanent preference	47%
Preference for limited period only	28
Oppose any preference	17
Undecided	8

Favor preference	Men	Women	U.A.P.-C.P. voters	Labor voters
Permanently	43%	52%	50%	44%
Few years only	31	23	30	26
Oppose any preference	20	15	13	22
Undecided	6	10	7	8

If service men receive preference for jobs after the war, should all service men receive the same preference, or should some have preference before others? (July '43—APOP)

Dec. '41	51	36	13
June '42	44	46	10
Oct. '42	48	47	5
May '43	64	29	7

Same preference for all 54%

Some before others:

Those on active service	16%
Volunteers, AIF	9
Disabled soldiers	2
According to circumstances	5

32

No answer, because opposed to any preference 14

Do you think that, in normal times, equal pay for men and women would greatly reduce women's desire for marriage and a family—or would it make no difference? (July '43—APOP)

Greatly reduce	45%
Slightly reduce	18
Would make no difference	34
No opinion	3

By politics:

Labor Party	55	36	9
Non-Labor	74	—	—

Do you favor or oppose compulsory insurance of all classes against unemployment and sickness? (June '43—APOP)

More than 80% said "Yes"

Should it be financed entirely by taxes, or partly by everyone's making weekly contributions?

Favor insurance, with contributions	62%
Favor insurance, financed entirely by taxes	15
Favor insurance, undecided on method of finance	7
Oppose compulsory insurance	11
Undecided or no answer	5

SOCIAL SECURITY

Regarding war saving, would you favor or oppose a compulsory saving plan? (June '43—APOP)

Compel saving	Don't compel	Undecided
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Trend:

Sept. '41	55%	27%	18%
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By politics:

Favor insurance		
With contributions	58%	67%
Non-contribution	17	12
Others favoring	8	6
Oppose insurance	12	10
Undecided	5	5

MISCELLANEOUS

Would you favor or oppose qualified teachers explaining sex matters and venereal disease to boys and girls? (June '43—APOP)

Favor	83%
Oppose	12
Undecided	5

Asked of those who favored sex instruction by qualified teachers:

At what age do you think children should be given their first lessons in sex matters?

Under 12 years	16%
12 years	25

Would you favor or oppose a law requiring trade unions to take secret ballots before declaring strikes? (June '43—APOP)

	Total	Labor Party supporters	Non-Labor people
Favor law for secret ballots	78%	76%	82%
Oppose such a law	11	14	7
Undecided	5	5	5
No answer	6	5	6

Which of the wartime restrictions do you consider least necessary? (July '43—APOP)

<i>Least Necessary Restriction</i>		
Brownout (since lifted)	31%	
Rationing of butter	7%	
Rationing of food	6	
Rationing of clothes, etc.	5	18
Petrol rationing	2	
Travel and transport	4	
	6	
Restrictions on sports (racing, etc.)	4	
Restrictions on building	3	
Beer and tobacco shortages	1	
Manpower control	1	
Other restrictions	6	
No answer or "all necessary"	30	
	100%	

13 years	11
14 years	24
Over 14 years	11
No answer	13

Are there any things not rationed, which you think should be rationed by coupons? (July '43—APOP)

	Beer	Tobacco	Food
Men	19%	26%	7%
Women	17	15	11

In general:

55%	oppose any more rationing
45%	favor more rationing

After the war which restriction would you like lifted first? (July '43—APOP)

Food	18%
Clothes, etc.	18
Petrol	10
Travel	5
Building	4
Manpower	3
Sport	2
Beer and tobacco	1
Others (incl. brownout)	20
No answer	19

Do you object to day baking, if it means that bread baked yesterday is delivered today? (April '43—APOP)

Don't object	64%
Do object	28
Undecided	8

Part Two: The War

1. IN THE UNITED STATES

DURATION

How much longer do you think the war with Germany will last? With Japan? (Oct. 6, '43—AIPO)

Length of War with Germany

August Poll Today

In 1943	8%	12%
First half 1944	31	28
Last half 1944	34	38
In 1945	18	11
Later than 1945	5	4
Unwilling to guess	4	7

Length of War with Japan

August Poll Today

In 1943	1%	1%
First half 1944	6	7
Last half 1944	17	20
In 1945	36	40
Later than 1945	35	25
Unwilling to guess	5	7

THE DRAFT

If our Army needs more men, which one of these two groups do you think should be chosen first—

(1) Single men and married men without children, even if highly skilled workers in essential war industries, OR

(2) *Fathers* who are *not* employed in essential war industries. (Sept. 16, '43—OPOR)

Group (1)	53%
Group (2)	39
No opinion	8

If the army needs more men, whom do you think should be drafted first—single men who are employed in essential war industries, or fathers who are NOT employed in essential war industries? (Sept. 15, '43—AIPO)

Favor drafting single men in war industries before drafting fathers	68%
Favor drafting fathers	24
Undecided	8

The Army can either draft 300,000 single women, aged 21-35, for the WACS for non-fighting jobs, or it can draft the same number of married men with families for the same work. Which plan would you favor? (Sept. 10, '43—AIPO)

Think single women should be drafted	81%
Think married men with families should be drafted	13
Undecided	6

By sex:

Women	84%
Men	78

Favor drafting single women

The Army can either draft 300,000 single women, aged 21-35, for the WACS for non-fighting jobs, or it can draft the same number of married men with families for the same work. Which plan would you favor? (Oct. 23, '43—AIPO)

	Total	Single Women	Married Men	All Women
Think single women should be drafted	73%	72%	70%	77%
Think married men with families should be drafted	19	23	21	16
No opinion	8	5	9	7

LEND-LEASE

Do you think we are getting *anything at all* in return for the supplies and war materials we are sending England? (Aug. '43—NORC)

Yes	54%
No	28
Don't know	18

Asked of 54% answering "Yes" to above:

What are we getting?

Cooperation, help in winning, fighting on our side, change in policy, friendship, protection, men (Intangible)	35.1%
Materials (civilian and military), food, tanks, planes, clothing and housing for our men over there, feeding our men, manufacturing plants, hospitals, Lend-Lease in Reverse (Tangible)	13.5
Naval bases, forts, island bases (Tangible)	2.2
Air bases (Tangible)	1.1
Money (Tangible)	1.1
Ships and shipping (Tangible)	0.5
Patents, experience, designs, training our men (Tangible)	0.5
Canada, lease on land bases (Tangible)	0.5
Reciprocal trade (Intangible)	•
Don't know	3.2
	<hr/> 61.5%

Asked of the 54% answering "Yes" to the above:

Do you think this is *enough* to get in repayment for what we're sending England, or do you think we should get something more?

Enough	30%
Something more	15
Qualified answer	2
Don't know	5
Not ascertainable	2

Asked of the 15% who thought we should get something more:

What more do you think we should get?

Money (Tangible)	5.4%
Naval and air bases (Tangible)	1.8
Materials (civilian and military), food, tanks, planes, clothing and housing for our men over there, feeding our men, manufacturing plants, hospitals, Lend-Lease in Reverse (Tangible)	1.4
Land and colonies (Tangible)	1.1
Help now, help in continuing to fight, help in winning the war (Intangible)	1.1
Cooperation after the war, loyalty, our place at the peace conference, credit and recognition for our part in the war (Intangible)	0.8
Trade Concessions (Intangible)	0.6
Payment of First World War debt (Tangible)	0.5
Canada (Tangible)	•
Other. Should pay cost or a just return, they should share with us what they have, we should have Great Britain (Tangible)	3.9
Don't know	0.9
	<hr/> 17.5%

Asked of the 28% answering "No" and the 18% answering "Don't Know" to the first question:

Do you think the United States *should* expect to get anything in return for what we're sending to England?

Yes	34%
No	7
Qualified answer	1
Don't know	3
Not ascertainable	1
	<hr/> 46%

Asked of the 34% answering "Yes" to the above:

What do you think we should get?

35.1%	Money (Tangible)	12.9%
13.5	Materials (civilian and military) food, tanks, planes, clothing and housing for our men over there, feeding our men, manufacturing plants, hospitals, Lend-Lease in Reverse (Tangible)	6.1
2.2	Land and colonies (Tangible)	2.0
1.1	Help now, help in continuing to fight, help in winning the war (Intangible)	1.7
1.1	Cooperation after the war, loyalty, our place at the peace conference, credit and recognition for our part in the war (Intangible)	1.4
0.5	Naval and air bases (Tangible)	1.4
0.5	Trade concessions (Intangible)	1.0
0.5	Canada (Tangible)	1.0
•	Payment of First World War debt (Tangible)	0.7
3.1	Other. Should pay cost or a just return, they should share with us what they have, we should have Great Britain (Tangible)	7.5
61.5%	Don't know	3.7
		<hr/> 39.4%

As far as you know, have we received any war materials and supplies from England in return for our lend-lease help? (Sept. 16, '43 —OPOR)

Yes, we have	25%
No, we haven't	40
Don't know	35

ATTITUDE TOWARD ENEMY PEOPLES

Which country is the greatest military threat to the United States—Germany or Japan? (Sept. 16, '43—OPOR)

Germany	25%
Japan	57
Both	12
Don't know	6

Which of the following statements comes closest to describing how you feel, on the whole, about the people who live in Germany (Japan)?

- The German (Japanese) people will always want to go to war to make themselves as powerful as possible.
- The German (Japanese) people may not like war, but they have shown that they are too easily led into war by powerful leaders.
- The German (Japanese) people do not like war. If they could have the same chance as people in other countries, they would become good citizens of the world. (Aug. '43—NORC)*

	<i>Always want war</i>	<i>Too easily led</i>	<i>Do not like war</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
Germany				
Total	22%	46%	32% = 100%	3%
By age:				
21-39	18	51	31	2
40 and over	25	41	34	3
By education:				
Some or completed college	25	52	23	1
Some or completed high school	19	48	33	2
Grammar-school graduate or less	23	40	37	5

* Percentages exclude "No opinion."

	<i>Always want war</i>	<i>Too easily led</i>	<i>Do not like war</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
<i>By section:</i>				
New England & Mid-Atlantic	19	47	34	2
Midwest	18	48	34	2
Mountain & Pacific States	21	43	36	†
South	30	43	27	6
<i>Trend:</i>				
February 1942	23	32	45	7
September 1942	25	39	36	7
June 1943	22	46	32	3
Japan				
Total	62	27	11 = 100	7
<i>By education:</i>				
Some or completed college	53	34	13	6
Some or completed high school	62	26	12	4
Grammar-school graduate or less	66	23	11	11
<i>By section:</i>				
New England & Mid-Atlantic	59	29	12	6
Midwest	65	24	11	6
Mountain & Pacific States	63	22	15	4
South	60	30	10	11
<i>Trend:</i>				
February 1942	48	31	21	14
September 1942	58	26	16	13
June 1943	62	27	11	7

† Less than 0.5%.

WAR EFFORT

Do you think the United States is doing all it possibly can to win the war? (Aug. 12, '43—OPOR)

Yes	73%
No	23
No opinion	4

Do you think the British are doing all they possibly can to win the war? (Oct. 14, '43—OPOR)

Yes	68%
No	17
No opinion	15

Apart from home problems, how about the job President Roosevelt has done on running the rest of the war—would you rate it good, only fair, or poor? (Nov. '43—FOR.)

	<i>This Survey</i>	<i>June</i>
Good	74.5%	70.4%
Only fair	16.9	21.2
Poor	3.5	4.1
Don't know	5.1	4.3

On the whole, do you rate the job President Roosevelt has done on home problems connected with the war as good, only fair, or poor? (Nov. '43—FOR.)

	<i>This Survey</i>	<i>June</i>
Good	55.6%	56.2%
Only fair	29.8	30.8
Poor	10.8	11.1
Don't know	3.8	1.9

Which if any of the groups on this list would you say has done a really good job of handling its end of the war effort? Which if any would you say has not done a good job? (Nov. '43—FOR.)

	<i>Good</i>	<i>Not good</i>
Farmers	53.0%	2.6%
Newspapers	34.4	5.6
Industry management	31.6	6.4
Office of War Information	18.8	10.1
Congress	17.0	20.8
Labor unions	7.4	50.7
All	7.8	.8
None	2.0	12.8
Don't know	9.5	21.1

How do you feel about the State Department, Office of Price Administration, War Labor Board, War Production Board—do you rate the job they have done as good, medium, or poor? (Separate question asked for each organization.) (Nov. '43—FOR.)

	State	OPA	WLB	WPB
Good	42.7%	29.4%	38.6%	62.6%
Medium	18.8	24.0	18.2	11.3
Poor	9.9	30.8	16.5	5.0
Don't know	28.6	15.8	26.7	21.1

Asked of those who answered "medium" or "poor" to above:

Who if anyone do you feel is to blame for each of these departments not having done what you would call a good job?

	State	OPA	WLB	WPB
Don't know	40.2%	37.0%	41.4%	43.1%
Roosevelt	18.7	11.6	17.2	15.3
Officials, dept. heads	7.6	16.1	8.8	8.3
Administration	3.6	4.1	4.6	3.4
Persons named	4.7	2.1	3.7	2.5
	(Hull)	(Henderson)	(Unions)	(Nelson)
Others	23.9	45.2	21.1	25.0

Which of these statements do you think is closer to the truth? England is now fighting mainly to preserve democracy against the spread of dictatorship; OR England is now fighting mainly to keep her power and wealth? (Aug. 12, '43—OPOR)

Preserve democracy	30%
Power and wealth	35
Both	23
No opinion	12

DANGERS AT HOME

In a recent speech, Vice President Wallace said there was a group of dangerous native fascists in this country. Do you feel this is true or not? (Nov. '43—FOR.)

Yes	45.9%
No	24.4
Don't know	29.7

Are there any prominent individuals in this country who you feel might be harmful to the future of the country unless they are curbed? (Nov. '43—FOR.)

By selected occupations

	Total	Professional men	Salaried executives	Farm hands	Negroes
Yes	52.4%	80.4%	79.3%	35.3%	23.1%
No	24.9	12.6	16.0	19.3	33.3
Don't know	22.7	7.0	4.7	45.4	43.6

The 52.4% who answered "Yes" to the above, named the following:

By selected occupations

	Total	Salaried executives	Factory labor	Other urban labor
John L. Lewis	70.6%	76.6%	60.2%	56.1%
Roosevelt	5.5	10.9	4.7	5.9
Wallace	5.4	9.8	2.1	3.4
Bridges	3.3	2.7	4.2	1.7
Wheeler	3.0	4.3	2.6	3.8
Mrs. Roosevelt	2.8	4.3	2.1	1.7

Willkie	2.3	1.6	1.0	3.4
Lindbergh	2.2	1.6	3.1	3.8
Hamilton Fish	1.9	3.8	.5	2.1
Harry Hopkins	1.8	4.3	.5	.4
Col. McCormick	1.6	2.2	1.6	2.5
Others	19.2	27.7	18.3	22.7
Don't know	8.9	1.1	15.7	12.7

Are there any organizations or groups of people in this country you feel might be harmful to the future of the country unless they are curbed? (Nov. '43—FOR.)

Yes	58.5%
No	21.8
Don't know	19.7

The 58.5% who answered "Yes" named the following groups:

Labor unions, leaders, labor	36.6%	} 53.0%
C.I.O.	13.4	
A.F. of L.	2.2	
Coal miners	.8	

Communists	16.2
German Bunds, Nazi organizations	15.0
Negroes	8.6
Jews	7.7
K.K.K.	5.2
Jehovah's Witnesses	5.0
Japs	5.1
America Firsters	2.4
Fascists	2.2
Isolationists	2.0
Others	25.8
Don't know	10.7
	<hr/> 158.9%

Are there any groups of people you think are trying to get ahead at the expense of people like you? (Nov. '43—FOR.)

By selected occupations

	Total	Professional men	Salaried executives	Factory workers
Yes	32.8%	44.9%	43.5%	35.6%
No	34.4	36.4	37.8	34.0
Don't know	32.8	18.7	18.7	30.4

The 32.8% who answered "Yes" to above identified the groups trying to get ahead at their expense.

By selected occupations

	Total	Salaried executives	Factory workers
Jews	21.5%	19.4%	33.8%
Big businessmen, capitalists, the rich	16.0	10.2	19.2
Labor groups	9.1	21.4	6.9
Politicians	5.6	5.1	3.8
Others	33.1	33.7	32.3
Don't know	19.6	15.3	13.8

2. IN CANADA

Canadians were asked how much longer they thought the war with Germany and Japan would last. (Sept. '43—C.I.P.O.)

Germany	19 months
Japan	27 months

Do you think Canada is doing all she can to help win the war? (Oct. 13, '43—C.I.P.O.)

	Aug. 1942	Today
Yes	54%	71%

No	41	21
Undecided	5	8

French-speaking Canadians:

Yes	89	84
No	8	9
Undecided	3	7

English-speaking Canadians:

Yes	44	67
No	50	26
Undecided	6	7

Part Three: Post-War Prospects

1. IN THE UNITED STATES

POST-WAR MILITARY ALLIANCES

After the war should the United States and Great Britain make a permanent military alliance, that is, agree to come to each other's defense immediately if the other is attacked at any future time? (Sept. 8, '43—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
Total	61%	25%	14%

By politics:

Republicans	57	29	14
Democrats	67	19	14

By section:

New England & Middle Atlantic	60	27	13
East Central	58	27	15
West Central	60	26	14
South	72	11	17
Far West	59	27	14

By politics:

Republicans	36	43	21
Democrats	45	31	24

BRITISH ALLIANCE:

By section:

New England & Middle Atlantic	60	27	13
East Central	58	27	15
West Central	60	26	14
South	72	11	17
Far West	59	27	14

By politics:

Republicans	57	29	14
Democrats	67	19	14

After the war, should the United States and Russia make a permanent military alliance, that is, agree to come to each other's defense immediately if the other is attacked at any future time? (Sept. 12, '43—AIPO)

Yes	39%
No	37
Undecided	24

After the war should the United States and China make a permanent military alliance, that is, agree to come to each other's defense immediately if the other is attacked at any future time? (Oct. 8, '43—AIPO)

Alliance with
China Britain Russia

Yes	56%	61%	39%
No	23	25	37
Undecided	21	14	24

By politics:

Republicans			
Yes	55	57	36
No	28	29	43
Undecided	17	14	21

Democrats

Yes	60	67	45
No	18	19	31
Undecided	22	14	24

After the war, should the United States and Great Britain make a permanent military alliance, that is, agree to come to each other's defense immediately if the other is attacked at any future time?

Yes	61%
No	25
Undecided	14

RUSSIAN ALLIANCE:

By section:

New England & Middle Atlantic	39%	38%	23%
East Central	37	39	24
West Central	37	42	21
South	47	22	31
Far West	40	39	21

TERRITORIAL GAINS

Which of these four statements comes closest to what you think the United States should do about new land and possessions in the world after the war?

- The United States should give up all the land outside of the United States that is difficult to defend.
- The United States should be satisfied with the amount of land in the world she had before she entered the war.
- The United States should try to get new military bases, but nothing else.
- The United States should try to get as much new land in the world as she can. (Sept. '43—NORC)

	1942		1943	
	Feb.	July	Jan.	June
Give up land difficult to defend	10%	8%	8%	9%
Be satisfied with pre-war land	42	36	43	37
Get new military bases only	34	44	39	44
Get as much land as possible	14	12	10	10
No opinion	8	8	5	4

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Would you like to see the United States join a league of nations after this war is over? (Oct. 14, '43—OPOR)

Yes	62%
No	17
No opinion	21

Which of these seems better to you—for us to win the war first and then think about the peace, or to start thinking now about the kind of peace we want after the war? (Aug. 12, '43—OPOR)

Win first	38%
Start now	59
No opinion	3

If a union of nations is formed after the war, do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea for the United States to join it? (Nov. 14, '43—NORC)

	Sept. '42	Today
Good idea	68%	81%
Qualified answer	3	—

Bad idea	15	11
Undecided	14	8

As you know, Congress has the power to make laws about problems that may come up between states. Do you think a union of nations should have power to make laws about problems that may come up between countries in the union? (Nov. 14, '43—NORC)

Yes	76%
No	13
Undecided	11

Asked of those who answered "Yes" to above question:

Do you think a union of nations would need to have some kind of a military police force to make all countries obey these laws? (Nov. 14, '43—NORC)

Yes	68%
No	6
Undecided	2

	Percentages Answering "Yes" on:		
	Union of Nations	Law-Making Powers	Police Force
1940 Roosevelt voters	85%	80%	72%
1940 Willkie voters	82	81	72
1940 Non-voters	75	70	61
College	92	86	76
High school	83	77	68
Grade school or less	69	69	61

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Asked of all people who could pass an information test on the international police force; that is, name at least one argument for or against it:

Taking into account the arguments for, and those against, how do you yourself stand—are you for or against an international police force? (Sept. 26, '43—AIFO)

For	75%
Against	17
Undecided	8

Now I am going to ask you some questions about an international police force after the war. By an international police force we mean an army, navy and air force made up of men from different countries. This police force would be directed by a group of men representing these different countries. Do you think all countries fighting Germany and Japan should set up an international police force after the war to try to keep peace throughout the world? (Sept. 16, '43—OPOR)

Yes	77%
No	15
No opinion	8

Those answering "Yes" to above were asked a, b, c, and d.

a. There has been a lot of discussion about how the international police force should work. Which ONE of these plans do you like best?

Plan A.

The international police force should police only the Axis countries to see that they do not build up strong armies or attack neighboring countries. 9%

Plan B.

The international police force should police the Axis countries and should also keep the small countries all over the world from going to war with each other. 10

Plan C.

The international police force should see to it that no country prepares to make war on other nations. It should police the Axis countries and the small countries, but it should also have the power to stop big countries like the United States, Russia and Great Britain from going to war. 76
No opinion 5

b. Do you think all the countries now fighting Germany and Japan should have soldiers in the international police force, or do you think some of these countries should not?

All countries	86%
Some countries should not	9
No opinion	5

c. However large the United States Army will be after the war, do you think that the international police force should be larger, smaller, or about the same size?

Larger	26%
Smaller	28
About same size	30
No opinion	16

d. Do you think it should be larger, smaller, or about the same size as the Russian Army will be after the war?

Larger	32%
Smaller	19
About same size	26
No opinion	23

Some people say that a strong international police force would be a threat to this country, because it might try to make us do things we don't want to do. Do you agree or disagree? (Sept. 16, '43—OPOR)

Agree	26%
Disagree	61
No opinion	13

Should the countries fighting the Axis set up an international police force after the war is over to try to keep peace throughout the world? (Oct. 14, '43—OPOR)

Yes	79%
No	11
No opinion	10

After Germany and Japan have been beaten and disarmed, do you think that all the nations should agree to disarm gradually, so that after about twenty-five years no nation would have a big army or navy, or do you think it would be better for the United States to have a big army and navy all the time for our protection? (Sept. 16, '43—OPOR)

All nations disarm	26%
U.S. have large force	68
No opinion	6

Asked of those who said "U.S. have large force":

If a strong international police force were set up to keep the peace, would you still be in favor of having a large American army and navy all the time for our protection?

Yes	83%
No	14
No opinion	3

Force when he reaches military age? (Oct. 14, '43—OPOR)

Yes	65%
No	27
No opinion	8

After this war is over, do you think every young man should be required to serve one year in the Army or Navy? (Nov. 17, '43—AIPO)

MILITARY SERVICE

After the war is over, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to spend one year in the Army, Navy, or Air

	1939 Total	Today Total	Men	Women
Approve training	37%	63%	67%	60%
Disapprove	58	29	28	30
Undecided	5	8	5	10

CONDITIONS OF PEACE

If the German army overthrew Hitler and then offered to stop the war and discuss peace terms with the Allies, would you favor or oppose accepting the offer of the German Army? (Aug. 12, '43—OPOR)

Favor	21%
Oppose	69
Don't know	10

Suppose the German Army gets rid of Hitler, gives up all the countries Germany has conquered and offers to make peace. If that happens, should we make peace, or should we continue the war until the German Army is completely defeated? (Nov. 1, '43—AIPO)

	Total	Men	Women
Make peace if German Army gives up conquered lands	24%	19%	30%
Continue fighting until German Army is crushed	70	76	64
Undecided	6	5	6

If Hitler offered peace now to all countries on the basis of not going any farther, but of leaving matters as they are now, would you favor or oppose such a peace? (Sept. 4, '43—AIPO)

	Favor	Oppose	Undecided
December 1941	10%	86%	4%
February 1942	8	87	5
February 1943	4	92	4
Today	8	89	3

If the German military leaders removed Hitler from office and offered peace to all countries on the basis of not going farther, but of leaving matters as they are now, would you favor or oppose such a peace? (Sept. 4, '43—AIPO)

	Favor	Oppose	Undecided
July 1942	13%	81%	6%
Today	10	84	6

APPROVAL OF PEACE TREATIES

Which of these would you favor as the best way to have peace treaties approved after the war—(1) Approval only by the President, (2) Approval by the President and a majority of the whole Congress, or, (3) Approval by the President and two-thirds of the Senate? (Oct. 13, '43—AIPO)

Approval only by President	7%
Approval by President and a majority of both Houses of Congress	54
Approval by President and two-thirds of the Senate	25
No opinion	14

2. IN CANADA

If Hitler offered to make peace now, disarm completely, and give up all occupied territory providing we allow the Nazi party to govern Germany, would you approve or disapprove of making such a peace? (Sept. 11, '43—CIPQ)		
Approve	9%	
Disapprove	87	
Undecided	4	

It has been suggested that a British Empire Council be formed; with a representative from each of the Dominions to decide affairs of the Commonwealth. Would you like to see such a Council formed, or should we continue as at present? (Nov. 6, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>For Council</i>	<i>Against Council</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Total	54%	26%	20%
Quebec	41	32	27
Ontario	54	29	17
National, ex-Quebec	57	25	18

After the war, would you approve or disapprove if Canada, along with the United Nations, were to give food supplies free to the people of Germany and Japan, until they got on their feet, even if this means that rationing will have to be continued in Canada? (Oct. 30, '43—CIPQ)

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Total	33%	59%	8%

By locality:

Farm	26	67	7
Under 10,000 population	29	64	7
10,000-100,000	33	59	8
Over 100,000	43	50	7

By income:

Upper income	43	49	8
Middle income	35	57	8
Lower income	29	64	7

3. IN AUSTRALIA

After the war do you favor or oppose a permanent military alliance between the British Empire and America? (Oct. 25, '43—APOF)

Favor	82%
Oppose	7
Undecided	11

Those in favor were also asked:

Should it be a permanent right, or a lease for, say, 25 years?

Favor U.S. using bases		
On lease	47%	
Permanent	23	
Undecided on terms	7	
Oppose U.S. using our bases		77%
Undecided on questions		15
		8

Would you favor or oppose letting the United States Air Force and Navy use bases in Australia after the war? (June '43—APOF)

After the war, would you alter the White Australia policy to admit a limited number of colored people, such as Chinese and Indians? (April, '43—APOP)

	<i>Favor limited colored immigration</i>	<i>Oppose any alteration of policy</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Total	40%	51%	9%
<i>By occupation:</i>			
Owners, managers, & professional	50	43	7
Farm owners	39	49	12
White collar	38	54	8
Skilled & semi-skilled workers	39	56	5
Unskilled	30	62	8
Farm workers	23	69	8

If a nation-wide free medical service is established after the war, who should organize and control the scheme—the doctors or the Government? (July '43—APOP)

	<i>Government</i>	<i>Doctors</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Total	57%	30%	13%
Better-off people	51	36	13
Well-to-do people	45	40	15
Men	62	27	12
Women	51	33	16

Should compulsory military training for young men continue after the war? (July '43—APOP)

Continue training	79%
Stop training	14
Undecided	7

Asked of those who favored peacetime universal training:

Which would you prefer—a year's continuous training at about 18—or say three years' spare-time training, with short annual camps?

Against each person who thought continuous training was "more effective" there were two who favored spare-time training over an extended period.

4. IN SWEDEN

Should Sweden give persons holding power in belligerent or occupied countries asylum if they seek refuge, or should such persons not be admitted to the country? (Sept. 25, '43—SIPO)

Would admit anyone	5%
Would admit some	61
Would admit none	17
Undecided	17

The 66% who said they would admit anyone or some was asked to vote on a specific list of leaders.

	<i>Admit</i>	<i>Refuse</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Hitler and Mussolini	7%	59%	—
Quisling (Norway)	7	57	2%
Laval	10	42	14
Stalin	15	39	12
Mannerheim and Ryti	32	17	17
Roosevelt and Churchill	43	9	14

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